Grant v Torstar Corp

Grant v Torstar Corp
Supreme Court of Canada
Hearing: April 23, 2009 Judgment: December 22, 2009
Full case name	Peter Grant v. Torstar Corporation
Citations	2009 SCC 61
Prior history	APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Rosenberg, Feldman and Simmons JJ.A.), Grant v. Torstar Corporation, 2008 ONCA 796, 92 O.R. (3d) 561, 301 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 243 O.A.C. 120, 61 C.C.L.T. (3d) 195, 71 C.P.R. (4th) 352, [2008] O.J. No. 4783 (QL), 2008 CarswellOnt 7155, setting aside a decision of Rivard J. and a jury award and ordering a new trial.
Ruling	Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed
Court Membership
Reasons given
Majority	McLachlin, joined by Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell.
Concur/dissent	Abella.

Grant v Torstar Corp, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, 2009 SCC 61, is a 2009 Supreme Court of Canada decision on the defences to the tort of defamation. The Supreme Court ruled that the law of defamation should give way to the rights of a party to speak on matters of public interest, provided the party exercises a certain level of responsibility in verifying the potentially defamatory facts. This decision recognizes a defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

Background

The Toronto Star newspaper published a story concerning the proposed development of a golf course on land owned by Peter Grant, the plaintiff. The stories contained comments from local residents that were critical of Grant, alleging that he was using his political influence to gain permission to build the golf course. In particular, one resident claimed that the decision to allow the golf course was a "done deal". The newspaper contacted Grant for comment, but he declined to comment. The Toronto Star published the article, and Grant sued the newspaper's parent company Torstar Corporation for defamation.

The courts below

Trial court

The Court did not allow the defence of responsible journalism to go to the jury. As a result, the jury was left to determine whether the Star engaged in 'fair comment'. The instructions to the jury, however, stated that the defendants would be guilty if the comment would not be held by a 'fair minded' person, or alternatively, would be guilty if the defendants held an honest belief in the defamatory statements. The jury found the defendants guilty of libel, and awarded general, aggravated, and punitive damages in the amount of $1.475 million.

Ontario Court of Appeal

Torstar appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. On the issue of responsible journalism, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in not allowing the jury to consider the defence, and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court also found that the idea of a 'fair minded' person would need to believe in a comment was previously rejected by the court, thus the trial court did not properly instruct the jury on this issue. Finally, the Court found that the defamatory comments in the article were attributed to a resident, and unless the defendants had adopted them as their own, the defendants' 'honest belief' in them was irrelevant.

Supreme Court ruling

Grant appealed to the Supreme Court. The court dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal, with only Justice Abella dissenting in part from the decision.

The Court first recognized that the tort of defamation places limits on Freedom of Expression guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but that limit should not go as far as to place a 'chill' on expression.

It then determined that four issues needed to be resolved:

Should the common law provide a defence based on responsible communication in the public interest?
If so, what are the elements of the new defence?
If so, what procedures should apply? In particular, what are the respective roles of the judge and jury?
Application to the case at bar
1. Fair comment
2. Responsible communication

Responsible communication defence

Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice McLachlin found that the defence should exist so as to not restrict speech. She found that the defence helped to strike the proper balance between rights of free expression, as protected in the Charter, and the rights of privacy and protection of reputation. She also found justification in the ruling supported by the emerging recognition given to the defence in other common law states.

Elements of the defence

First, McLachlin stated that the defence of responsible communication was a new defence, and not a modification of qualified privilege. She then ruled that defence should be known as 'responsible communication', as it is not only journalists who should benefit from the defence, but bloggers and other people who disseminate information regardless of their status in established media.

McLachlin found that two conditions must be met for the defence of responsible communication to apply:

The matter must be one of public interest.
The defendant must show that he acted responsibly, in that he showed diligence in attempting to verify the allegedly defamatory comments, having regard to the totality of the circumstances.

In determining whether the defendant acted responsibly, she found a court should consider:

The seriousness of the allegation
The public importance of the matter
The urgency of the matter
The status and reliability of the source
Whether the plaintiff's side of the story was sought and accurately reported
Whether inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable
Whether the defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth (“Reportage”)

She noted that this list was not exhaustive, but served merely as a guideline. A court is free to consider other factors as well. As well, the factors should not all be given equal weight.

Roles of judge and jury

McLachlin ruled that the judge is to determine whether the matter is one of public interest. Recognizing that this may involve factual determination, she nonetheless ruled that the judge was serving as a sort of 'gatekeeper' in determining whether the defence should be allowed.

The jury was left the role to determine whether a particular defamatory statement was needed to determine whether a defendant acted responsibly when he published it.

Application

McLachlin ruled that the three defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication should have been left to a jury. As a result, she remanded the case for a new trial.

Dissent

Justice Abella concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed with the majority ruling that a defence of 'responsible communication' should be available in Canadian defamation law. She dissented, however, as to the division of roles between the judge and the jury. In her opinion, the inquiry as to the availability of the defence was for the judge alone.