Natural gas in the Gaza Strip

Significant reserves of natural gas were found offshore from the Gaza Strip.

History

In 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak set aside exploration of Gaza's offshore resources for a future Palestinian state, with no prior consultation with Israel stipulated.[1] The natural gas reserve was calculated to have 35 BCM, larger than Israel's own recently discovered Yam Tethys maritime gas field.[2] The Palestinians signed a memorandum of intent on November 8, 1999 with British Gas and a company linked to the Palestinian Authority, the Consolidated Contractors Company, giving them rights to explore the area.[1][2] According to Michael Schwartz, Barak deployed the Israeli navy in Gaza's coastal waters to impede the implementation of the terms of the modest contract between the Palestinian Authority and British Gas (BG) to develop Gaza's Mediterranean gas resources.[3] Israel demanded that the Gaza gas be piped to facilities on its territory, and at a price below the prevailing market level[4] and that Israel also control all the (relatively modest) revenues destined for the Palestinians—to prevent the money from being used to "fund terror." In Schwartz's view, with this Israeli action the Oslo Accords were officially doomed, because by declaring Palestinian control over gas revenues unacceptable, the Israeli government committed itself to not accepting even the most limited kind of Palestinian budgetary autonomy, let alone full sovereignty. In Schwartz's view, since no Palestinian government or organization would agree to this, a future filled with armed conflict was assured.[3]

The Israeli veto led to the intervention of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who sought to broker an agreement that would satisfy both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. The result was a 2007 proposal that would have delivered the gas to Israel, not Egypt, at below-market prices, with the same 10% cut of the revenues eventually reaching the PA. However, those funds were first to be delivered to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York for future distribution, to guarantee that they would not be used for attacks on Israel.[3]

The Israelis pointed to the recent victory of the militant Hamas party in Gaza elections as a deal-breaker. Though Hamas had agreed to let the Federal Reserve supervise all spending, the Israeli government, now led by Ehud Olmert, insisted that no "royalties be paid to the Palestinians." Instead, the Israelis would deliver the equivalent of those funds "in goods and services."[3]

The Palestinian government refused the offer, and soon after, Olmert imposed a blockade on Gaza, which Israel's defense minister termed a form of "'economic warfare' that would generate a political crisis, leading to a popular uprising against Hamas." With Egyptian cooperation, Israel then seized control of commerce in and out of Gaza, limiting even food imports and eliminating its fishing industry. Olmert advisor Dov Weisglass summed up this policy by saying the Israeli government was putting the Palestinians "on a diet." According to the Red Cross, this blockade produced "chronic malnutrition," especially among Gazan children.[3]

The Palestinians still refused to accept Israel's terms, and the Olmert government decided to unilaterally extract the gas, something that, they believed, could only occur once Hamas had been displaced or disarmed. As Moshe Ya'alon explained, "Hamas... has confirmed its capability to bomb Israel's strategic gas and electricity installations... It is clear that, without an overall military operation to uproot Hamas control of Gaza, no drilling work can take place without the consent of the radical Islamic movement."[3] Operation Cast Lead, launched in the winter of 2008, did not achieve the goal of "transferring the sovereignty of the gas fields to Israel."[3]

In 2010-11, the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faced an energy crisis when the Arab Spring in Egypt interrupted and then stopped 40% of Israel's gas supplies. Rising energy prices contributed to some of the largest protests involving Jewish Israelis in decades.[3] Israel's Resource Minister asserted that "[t]hese areas are within the economic waters of Israel... We will not hesitate to use our force and strength to protect not only the rule of law but the international maritime law."[3]

The Iron Dome system, developed in part to stop Hezbollah rockets aimed at Israel's northern gas fields, was put in place near the border with Gaza and was tested during Operation Returning Echo, the fourth Israeli military attempt to weaken Hamas and eliminate any Palestinian "capability to bomb Israel's strategic gas and electricity installations."[3]

The next round of negotiations stalled over the Palestinian rejection of Israel's demand to control all fuel and revenues destined for Gaza and the West Bank. The new Palestinian Unity government then followed the lead of the Lebanese, Syrians, and Turkish Cypriots, and in late 2013 signed an "exploration concession" with Gazprom, the large Russian natural gas company. As with Lebanon and Syria, the Russian Navy was a potential deterrent to Israeli "interference."[3]

With Gazprom's move to develop the Palestinian-claimed gas deposits on the horizon, the Israelis launched their fifth military effort "to force Palestinian acquiescence," Operation Protective Edge. The operation "had two major hydrocarbon-related goals: to deter Palestinian-Russian plans and to finally eliminate the Gazan rocket systems." The first goal was apparently met when Gazprom postponed its development deal. However, "the two-pronged land and air attack -- despite unprecedented devastation in Gaza -- failed to destroy Hamas's rocket stockpiles or its tunnel-based assembly system; nor did the Iron Dome achieve the sort of near-perfect interception rate needed to protect proposed energy installations."[3]

As of early 2015, Gaza's natural gas is still underwater and the same for almost all of the Levantine gas.[3]

References

  1. 1 2 'Focus on Palestine: offshore gas projects in the East Mediterranean Sea,' Offshore technology.com, 4 October 2012
  2. 1 2 Steven W. Popper, Claude Berrebi, James Griffin, Thomas Light, Endy Y. Min, Natural Gas and Israel's Energy Future: Near-Term Decisions from a Strategic Perspective, Rand Corporation, 2009 p.11.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Schwartz, Michael (February 2015). The Great Game in the Holy Land - How Gazan Natural Gas Became the Epicenter of An International Power Struggle. TomDispatch
  4. ↑ Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, 'Israel’s War for Gaza’s Gas,' Le Monde diplomatique, November 2012.
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