Nuclear weapons and Ukraine

Prior to 1991, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and had Soviet nuclear weapons in its territory.

On December 1, 1991, Ukraine, the second most powerful republic in the Soviet Union (USSR), voted overwhelmingly for independence, which ended any realistic chance of the Soviet Union staying together even on a limited scale.[1] More than 90% of the electorate expressed their support for Ukraine's declaration of independence, and they elected the chairman of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk as the first president of the country. At the meetings in Brest, Belarus on December 8, and in Alma Ata on December 21, the leaders of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine formally dissolved the Soviet Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine held about one third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world at the time, as well as significant means of its design and production.[2] 130 UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totaling approximately 1,700 warheads remained on Ukrainian territory.[3] While Ukraine had physical control of the weapons, it did not have operational control, as they were dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system. In 1994 Ukraine agreed to destroy the weapons, and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[4][5]

Former military units

As a republic in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the base for the following nuclear forces:

Denuclearization

International relations theorist John Mearsheimer predicted a Ukraine without any nuclear deterrent was likely to be subjected to aggression by Russia, but this was very much a minority view at the time.[7]

A 2016 study argues that the denuclearization of Ukraine was not a "stupid mistake" and that it is unclear that Ukraine would be better off as a nuclear state.[8] The study argues that the push for Ukrainian independence was with a view to make it a nonnuclear state.[8] The United States would also not have made Ukraine an exception when it came to the denuclearization of other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan.[8] The deterrent value of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was also questionable, as Ukraine would have had to spend 12 to 18 months to establish full operational control over the nuclear arsenal left by the Russians.[8] The ICBMs also had a range of 5.000-10.000 km (initially targeting the United States), which meant that they could only have been re-targeted to hit Russia's far east.[8] The air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) left by the Russians had been disabled by the Russians during the collapse of the Soviet Union, but even if they had been reconfigured and made to work by the Ukrainians, it is unlikely that they would have had a deterrent effect.[8] Had Ukraine decided to establish full operational control of the nuclear weapons, it would have faced sanctions by the West and perhaps even a withdrawal of diplomatic recognition by the United States and other NATO allies.[8] Ukraine would also likely have faced retaliatory action by Russia.[8] Ukraine would also have struggled with replacing the nuclear weapons once their service life expired, as Ukraine did not have a nuclear weapons program.[8] In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum.[8]

Budapest Memorandum

On December 5, 1994 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Britain and the United States signed a memorandum to provide Ukraine with security assurances in connection with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The four parties signed the memorandum, containing a preamble and six paragraphs. The memorandum reads as follows:[9]

The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapon State,

Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,

Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.

Confirm the following:

1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.

2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

5. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments.

— Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[9]

France and China's commitments

France and China also provided Ukraine with assurances similar to the Budapest Memorandum, but with some significant differences. For instance, France's pledge does not contain the promises laid out in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, to refer any aggression to the UN Security Council, nor to consult in the event of a question regarding the commitments.[10]

China's pledge takes a different form entirely, dating from 4 December, and reading as follows:[11]

Thus, China's pledge, similar to France's, does not pledge to involve UN or consultative mechanisms in case of crisis. However, it does pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

2014 Crimean crisis

Despite Russia's claimed annexation of Crimea, the Government of Ukraine in 2014 reaffirmed its 1994 decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.[12]

After the Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove President Viktor Yanukovych from office, a power vacuum formed, and Russia annexed Crimea.[13] The Russian pretext used nationalist and cultural rhetoric, stating that the Russian military was protecting ethnic Russians from attack in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Russia's military actions violated the Budapest Memorandum.[14]

Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament (Udar Party headed by Vitali Klitschko) told USA Today that Ukraine may have to arm themselves with their own nuclear weapons if the USA and other world leaders do not hold up their end of the agreement. He said "We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement. Now, there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake."[13] He also said that, "In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons, people don't invade you."[15]

On 13 December 2014 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated that he did not want Ukraine to become a nuclear power again.[16]

See also

Reference list

  1. ↑ Nohlen, D & Stöver, P (2010) Elections in Europe: A data handbook, p1976 ISBN 9783832956097
  2. ↑ Dahlburg, Decemb. "Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal". LA Times. Retrieved April 15, 2014.
  3. ↑ Norris, Robert S. (January–February 1992). "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago". Arms Control Today. Arms Control Association. 22 (1): 24. JSTOR 23624674. (subscription required (help)).
  4. ↑ William C. Martel (1998). "Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons : nonproliferation incentives and disincentives". In Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy. Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. Psychology Press. pp. 88–104. ISBN 9780714648569. Retrieved 6 August 2014. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).
  5. ↑ Alexander A. Pikayev (Spring–Summer 1994). "Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?" (PDF). The Nonproliferation Review. 1 (3). doi:10.1080/10736709408436550. Retrieved 6 August 2014.
  6. ↑ Michael Holm, 46th Missile Division
  7. ↑ Global Security Newswire March 3, 2014 Should Ukraine Have Gotten Rid of Its Cold War Nukes? retrieved 14/10/15
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Budjeryn, Mariana (2016-09-01). "Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?". World Affairs. 179 (2): 9–20. doi:10.1177/0043820016673777. ISSN 0043-8200.
  9. 1 2 "Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances". Retrieved December 12, 2014.
  10. ↑ Page K-8, Full text in French of France's Security Assurance to Ukraine
  11. ↑ Letter dated 12 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, from UN Office of Disarmament Affairs
  12. ↑ Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, March 25, 2014.
  13. 1 2 Dorell, Oren. "Ukraine May Have to Go Nuclear, Says Kiev Lawmaker". USA Today. Retrieved 15 April 2014.
  14. ↑ Kramer, Andrew. "Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 September 2014.
  15. ↑ Koren, Marina. "The Ukraine Crisis Is Unsettling Decades-Old Nuclear-Weapons Agreements". Retrieved April 15, 2014.
  16. ↑ Ukraine has no ambitions to become nuclear power again – Poroshenko, Interfax-Ukraine (13 December 2014)
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