Task Force 88 (anti-terrorist unit)

Task Force 88 is an American special operations unit, of which little is publicly known. It was formed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks with support from elements from United Kingdom Special Forces. It is described as a "hunter-killer team"[1] with its core made up of Delta Force, 75th Ranger Regiment Rangers, members of the USAF 24th Special Tactics Squadron, and Navy DEVGRU operators.[2] The unit was reported to be responsible for the cross border raid into Syria from Iraq in October 2008 that resulted in eight deaths including Abu Ghadiya,[3] along with several US operations in the Horn of Africa targeting al Qaeda.[4][5]

History as Task Force 145

Since the invasion of Iraq, the unit went through a number of changes of designation. Task Force 20 was amalgamated with Task Force 5 (formerly Task Force 11/Task Force Sword) in Afghanistan in July 2003, and became Task Force 21. It was then redesignated Task Force 121, and later as Task Force 626, Task Force 145, and Task Force 88.[6] Neville notes that he omitted the 'current' (c. 2008, time of writing) designation of the unit. However he did say that it was also known obliquely as Other Coalition Forces – Iraq (OCF-I), 'a wry reference to the CIA unit of the moniker OGA.'[7] By the time General Stanley McChrystal took command, the force was known as Task Force 714.[8]

It was a combined U.S. and British military special forces provisional grouping specifically charged with hunting down high-value al-Qaeda and Iraqi leadership including Osama bin Laden and, prior to his death on 7 June 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is believed that the Task Force played a role in the medium altitude strike mission that killed al-Zarqawi just outside Baqubah.[9] The Task Force was charged with disrupting al-Qaeda operations in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.

The action arm of the task force was made up of operators from 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group ('DEVGRU'), British Special Air Service, British Special Boat Service and soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment. Members of the CIA's elite Special Activities Division paramilitary unit were also believed to be an important part of the group.[10] Support elements include the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers), the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron, and British paratroopers from the Special Forces Support Group.

The unit was operating up until at least January 2007; it is not clear whether it is still operational with the U.S. drawdown from Iraq. In January 2007 Task Force 88 established a subsidiary task force, Task Force 17 (US Army ODA/Special Forces), in addition to an existing task force for which it supported, Task Force 16 (US/UK Tier 1 SOF). Task Force 17 was established to 'counter Iranian influence.' Task Force 17 was to be made Initially Operationally Capable as of 'NLT 15 January 2007 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) will be in place NLT 15 February 2007.'[11]

Operations

The task force is known to operate very autonomously. In their only publicly known operation they reportedly conducted several raids without requiring approval from nearby conventional command structures and only requiring it from USSOCOM. The task force was also responsible for the tracking and eventual elimination (by F-16 launched ordinance) of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Over 18 months beginning in early 2007, the task force reportedly arrested 3,500 terrorists in Baghdad and killed several hundred others. Thus, al Qaeda bomb attacks went down from an average of 150 per month (killing monthly 3,000 people) to about two.

During operations in Al-Anbar province, TF88 operatives entered the insurgent-controlled city of Haditha, several times finding Zarqawi's hideouts. Their raids found eggs still cooking, just missing the terrorist leader. Based on this current and actionable intelligence, they asked the commander of II MEF(FWD) to have to city of Haditha assaulted in order to flush Zarqawi out. The general chose the 3rd Battalion 1st Marines, experienced in heavy fighting from Operation Phantom Fury, to assault the city.

Originally, it was not clear what the reduced U.S. military role following the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement and associated drawdown to purely advisory operations has had on the task force's operations. Currently, other temporarily formed Task Forces are compiled primarily of US and UK Special Operations units (and depending on the operational needs, usually involving other Coalition members' SOF units such as Australian SASR, Canadian CSOR/JTF2, etc.) and mostly, are put together for specific taskings, such as hunting ISIL leadership (such as unconfirmed reports of a reformation of "TF Black") or the hunt of Somalian Al-Shabaab alongside CJSOTF-Africa. There are numerous small Task Forces dedicated to counterterrorism tasks across the globe, but with the current cutbacks by the Dept of Defense and the Administration, the most needed Task Forces are stretched more thin than even before in the Global War on Terror.

Organization

(see Iraq War order of battle)

Organization as of October 2006

TF 145, or TF 88 as it may now be known, was commanded by a colonel (the commanding officer of the Army's Delta Force)[17] and is based at five locations across Iraq. Its task organization drew on every unit of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as well as on the CIA's Special Activities Division and British special operations forces.

The headquarters element, which included the majority of the task force's many aviation and intelligence assets, was based at Balad Air Base between Samarra and Baghdad; the four elements that it controlled, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel or equivalent, were spread across the country.

Task Force Center is probably co-located with TF 145's headquarters element at Balad, but it could also be based at Camp Liberty, since it is responsible for the Baghdad region. TF Center is based around a direct-action squadron; the three Delta Force squadrons and SEAL Team 6 appear to rotate through this position. It is also supported by a rotating company-sized element of the 75th Ranger Regiment and elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. TF Center has taken casualties in the Yusufiya area, where one of its helicopters was shot down in spring 2006.

Task Force West is structured similarly to TF Center in that it has a company-sized force protection element from the 75th Rangers and is based around a battalion-sized direct action unit that can at any given time be a Delta Force squadron or Naval Special Warfare Development Group (known also as SEAL Team 6). It seems that these units rotate every three to four months. TF West is responsible for operations in Anbar, where it is known to have been active at various times in Fallujah, Qaim, Husayba, and Ramadi; Delta Force lost nine operators during combat in Husaybah, Qaim and Ramadi. It is likely that TF West is based either at Camp Asad or Camp Taqaddum.

Task Force North is organized differently: it is based around a full battalion of the 75th Rangers (the position rotates among the three battalions), with a company-sized element from Delta Force acting in support. TF North was based at FOB Marez in Mosul.

Task Force Black/Knight

Based in the Baghdad area at MSS Fernandez,[18] TF Black (which was supported by Parachute Regiment members of the Special Forces Support Group)[19] is based around a squadron of the British army's 22 Special Air Service Regiment, with integrated units from the Special Boat Service, Special Reconnaissance Regiment, 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment and Delta Force. In the early months of 2004, the SAS used their capabilities in reconnaissance and surveillance to watch suspects and develop/gather intelligence for the coalition intelligence services. The SAS operational process in Baghdad was known as find-fix-finish, working backwards with the 'finish' part being a raid to take down a suspect, 'fix' involved pinpointing a time and place which a target can be taken and 'find' would be finding the insurgent/terrorist. In this period they almost captured/killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when they assaulted a house in Baghdad; after forcing entry they withdrew when they discovered a booby trap, they still managed to overwhelm the occupants of the building and captured intelligence revealed Zarqawi had left a short time before.[20] Due to mistreatment of detainees and the conditions at Camp Nama and JSOC's TSF (Temporary Screening Facility) at Balad and the deportation of detainees to Bagram Airbase, US-UK relations were strained when they refused to turn over detainee's to US custody, McChrystal kept Task Force Black out of JSOC, but this would change in 2006, in the man time Task Force Black targets were former Ba'athist party regime elements.[21] On 11 April 2005, Task Force Blacks G squadron, SAS captured Fadhil Ibrahim al-Mashhadani, one of Saddam Hussein's former apparatchik after assaulting his house. At about the same time, in an attempt to find the kidnappers of a foreigner, the SAS also captured a former senior Ba'athist party official and another man, they didn't find the hostage but the men were definitely connected to the kidnappers; however they were later when US intelligence revealed that they were CIA assets. [22] In Spring 2005, the Director of Special Forces rebalanced British special forces deployments so that Afghanistan would be the responsibility of the SBS and Iraq would be the 22nd SAS Regiment's. [23] Following the Basra prison incident in September 2005, in which the name of the unit 'Task force Black' was leaked to the press; the unit was renamed 'Task force Knight'[24]

After a change of DSF and improvement of the JSOCs TSF in late 2005 Task Force Black began to integrate more closely with JSOC. In mid-January 2006, the British SAS began Operation Traction: which was its secret upgrade/integration into JSOC, they deployed TGHG (Task Group Headquarters Group): this included senior officers and other senior members of 22 SAS - to JSOCs base at Balad. This upgrade now meant that the SAS were "joined at the hip" with JSOC and it gave the SAS a pivotal role against Sunni militant groups, particularly AQI [25] In early 2006, Task Force Black was involved in the release of three hostages working for Christian Peacemaker Teams as part of Operation Lightwater. With the aim of finding the hostages, the operation involved raiding houses and arresting suspects almost every day and night until sufficient intelligence was gathered on the whereabouts of the hostages. The total number of building raids amounted to 50, 44 of them being by British special forces including a total detained 47 people.[26] In April 2006, B squadron SAS launched Operation Larchwood 4 the results of the gave the coalition intelligence on Zarqawi which led to his death.[27]

According to journalist Sean Rayment for the Telegraph, TF Black removed or killed 3,500 terrorists in Baghdad prior to 2008.[28] Rayment wrote that these killings "reduced bombings in Baghdad from about 150 a month to just two."[28] In October 2004, all SAS personnel in Iraq including Task Force Black were banned from handing over suspects to the US forces if the suspects were going to be taken to a US interrogation center, because of the bad reputation of the centers.[29] Another setback for the task force was during the Second Battle of Fallujah when the SAS was banned from going into the city alongside its American counterpart because of the pressure that the government was feeling from the unpopularity of the war. In 2007, when JSOC began conducting CII (Counter Iranian Influence) missions, the UK government ordered that Iranian nationals should not be taken by Task Force Knight and they excluded them from certain intelligence gathering missions measures being taken to prepare for possible strikes against Iran.[30] Following an SAS takedown operation of Qais Khazali - a senior Shia militant and Iranian proxy in Basra and his brother: Laith al-Khazali and his Ali Mussa Daqduq a Hezbollah advisor, turned out to be the Task Force most significant action of Operation Crichton. They also found critical documents: one was a report on the Karbala raid which identified Azhar al-Dulaimi as being responsible for it, he was eventually killed by US forces; the Karbala memo also indicated that Iran's Quds Force was approved the attack. there were Memos to about attacks on British forces in Basra and large financial payments based on performance against the coalition, Daqduq revealed that he had been brought into Iraq by Quds Force leadership to be a sort-of insurgent management consultant. He also revealed that the Shia Special Groups gave reports of IED attacks and indirect fire to the Iranians as well as said Iraqi's for training in Iran. The mission made a strategic impact, Task Force 17 (a unit consisting of US Army Special Forces and elite Iraqi units conducting Counter Iranian Influence missions) stepped up its raids against Iranian targets. Operators from Task Force knight responded to 2007 Iranian seizure of Royal Navy personnel, but the incident was eventually resolved.[31]

During the Spring and summer of 2007 the British SAS as part of Task Force Knight suffered several men seriously wounded as it extended its operations into Sadr City; in April, Task Force Knight focused its efforts against Arab Jabour which HUMINT intelligence revealed that it was an al-Qaeda's "bastion". Following the disbandment of Task Force Spartan in southern Iraq following the British withdrawal, Task Force Knight focused its efforts on AQI's VIBED, mainly in Doura, Salman Pak and Arab Jabour, killing dozens in the summer months of 2007. By March 2008, the Sunni insurgency was waning rapidly, the need for aggressive special operations raids became few, B squadron SAS extended its operations into Tikrit and Anbar province, going after low-level targets that the Iraqi military could deal with .[32] UKSF left Iraq in May 2009.[33] the Task Force Black/Knight provided the United Kingdom with one clear success of the nations controversial involvement in the Iraq War, in an interview with The Times newspaper in August 2008, General David Petraeus said the SAS "have helped immensely in the Baghdad area, in particular to take down the al-Qaeda car bomb networks and other al-Qaeda operations in Iraq's capital city". Lieutenant-General Rob Fry described the role of British special forces in defeating al-Qaeda as being of "an absolutely historic scale".[34] The SAS's campaign against the Shia Special Groups was successful however Iraq's population is made up of a Shia majority, whose insurgents were supported covertly by Iran and therefore the task force and JSOC could only contain the threat rather than destroy it. Many members of the Special Groups have since been released by the Iraqi government.[35]

Currently, rumors of a "reformation of a similar Task Force going by the cover name of TF Black" have emerged, although most former Special Mission Unit members and insiders believe that since the whole concept of a "Task Force is temporary, hence the term 'Task' Force...as in being tasked with a particular objective", this would be unlikely, regardless of the reports of mainstream media to the contrary. Most of the time, Task Forces such as the original TF Black, cannot technically "be reformed" to hunt ISIL when the creation of a more current and lesser known joint Task Force would make more sense to those inside the Joint Special Operations Command.[29]

References

  1. ↑ "What's Behind the US Military Raid on Syria?". Time. 27 October 2008.
  2. ↑ Naylor, Sean (2006). Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. Berkeley: Berkley Books. ISBN 0-425-19609-7.
  3. ↑ Bill RoggioOctober 27, 2008 (2008-10-27). "US strike in Syria "decapitated" al Qaeda's facilitation network". The Long War Journal. Retrieved 2012-07-23.
  4. ↑ Gordon, Michael R.; Mazzetti, Mark (23 February 2007). "U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda". The New York Times.
  5. ↑ Schmitt, Eric; Mazzetti, Mark (10 November 2008). "Secret Order Lets U.S. Raid Al Qaeda". The New York Times.
  6. ↑ Leigh Neville, 'Special Operations Forces in Iraq,' Osprey Publishing Elite 170, Osprey, 2008, ISBN 978-1-84603-357-5, 32.
  7. ↑ Neville, 2008, 32.
  8. ↑ McChrystal, My Share of the Task, ISBN 978-1-59184-475-4, pp. 90, 93, 96-7, 111.
  9. ↑ http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2006/06/victory_for_tas.html The Blotter: Brian Ross Reports, ABC News. 8 June 2006 9:12 am
  10. ↑ Sean D. Naylor, SpecOps Unit nearly nabs Zarqawi, (from www.armytimes.com, 28 April 2006)
  11. ↑ Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (2012). The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. New York: Pantheon Books. pp. 324, 727. ISBN 978-0-307-37722-7.
  12. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.15-16
  13. 1 2 3 "SAS - Task Force Black". Eliteukforces.info. Retrieved 2012-07-23.
  14. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.71
  15. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.71
  16. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.15-16
  17. 1 2 Michael Smith, Secret War of the SAS, Sunday Times, 16 September 2007.
  18. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.15-16,p.75
  19. ↑ Thomas Harding, US Calls in Paras for Baghdad Secret War, Daily Telegraph, 24 April 2006
  20. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.49,p.71
  21. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967
  22. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.75,p.76-77
  23. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.92-93
  24. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.116
  25. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.116,p.117
  26. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.122-p.123,p.128,p.130
  27. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.138-p.146
  28. 1 2 Rayment, S. (2008, 30 August). Sas kills hundreds of terrorists in 'secret war' against al-qaeda in iraq. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2652496/SAS-kill-hundreds-of-terrorists-in-secret-war-against-al-Qaeda-in-Iraq.html
  29. 1 2 Haynes, D. (2010). SAS was barred from dealing with US force. Lexisnexis. Retrieved (2010, 15 September) from http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/
  30. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.214
  31. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.224-227,p.229
  32. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.232,p.240,p.253-254,p.262-263
  33. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.270
  34. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.274
  35. ↑ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin , 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967,p.275

Further reading

External links

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