Yamataya v. Fisher

Yamataya v. Fisher

Argued February 24, 1903
Decided April 6, 1903
Full case name Kaoru Yamataya v. Thomas M. Fisher
Citations

189 U.S. 86 (more)

Prior history Board of Special Inquiry found Yamataya to be in violation of the 1891 Immigration Act and was subject to deportation.
Holding
The courts may not interfere with a pending deportation unless the administrative hearing was unfair, subjecting procedures to constitutional scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Melville Fuller
Case opinions
Majority Harlan, joined by Fuller, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day
Dissent Brewer, joined by Peckham
Laws applied
1891 Immigration Law

Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), popularly known as the Japanese Immigrant Case, is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the U.S. government’s power to exclude and deport certain classes of alien immigrants under the Immigration Act of 1891. The Supreme Court held that the courts may not interfere with a pending deportation unless the administrative hearing was unfair, subjecting deportation procedures to constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process clause.[1][2] The Japanese Immigrant Case is also the first time the Supreme Court allowed judicial review of a procedural due process claim.[3]

Background

The passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 not only restricted Chinese immigration to the United States, but also provided for the deportation of Chinese immigrants who entered the United States in violation of the exclusion laws.[4] In 1892 Congress passed the Geary Act which significantly expanded deportation under Chinese exclusion by introducing a system of residence certificates for all laborers of Chinese descent.[5] If the laborer did not have a certificate present at a deportation hearing then they would be deported. The Immigration Act of 1882 allowed for the exclusion and deportation of immigrants in the categories of immoral, criminal, mental defectives, and those unable to support themselves.[6] In 1891 Congress extended the federal government’s power to deport immigrants by adding categories of excludable and deportable immigrants including: idiots, the insane, paupers, and polygamists; persons “likely to become a public charge”; people convicted of felonies, other crimes or a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; and those suffering from contagious diseases.[7] Later in 1903 Congress passed another general immigration act which added anarchists and political radicals to the list of both excludable and deportable immigrants. General immigration deportations were heard before a Board of Special Inquiry staffed by three immigration officers while appeals went to a Board of Special Inquiry, then to the Secretary of the department that controlled the Bureau of Immigration.[8]

Case

Kaoru Yamataya was a sixteen-year-old girl from Japan when she landed in Seattle on July 11, 1901.[9] Four days after her arrival immigration authorities arrested and detained Yamataya on the grounds that she had entered the country illegally and was likely to become a public charge.[9] This was a violation of the 1891 Immigration Act which excluded any immigrant deemed likely to become a public charge. On July 26, 1901, a Board of Special Inquiry consisting of three immigration officials convened to hear her case and found Yamataya deportable.[9] Yamatya appealed her deportation through the court and eventually her case was heard in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Argument

Yamataya’s appeal, argued by Harold Preston, utilized three key arguments. First, since the Immigration Act of 1891 “did not explicitly provide for due process” the act was unconstitutional.[9] The second argument challenged the legitimacy of the appeals process for deportations under general immigration law which went to the Secretary of Labor whose decision was final and not reviewable in court.[9] Finally, Preston argued that the immigration agents denied Yamataya her Fifth Amendment due process rights as the evidence used against her was “garbled, incomplete, and in many respects misleading and untrue,” the hearing was conducted in English (a language she did not speak), and the investigation occurred without Yamataya having access to a legal counsel.[9] During the investigation, Yamataya also did not have a chance to show she was not likely to become a public charge and these aspects of her hearing and investigation violated federal due process standards.[9]

Opinion of the Court

Justice Harlan gave the opinion of the court and dismissed Yamataya’s appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the general Immigration Law of 1891 even though it had no explicit provisions for due process. The Court did not discuss whether the exclusion and deportation of a certain class of immigrants violated any constitutional rights. Justice Harlan wrote that an act of Congress “must be taken to be constitutional unless the contrary plainly and palpably appears”.[10]

The Supreme Court also held that the appeals process under the general immigration law was constitutional. While the appeals process was not reviewable by the courts, the Court found that the immigration law still provided sufficient trial and appellate tribunals and agreed with the government’s assertion of administrative competency, holding that the investigations and actions of the executive offices in the deportation process were not “subject to judicial review”.[11]

Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld Yamataya's deportation and ruled that the deportation hearings met Fifth Amendment due process rights as they found the executive hearing in front of immigration agents to meet the standard of due process.[11] The Court also held that even a hearing that an immigrant cannot understand was not a violation of their Fifth Amendment due process rights. For Yamataya, even though her hearing was conducted in English and she could not understand the proceedings against her, Harlan writes that “this was her misfortune, and constitutes no reason… for the intervention of the courts by habeas corpus.”[12] However, within their decision the Supreme Court argues that if a person was deported without a hearing then their Fifth Amendment due process rights would have been violated, providing some appeals the ability to go through the courts.

Significance

While Yamataya was ordered to be deported back to Japan, the Japanese Immigrant Case significantly altered the appeals process for deportations in the United States. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Yamataya v. Fisher effectively created an appeals process in deportations under general immigration law. While immigrants could not challenge the outcome of deportation hearings in the courts and judicial system, they could challenge the legitimacy of the procedures.[13] If their procedural due process rights had been violated, immigrants were able to appeal their deportations in the courts. This was a significant shift in deportation appeals process as individuals had an opportunity to appeal their deportation through the courts which was unavailable before the Japanese Immigrant Case. For fifty years after Yamataya, the Supreme Court decisions continued to use a procedural due process requirement while refusing to apply it to overturn government decisions in both exclusion and deportation contexts.[14] During the same period the courts remained reluctant to hear any substantive constitutional challenges to both the admission and deportation categories established by Congress.[15]

See also

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References

  1. ↑ Howard L. Bens, “The Deportation of Aliens,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 68, no. 2 (1920), 111.
  2. ↑ Alexander Aleinikoff, “Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution,” The American Journal of International Law 83, no. 4, 864.
  3. ↑ Hiroshi Motomura, ‘The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights,” Columbia Law Review 92, no. 7 (1992), 1637.
  4. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 12.1
  5. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 12.
  6. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 13.
  7. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 14.
  8. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 15.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 23.
  10. ↑ 189 U.S. 86.
  11. 1 2 Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 24.
  12. ↑ 189 US 86.
  13. ↑ Torrie Hester, “Protection, Not Punishment: Legislative and Judicial formation of U.S. Deportation Policy, 1882-19044” Journal of American Ethnic History 30, no. 1 (2010), 25.
  14. ↑ Hiroshi Motomura, ‘The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights,” Columbia Law Review 92, no. 7 (1992), 1638.
  15. ↑ Hiroshi Motomura, ‘The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights,” Columbia Law Review 92, no. 7 (1992), 1639.

External links

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