National Resistance Movement

Not to be confused with National Resistance Movement of Iran.
National Resistance Movement
Leader Yoweri Museveni
Founded 1986
Preceded by Uganda Patriotic Movement
Ideology Ugandan nationalism
Economic liberalism
Social conservatism
Political position Right-wing
Parliament of Uganda
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This article is part of a series on the
politics and government of
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The National Resistance Movement (NRM), commonly referred to as the Movement, is the ruling political party in Uganda.

Until a referendum in 2005, Uganda held elections on a non-party basis. The NRM dominates parliament, however, and is expected to continue to do so. The presidential elections of 12 March 2001 were won by Yoweri Museveni of the NRM with 69.3% of the popular vote. It began as the political body associated with the rebel National Resistance Army before Museveni came to power in 1986.

On 17 November 2005 Museveni was elected unopposed as NRM's presidential candidate for the 2006 elections.

In the general election of 23 February 2006, the party won 205 out of 289 elected seats. In the presidential election of the same date Museveni won 59.3% of the vote.

Museveni was involved in the war that deposed Idi Amin, ending his rule in 1979, and in the rebellion that subsequently led to the demise of the Milton Obote regime in 1985; however, parallels have been drawn between the NRM and its predecessors. For instance, the NRM-sponsored Public Order Management Bill is strikingly similar to the 1967 Public Order and Security Act, codified by the Obote regime, in that both bills "seek to gag dissenting views."[1] Museveni's statements are also reminiscent of Uganda's dictatorial past: "Whoever tries to cause problems, we finish them. Besigye [an opposition leader] tried to disorganize Kampala and we gave him a little tear gas and he calmed down. He didn't need a bullet, just a little gas."[2] Further, as he once stated that "the problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power," some have viewed his move to abolish presidential term limits as hypocritical.[3][4] In the past, The NRM has been praised for bringing relative stability and economic growth to a country that has endured decades of government mismanagement, rebel activity and civil war; however, with an unemployment rate of 62% among the youth, his economic effectiveness has seriously come into question.[5] His tenure has witnessed one of the most effective national responses to HIV/AIDS in Africa.[6]

In the mid-to-late 1990s, Museveni was lauded by the West as part of a new generation of African leaders. His presidency has been marred, however, by invading and occupying Congo during the Second Congo War (the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which has resulted in an estimated 5.4 million deaths since 1998) and other conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Recent developments, including the abolition of presidential term limits before the 2006 elections, Museveni's confirmation of the NRM-sponsored Public Order Management Bill — a bill which severely limits freedom of assembly — NRM media censorship and the persecution of democratic opposition (i.e. general intimidation of voters by security forces; arresting opposition candidates; extrajudicial killings) have attracted concern from domestic and foreign commentators. Most recently, indicators of an alleged succession to the President's son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, have increased tensions.[7][8][9][10]

Allegations regarding significant corruption have also shaped criticism of the NRM government. According to the U.S. State Department's 2012 Human Rights Report on Uganda, "The World Bank's most recent Worldwide Governance Indicators reflected corruption was a severe problem" and that "the country annually loses 768.9 billion shillings ($286 million) to corruption." [11] Understandably, Uganda was ranked 140th out of 176 nations on the Corruption Perceptions Index.[12] A specific scandal, which had significant international consequences and highlighted the presence of corruption in high-level government offices, was the embezzlement of $12.6 mil in donor funds from the Office of the Prime Minister in 2012. These funds were "earmarked as crucial support for rebuilding northern Uganda, ravaged by a 20-year war, and Karamoja, Uganda's poorest region." This scandal prompted the E.U., The U.K., Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Norway to suspend aid.[13] What may compound this problem - as it does in many developing nations (Resource Curse) - is an abundance of oil.

The Petroleum Bill - passed by Ugandan Parliament in 2012 - which was touted by the NRM as bringing transparency to the oil sector has, failed to please domestic and international political commentators and economists. For instance, Angelo Izama, a Ugandan energy analyst at the U.S.-based Open Society Foundation said the new law was tantamount to "handing over an ATM (cash) machine" to Museveni and his regime.[14] According to Global Witness, an international law NGO, Uganda now has "oil reserves that have the potential to double the government’s revenue within six to ten years, worth an estimated US$2.4bn per year."[15]

Other contentious bills have been sponsored, passed and confirmed by the NRM government during his tenure. For example, The Non Governmental Organizations (Amendment) Act, passed in 2006, has stifled the productivity of NGOs through erecting barriers to entry, activity, funding and assembly within the sector. Burdensome and corrupt registration procedures (i.e. requiring recommendations from government officials; annual re-registration), unreasonable regulation of operations (i.e. requiring government notification prior to making contact with individuals in NGO's area of interest), and the precondition that all foreign funds be passed through the Bank of Uganda, among others things, are severely limiting the output of the NGO sector. Furthermore, the sector's freedom of speech has been continually infringed upon through the use of intimidation, and the recent Public Order Management Bill (severely limiting freedom of assembly) will only add to the government's stockpile of ammunition.[16]

History

Ugandan Bush War

Main article: Ugandan Bush War

Museveni's action made him extremely popular, particularly as the Democratic Party which took up its seats in Parliament was perceived as increasingly irrelevant. The undisciplined army continued its atrocities under Obote's government and Paulo Muwanga (Vice President), Tito Okello (Commander of the Army) and David Oyite-Ojok (Army Chief of Staff) had all been rewarded by Obote. The army responded by carrying out a brutal campaign in the south particularly in the central Luwero district where Museveni's forces were established.

Museveni proved to be an astute politician, and quickly formed an alliance with Buganda resistance groups like the Uganda Freedom Fighters of Yusuf Lule and the remnants of Idi Amin's army in the Uganda National Rescue Front led by Moses Ali. The alliance emerged as the National Resistance Movement (NRM) with its military wing the National Resistance Army (NRA). Museveni moulded the NRA into a formidable and disciplined fighting force. Its main method of operation was small strikes at military and government installations and then melting away. In response the government army would brutalise civilians around the place of attack thus further alienating them.

Although there were other guerrilla armies fighting the government, such as the Uganda Freedom Movement led by Andrew Kayiira, Museveni's experience gained during his time with FRELIMO enabled him to develop the NRA more effectively.

Despite its symbolic successes, the NRA was unable to establish itself beyond its heartland in the Luwero district and by 1984 there were rumours that Museveni had left the country and was living in Sweden. However things changed dramatically when Oyite-Ojok, the Army Chief of Staff was killed in a mysterious helicopter crash in 1984. Oyite-Ojok was from the Lango tribe along with president Obote. Whereas many of the military elite belonged to the Lango tribe, the Acholi tribe made up most of the rank and file and suffered the most casualties at the hands of the NRA. Acholi resentment grew when Obote appointed a relatively unknown officer from his tribe, Brigadier Smith Opon Acak as the new Army Chief of Staff. Many had expected him to appoint Bazilio Olara-Okello, an Acholi.

Although an Acholi, the respected army commander Tito Okello maintained his passive attitude despite pressure from fellow Acholi officers. Obote appeared confident that as long as Tito remained in place, the resentment would disappear, and in the meantime he began to build an internal army called the Special Forces, dominated by Lango Officers to counter any army mutiny. Obote's plans were thwarted when Bazilio Olara-Okello led a surprise coup on 27 July 1985. The coup leaders recognised that they needed a more conciliatory figure to lead the new government. Their choice was Tito Okello, the army commander. Tito Okello was reluctant to take up the role and hesitated for two days, but finally reluctantly agreed to lead the new government. His first call was to Museveni and the NRA to join him in a government of National Unity.

The coup resulted in an inexperienced military establishment that often seemed unsure how to rule the country. The army was clearly tired of the war and wanted to reach a peaceful agreement with Museveni. However Tito Okello was often out of his depth at the peace talks in Nairobi, and in the meantime the NRA was able to begin recruiting more soldiers and began extending its area of control westwards. At the peace talks it was Museveni who appeared more in control and articulate.

It is important at this stage to recognise the multitude of forces that now joined the National Resistance Movement, because it is only then that one can understand Museveni's success:

First, the Baganda - who for the first time saw an opportunity to gain military influence and power. Hundreds of Baganda flocked to the NRA often risking their lives to cross government army lines. Many Baganda had simply had enough with the northern dominated army, others saw the chance to restore their Kingdom and some level of autonomy.

Second, the Tutsi refugees - Uganda was the home of thousands of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda who were exiled in the 1960s by the Hutu majority. Many of these refugees joined the NRA and became senior figures in the NRM, including Paul Kagame. Whether at this point or later, these refugees saw the NRA as a vehicle to eventually begin their own military struggle in Rwanda.

Third, the educated elite - Museveni was admired by many of the young educated elite in Uganda, who suffered high unemployment and lack of recognition. Museveni's speeches were often laced with words of Marxist/socialist influence, which attracted young university students.

Fourth, the tribal factor - which still influences Ugandan politics. Museveni's home district in the West saw him as a route to gaining power. The Western regions make up 35% of the population.

The NRA overthrew Okello on 25 January 1986, with Museveni assuming the presidency. The National Resistance Movement embarked on a Marxist-oriented approach to government, establishing a 'no-party' democracy, cadres, and local resistance councils.

In government

Main article: Politics of Uganda

Museveni began a pragmatic turn around in vision. To appease the Baganda he re-instituted the Kabaka and other royal palaces, promoted economic liberalisation and established himself as more of a civilian politician than a guerrilla leader. The NRM began to widen its appeal by emphasising its role in establishing security and maintaining a very disciplined army. The NRM also courted influential members from Idi Amin's tribe like Moses Ali. The NRM also encouraged free trade and stimulated rapid economic growth thus attracting the support of the affluent middle class while retaining favour in rural areas by ensuring law and order. The rural areas particularly in Buganda had suffered years of terror under Obote. By broadening its political base, the NRM was able to overcome splits from NRM members with other interests (see above) including the Rwandan refugees (led by Kagame) who abandoned the party to take up their own liberation struggle in Rwanda and the discontented members like Kizza Besigye who broke away to form the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).

In the elections of 2006, the NRM proved its political credentials by out flanking the traditional parties like the Uganda People’s Congress and Democratic Party reminding people–-particularly those in the south—that the brutal northern dominated armies of Amin and Obote could return if the south showed any disunity. This appears to have pacified the Buganda nationalists and discouraged people particularly in the south from voting for the FDC. The death of Milton Obote has also resulted in the lack of any political force from northern Uganda. The north was also blighted by the Lord's Resistance Army which has carried out numerous atrocities there.

The NRM has however not escaped the tribal based politics that has dominated Uganda. Even in the south there is resentment over the dominance of people from the west in most key positions in the party and government institutions. Museveni’s iconic stature and economic progress in the south however are closely related to the NRM.

References

  1. Boniface, Ngaruye. (2013). Is History Repeating Itself?. The Daily Monitor.
  2. New Vision.(2013). ‘We are at war’ with dev’t saboteurs.
  3. The Economist. (2013). Africa Prepares to Vote.
  4. Lumu, David Tash. (2013). How term limits were kicked out in 2005. The Observer.
  5. Ashaba, Anita. (2013). Unemployment: Uganda’s Time Bomb. Chimp Reports.
  6. "Declining HIV Prevalence, Behavior Change, and the National Response", Janice A. Hogle, US Agency for International Development, September 2002
  7. Article 19. (2013). Uganda: Public Order Management Bill.
  8. Masereka, Alex. (2013). M7 Okays Public Order Bill. Red Pepper.
  9. United States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor).(2012). Uganda 2012 Human Rights Report.
  10. Natabaalo, Grace. (2013). Ugandan Police Shutdown Papers Over 'Plot'. Al Jazeera.
  11. United States Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor).(2012). Uganda 2012 Human Rights Report.
  12. Transparency International. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.
  13. Human Rights Watch. (2013). Letting the Big Fish Swim.
  14. Biryabarema, Elias. (2012). Ugandan Lawmakers Pass Oil Bill, Worry About Corruption. Thomson Reuters
  15. Global Witness. (2012). Uganda's oil laws: Global Witness Analysis.
  16. The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law. (2012). NGO Law Monitor: Uganda.

External links

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