CIA activities in Indonesia

Prior to WW2, Indonesia had been one of the most lucrative colonies for the Netherlands. The Dutch took control of the islands in the early 17th century and called it the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch held control over these lucrative trade and spice islands until 1942, when the Japanese took control of the islands. From 1942-1945 the Japanese ruled the islands with an iron fist. Shortly before the fall of the Japanese Empire the Indonesians declared their independence in 1945. It took 4 years of rebellion, and negotiations with the UN, before the Netherlands finally recognized the independent status of Indonesia.[1]

Indonesia 1945-1950

Operation ICEBERG

After World War II, the Office of Strategic Services(OSS) and what would become the CIA was put on the mission of collecting surrendering Japanese troops, and recovering military POWs and civilian internees. The caring nature of these "rescue" missions was a nice cover for the CIA's real objective. The true objective of these missions was to create a place to perform espionage in what would turn into the nation of Indonesia. The US did this out of the fear of further communist expansion in South East Asia (as it had already taken hold in Mao's China).[2]

At the time when operation ICEBERG was put into motion, Indonesia was still under the control of the Dutch. Indonesians were understandably "violently" anti-Dutch" as they had declared their independence in 1945. The U.S. had sympathy for the people of Indonesia. During this time, there was a violent 4 year revolution in Indonesia that would eventually end with Indonesia free from Dutch Rule.[2]

Col. John G. Coughlin became the head of the planning of operation ICEBERG. He along with the CIA wanted to establish field stations in key cities such as Singapore, Saigon, and Batavia. The stations's responsibilities included collecting information about Japanese war crimes, assessing the condition of U.S. property holdings, and accepting the surrender from the Japanese soldiers and commanders.[2]

The Dutch did not want the U.S. to establish an intelligence team in Batavia for many reasons. The first reason they argued that it wasn't within "the sphere of influence" that the U.S. had. The second reason they argued was that there was no need for the U.S. to have intelligence there because they would only come up with the same intelligence that the Dutch and British had already acquired. The Dutch also stated that they along with the British would gladly inform the United States on anything they needed to know. But SEAC had already gave the go ahead for the U.S.'s participation in Batavia, so the Dutch were forced to allow the ICEBERG mission.[2]

ICEBERG was commanded by Major Crockett, and under Crockett here were two teams. Team A was located in the city of Batavia and their mission was espionage, counterintelligence, research and analysis, radio operations, and cryptography. Team B was located in Singapore, and their mission was to be the back up to Team A if and when the time came. [2]

The Fate of HUMPY

One of the objectives for operation ICEBERG was to discover the fate of J.F. Mailuku, an OSS wartime agent, who had been codenamed HUMPY. Mailuku studied engineering and eventually became an air force cadet in the colonial armed forces. Before the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese in 1942, Mailuku was evacuated to Australia, and from there he traveled to the United States. He was recruited and trained by the OSS and on June 23, 1944, he infiltrated Java via submarine for operation RIPLEY I.

Due to being detained temporarily by Japanese paramilitary forces, Mailuku was unable to attend a rendezvous with the OSS and therefore did not have contact with Americans during the war. Upon the arrival of the Cumberland, Mailuku was introduced to Crockett who was able to receive his reports. "An OSS summary of HUMPY's intelligence activities characterized his detailed reports as 'information of inestimable value.'"

Mailuku had substantiated other OSS reports of anti-Dutch sentiment even though Dutch officials rejected this notion immediately and violently. He also reported of the Indonesian's desire for independence. Mailuku was last seen with an acquaintance who was supposedly working for Dutch intelligence before he disappeared. They had been on their way to meet with Indonesian nationalists and never returned. It is widely believed that Mailuku was executed for his association with a Dutch agent.[3]

Covert actions during the 1950's and 1960's

Since the late 1950s, the CIA had been interested in attempts to thwart Communist political influence in Indonesia. The United States, Britain, and Australia did not like President Sukarno and wanted him out. Sukarno allegiances were too ambiguous for what has happening during the Cold War as he courted both the US, the Soviets, and the Chinese. In 1955 the CIA plotted to assassinate President Sukarno, despite objections from then Vice President Nixon. Over the next three years, the CIA attempted to subvert Sukarno by financing his political opponents and bribing other public officials. This happened until 25 September 1957 when President Eisenhower finally ordered the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government. In 1958, elements of the Indonesian military, with the support of the CIA, rebelled against the rule of President Sukarno. This attempted coup ended in failure as had many other CIA other throw attempts.[4]

During the mid-1960s, the U. S. Government sought to frustrate the PKI's ambitions and influence, as reflected in the CIA's 1965 goals and objectives, and its contemporary Intelligence analyses of the political situation. Agents of the USG, including its embassy and CIA, have stated that there was no direct involvement in the 1965 Indonesian purge of Communists. Scholars have disputed this claim, citing documentary evidence that the US covertly undermined the Sukarno regime and fomented the killings of communists and those branded as communists.[5][6][7][8]

In November 1965, another coup was attempted but also proved unsuccessful. According to the president's Daily Briefs, Sukarno wanted to send a message to both military officials and the press. First he wanted to make it clear that Indonesia was in alliance with the Communist axis that included North Vietnam, China, and Cambodia, and that their allegiance was against "American Imperialism." Also, he wanted to make it known that he found the media of the time to be slanderous of their regime, their party, and other Communist governments. He minimized the effect of the coup and voiced further intent of resistance to the American forces.[9] In the same year, the left-leaning government of Sukarno was overthrown in a military coup by General Suharto. The new military quickly went after everybody who was opposed to the new regime. Non-violent communist supporters, Indonesian women's movements, trade union movement organizers and activists, intellectuals, teachers, land reform advocates, and the ethnic Chinese were all targeted. Over the course of about two years, it is estimated now by survivors, that as many as 2,500,000 of these people were massacred.

The U.S. was very much involved with providing money, weapons, radios, and supplies to this new government. The U.S. government along with the CIA provided death lists with names of leftist public leaders with the intents to eliminate them. The United States wanted the Indonesian army to go after and remove the entire grass roots base of the leftist party. It is alleged that without the US financial support, the massacres would have been non existent or less extreme (as the US had bankrolled the whole process).

CIA Failed Coup Attempt of 1958

Following President Eisenhower's 25 September 1957 order to the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government, Soviet intelligence learned of the plans almost instantly, publicizing the "American Plot to Overthrow Sukarno" three days later in an Indian newspaper, Blitz, which Soviet intelligence controlled. Despite Soviet awareness, the CIA began planning the coup, setting up operational bases, primarily in the Philippines. The CIA then employed veteran Filipino CIA paramilitary officers to make contact with Indonesian military forces on Sumatra and Sulawesi. Working in tandem with the Pentagon, deliveries of weapons packages were prepared for distribution to rebel military forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA also financed rebel forces with radio stations that issued anti-Sukarno broadcasts.

Back in the United States, at an OCB (Operations Coordination Board) Luncheon on 8 January 1958, the memorandum for the record states: "Mr. Dulles gave a brief report on the latest developments in Indonesia. He referred particularly to indications that the Bandung Council proposes to establish a Free Government of Indonesia, and said that while he believes a move of this sort would be premature, there is little we can or should do to try and stop it. It was agreed it would be unwise to supply arms so long as the possibility exists that the government might become communist dominated."[10]

On 21 February 1958, the Indonesian military obliterated the radio stations in Sumatra via bombings and established a naval blockade along the coast. Not only did the CIA underestimate the Indonesian army, but the agency apparently failed to realize that many of the top commanders within the Indonesian army were fiercely anti-communist, having been trained in the United States, even calling themselves "the sons of Eisenhower." This misstep led to American-aligned Indonesian military forces fighting American-aligned rebel forces. Finally, in a desperate last ditch, CIA pilots began bombing Indonesia's outer islands on 19 April 1958, targeting civilians and fomenting much anger among the Indonesian populace. Eisenhower had ordered that no Americans be involved in such missions, yet CIA Director Dulles ignored this order from the president. On 18 May 1958, Al Pope, an American citizen and CIA bomber, was downed over eastern Indonesia, revealing U.S. involvement. The 1958 CIA covert coup thus ended as a complete and transparent failure.[11] The failed coup would become one of the biggest failures in the history of the CIA, the inability to compete with Soviet espionage intelligence proved costly in this instance, and would prove costly in many other CIA operations against the Russians.

On Feb. 9, 1958, rebel Colonel Maluddin Simbolon issued an ultimatum in the name of a provincial government, the Dewan Banteng or Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, calling for the formation of a new central government. On Feb. 15 Dewan Banteng became part of a wider Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI or "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia") that included rebels led by other dissident colonels in East and South Sumatra and in North Sulawesi.

Sukarno aggressively opposed the rebels; he called upon his loyal army commander, General Abdul Haris Nasution, to destroy the rebel forces. By Feb. 21 forces loyal to Sukarno had been airlifted to Sumatra and began the attack. The rebel headquarters was in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia.

In April and May 1958 CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport (CAT) operated B-26 aircraft from Manado, North Sulawesi to support Permesta rebels.

Military loyal to the central government launched airborne and seaborne invasions of the rebel strongholds Padang and Manado. By the end of 1958, the rebels were militarily defeated. The last remaining rebel guerilla bands surrendered by August 1961.[12]

Military rebellion

The Indonesian government of Sukarno was faced with a major threat to its legitimacy beginning in 1956, when several regional commanders began to demand autonomy from Jakarta. After mediation failed, Sukarno took action to remove the dissident commanders. In February 1958, dissident military commanders in Central Sumatera (Colonel Ahmad Hussein) and North Sulawesi (Colonel Ventje Sumual) declared the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Permesta Movement aimed at overthrowing the Sukarno regime. They were joined by many civilian politicians from the Masyumi Party, such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were opposed to the growing influence of the communist party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI.[12]

USG stance in 1965

Unanticipated event

An action proposal was approved in March of that year, with an intermediate intelligence memorandum in July, and a SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate), on the situation regarding Indonesia and Malaysia, in September. According to H. W. Brands, American officials were so unprepared for the crisis that at first they misidentified the anti-communist leader, General Suharto.[13]

On the night of September 30, 1965, 6 of the Indonesia senior generals were dragged from their beds and were brutally murdered. This event led to the bloodiest mass destruction of a large communist party outside of China and the Soviet Union. The United States along with Britain and Australia wanted to overthrow the Sukarno administration, who had become Indonesia's first president in 1949. Sukarno's vision was to unify the different cultures, languages, religions and political ideologies that existed within Indonesia under one common government and culture. Three months after Sukarno visited the United States, he visited China and the Soviet Union. Since Sukarno welcomed the ideology of communism (though he himself was a nationalist) and the success of PKI in 1965, his recent visit to these communist nations forced the U.S. to question Sukarno's objectives concerning communism. As tension between the Indonesian army and PKI built up, Sukarno appointed Suharto as the head of the army in an attempt to keep the peace in Indonesia. However, Suharto had his own agenda in mind when he took over his new position as the head of the Indonesian army. His agenda was to prosecute and kill PKI members and supporters; his motto "surrender, support the government or die." Shortly after being appointed as head of the army, Suharto placed in motion a plan for a complete takeover of the government. Eventually, with the help of the U.S government and the army, Suharto defeated Sukarno and took over the government. Suharto managed to establish one of the most corrupt regimes in history and ruled Indonesia for over thirty years causing the death of thousands of his own people. His legacy was mass graves and mass imprisonment. It's estimated over five hundred thousand individuals were killed during his era. The night of September 30 1965, became a major turning point of the cold war when the west helped an Indonesian seized power and become one of the most ruthless dictator of our time.[14]

Anti-communist purge

Bradley Simpson, Director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive[15] contends that declassified documents[16] indicate that the United States "provided economic, technical and military aid to the army soon after the killings started. It continued to do so long after it was clear a 'widespread slaughter' was taking place in Northern Sumatra and other places, and in the expectation that US assistance would contribute to this end."[5][17][18][19] Further evidence for this funding has been substantiated by a cable that was sent from Ambassador Marshall Green, after meeting with CIA's Hugh Tovar, to the assistant secretary of state Bill Bundy, one advocating for payments to be sent to anti-communist fighter Adam Malik:

This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million ruphias [about $10,000] for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. The army-inspired but civilian-staffed group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts...Our willingness to assist him in this manner will, I think, represent in Malik's mind our endorsement of his present role in the army's anti-PKI efforts, and will promote good cooperating relations between him and the army. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black flag operation can be.[20]

Other cables from Green, issued to the State Department, suggested that the United States played a role in developing elements of the anti-communist propaganda following alleged PKI activities. As Green stated in a cable dated from October 5, 1965, "We can help shape developments to our advantage...spread the story of PKIs guilt, treachery, and brutality." [21] He went on to say that it would be a welcome goal to blacken the eye of the PKI in the eyes of the people. This position of ousting the communist PTI was later echoed by the CIAs Hugh Tovar, who recalled with great satisfaction how the PKI were partially defeated due to the use of Soviet-provided weapons.[21]

Despite the Soviet weapons used to killed members of the PKI, the United States was complicit in providing amounts of money and backing to the anti-PKI leaders, General Suharto and Adam Malik. Malik, as reported by CIA's Clyde McAvoy, was trained, housed, and supplied by the CIA. "I recruited and ran Adam Malik," McAvoy said in a 2005 interview. "He was the highest-ranking Indonesian we ever recruited." [22] The conflict in Indonesia ultimately led to upwards of 500,000 people killed, a number confirmed by Ambassador Green in a 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.[23]

In May 1990, the States News Service published a study by journalist Kathy Kadane which highlighted significant U.S. involvement in the killings.[24][25] Kadane quoted Robert J. Martens (who worked for the U.S. embassy) as saying that senior U.S. diplomats and CIA officials provided a list of approximately 5,000 names of Communist operatives to the Indonesian Army while it was hunting down and killing members the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and alleged sympathisers.[24] Martens told Kadane that "It really was a big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."[24][26] Kadane wrote that approval for the release of names put on the lists came from top U.S. embassy officials; Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters.[24] The accuracy of Kadane's report was challenged by those officials in a July 1990 article in The New York Times.[27] Martens asserted that he alone compiled the list from the Indonesian communist press, that the names were "available to everyone," and that "no one, absolutely no one, helped me compile the lists in question." He admitted to providing the list of "a few thousand" names of PKI leaders and senior cadre (but not the party rank and file) to Indonesian "non-Communist forces" during the "six months of chaos," but denied any CIA or embassy involvement.[27][28]

Green called Kadane's account "garbage," adding that "there are instances in the history of our country....where our hands are not as clean, and where we have been involved....But in this case we certainly were not".[27] Lydman, Masters, and two other CIA officers quoted by Kadane also denied that her account had any validity.[27] Masters stated:

I certainly would not disagree with the fact that we had these lists, that we were using them to check off, O.K., what was happening to the party. But the thing that is giving me trouble, and that is absolutely not correct, is that we gave these lists to the Indonesians and that they went out and picked up and killed them. I don't believe it. And I was in a position to know.[27]

The States News Service issued a memo in July 1990 defending the accuracy of Kadane's work, and in a rebuttal to their statements to The New York Times, published excerpts from the interviews that Kadane had made with Green, Lydman and Masters.[29][30][31] In 2001, the National Security Archive reported that Ambassador Marshall Green admitted in an August 1966 airgram to Washington, which was drafted by Martens and approved by Masters, that the lists were "apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership."[28][32] In an October 1965 telegram, Green endorsed the Indonesian military "destroying PKI" through executions.[8][33] In February 1966, he further expressed approval that "the Communists . . . have been decimated by wholesale massacre."[8][34]

Scholars, including documentary filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer, the director of The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence, have since then corroborated Kadane's account of U.S. involvement in the killings.[6][7][8][35][36] In a January 2014 interview with The Diplomat, Oppenheimer stated:

The details of what individual Western governments did are somewhat obscure, but for example the United States provided cash for the death squad and the army, weapons, radios so the army could coordinate the killing campaigns across the 17,000-island archipelago, and death lists. I interviewed two retired CIA agents and a retired state department official whose job was to compile lists generally of public figures known publicly to the army, compiled lists of thousands of names of people the U.S. wanted killed, and hand these names over to the army and then check off which ones had been killed. They would get the list back with the names ticked off [designating] who had been captured and killed.[37]

Regarding the 5,000 individuals named on the lists, Oppenheimer contends "my understanding is that 100% were killed."[36]

On 10 December 2014, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) introduced a "Sense of the Senate Resolution" which condemned the killings and called for the declassification of all documents pertaining to U.S. involvement in the events, noting that "the U.S. provided financial and military assistance during this time and later, according to documents released by the State Department."[35][38][39]

In 2016, Indonesia's human rights commission submitted an official request with the US government to declassify archived files believed to detail the CIA's involvement in the killings.[40]

President Sukarno

In May 1965, President Sukarno openly expressed his concerns over the imbalance of power that had developed in Indonesia. To combat the improper balance, Sukarno implemented steps to balance Indonesia more evenly.

  1. During the first week of May, Sukarno signed a decree reinstating Murba as a recognized and sanctioned political party within the country.
  2. May 5, General Nasution was sent to Moscow to deliver an invitation to Soviet Premier Kosygin to visit Indonesia. It was also Nasution's mission to pacify the Russians by assuring them that Sukarno intended to take certain measures which would alter the current situation.
  3. Sukarno called for a major cabinet reshuffle. This move would be made to balance the internal forces of power in his favor.

The United States received a message from the Indonesian government that planned to sever diplomatic relations by August 1965. "The Indonesian communist party which was rapidly increasing in strength was pressuring President Sukarno to break away from U.S. relations and support".[41] Confrontation broadened the Indonesian campaign to completely remove Western influence from Southeast Asia. This pursuit drew Indonesia into an informal alliance with communist China. Military schools were newly injected with communist doctrine under the control of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

During the meeting with the UN, Sukarno and his ministers explained their concerns about the Dutch "using British Occupation as a cover to achieve a coup d'tat." This was due to Dutch troops that were starting to arrive in Java in incredibly small numbers. Many of these assaults the nationalists said were "made from trucks that had markings 'USA' on them and many of the Dutch soldiers were dressed in U.S. uniforms."

 This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[42]

Sukarno struck up a revolution with the attempt at a coup supported by the PKI. Blame and reminders were brought out against the CIA by the Indonesian government to remind the people and were marked as a threat to Indonesian sovereignty. The CIA recruited Malik to drive a "political wedge between the left and the right in Indonesia". The CIA worked to build a shadow government to use in a clandestine setting to fight back against Sukarno and the PKI. It was the goal of the CIA to rid the country of communism through a new political movement. Suharto and Kap Gestapu were given American support but in secrecy. 500,000 dollars was given to support the Indonesian army, Suharto, and Gestapu through the CIA.

President Sukarno had been collaborating during the war. A political stance the republican ministers attributed to be willing to work with any country that would pledge to support the Indonesian independence. Even though the Japanese promises were lies, Sukarno acknowledged the gratitude for the recent occupation. The Japanese unintentionally or intentionally helped to unify the Indonesian people and provided military training for the armed forces. Many of the nationalists believed "capable of resorting to force if necessary in order to preserve their independence.

 This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[43]

Sukarno was placed under house arrest due to the possible involvement he played in the coup attempt. He died as a broken man in the year of 1970. President Sukarno had at least six assassination attempts on his life in which he blamed the CIA for the majority of these assassination attempts. Sukarno was a nationalist and was never a communist. Despite this fact, he was forced to be dependent on the communist party because it was able to help him mobilize mass support for his political objectives. The West and many other countries then began to have fears of the danger of communism in Indonesia,which is why the CIA and other Western organizations plotted his overthrow.

 This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[44]

Discussion of assassinating Sukarno

In 1975, the Rockefeller Commission looked into claims that the CIA had been involved in assassination attempts on foreign leaders, part of the so-called Family Jewels which detailed the illegal, inappropriate or embarrassing activities of the CIA. The Ford administration attempted (but failed) to keep the Rockefeller Commission from investigating reports of CIA planning for assassinations abroad.[45][46] Unsuccessful in blocking investigation into the assassinations, Richard Cheney, then the deputy assistant to the president, excised the 86 page section of the Commission's report dealing with assassination and those pages were not made available to the public on White House orders.[47] The bulk of the 86-pages focuses on U.S. covert activities against Cuba including some assassination plots against Fidel Castro. A smaller section of the report also investigates CIA actions against the president of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo. Although the report briefly mentions plans against Congolese President Patrice Lumumba and Indonesia's President Sukarno. To quote the Commission report's findings on assassination Sukarno:

"Bissell also testified that there was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia which "progressed as far as the identification of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for the purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible." He said the Agency had "absolutely nothing" to do with the death of Sukarno. With regard to both plans, he stated that no assassination plans would have been undertaken without authorization outside the Agency, and that no such authorization was undertaken for plans against either Lumumba or Sukarno"

Secrets as of 1998

DCI George Tenet, in declining the declassification of nine operations, said it would constitute a secret history of American power as used against foreign governments by three Presidents. Such CIA operations regarding Indonesia included political propaganda and bombing missions by aircraft during the 1950s.[48]

In 2001, the CIA attempted to prevent the publication of the State Department volume Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, which documents U.S. involvement in the Indonesian mass killings of leftists in the 1960s.[49][50]

See also

References

  1. ↑ "Indonesia". The World Fact Book. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-60-no-1/pdfs/Rust-Operation-ICEBERG.pdf
  3. ↑ Rust, William J. "Operation ICEBERG: Transitioning into CIA: The Strategic Services Unit in Indonesia" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 2016-07-21.
  4. ↑ Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007) 143-153.
  5. 1 2 Cf., Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development of U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford University Press, 2010), ISBN 9780804771825, Chap. 7 "The September 30th Movement and the destruction of the PKI" at 171-206, massacres at 184-192.
  6. 1 2 Mark Aarons (2007). "Justice Betrayed: Post-1945 Responses to Genocide." In David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L. H. McCormack (eds). The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance? (International Humanitarian Law). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 9004156917 pp. 80–81.
  7. 1 2 Bellamy, J. (2012). Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0199288429. p. 210.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Kai Thaler (December 2, 2015). 50 years ago today, American diplomats endorsed mass killings in Indonesia. Here's what that means for today. The Washington Post. Retrieved December 2, 2015.
  9. ↑ "The President's Daily Brief 20 November 1965" (PDF). Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  10. ↑ "Memorandum for the Record 13 January 1958" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency Library. CIA. 13 January 1958. Retrieved 21 July 2016.
  11. ↑ Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007) 147-153.
  12. 1 2 Roadnight, Andrew (2002). United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-79315-3.
  13. ↑ H. W. Brands, "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno," Journal of American History, December 1989, p801.
  14. ↑ Documentary: The Shadow play(CIA roles in Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966)
  15. ↑ The Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project. National Security Archive. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  16. ↑ FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXVI, INDONESIA; MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE; PHILIPPINES: Coup and Counter Reaction: October 1965–March 1966. Office of the Historian. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  17. ↑ Brad Simpson (28 February 2014). It's Our Act of Killing, Too. The Nation. Retrieved 9 May 2014.
  18. ↑ Brad Simpson (2009). Accomplices in atrocity. Inside Indonesia. Retrieved August 28, 2015.
  19. ↑ Accomplices in Atrocity. The Indonesian killings of 1965 (transcript). Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7 September 2008
  20. ↑ Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA(New York: Anchor Books, 2007) 300-301
  21. 1 2 Shadow Play: Indonesia's Year of Living Dangerously. Directed by Chris Hilton. Singapore: Offstreamtv, 2003.
  22. ↑ Clyde McAvoy. Interview with Tim Weiner. Personal Interview. 2005.
  23. ↑ U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Green Testimony before Congress. January 30, 1967, declassified March 2007.
  24. 1 2 3 4 Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians San Francisco Examiner, 20 May 1990
  25. ↑ Noam Chomsky (1993). Year 501: The Conquest Continues. South End Press. pp. 131-133. ISBN 0896084442
  26. ↑ Klein, Naomi (2008). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Picador. ISBN 0312427999 p. 78.
  27. 1 2 3 4 5 Wines, Michael (12 July 1990). "C.I.A. Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge". The New York Times.
  28. 1 2 185. Editorial Note. Office of the Historian. Retrieved December 25, 2015.
  29. ↑ Kathy Kadane's research. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  30. ↑ December 6, 1995: introductory note from David Johnson
  31. ↑ July 1990 MEMO TO EDITORS: FROM STATES NEWS SERVICE. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  32. ↑ Thomas Blanton (ed). CIA STALLING STATE DEPARTMENT HISTORIES: STATE HISTORIANS CONCLUDE U.S. PASSED NAMES OF COMMUNISTS TO INDONESIAN ARMY, WHICH KILLED AT LEAST 105,000 IN 1965-66. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 52., July 27, 2001. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  33. ↑ 158. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State. Office of the Historian. Retrieved December 25, 2015.
  34. ↑ 191. Memorandum of Conversation. Office of the Historian. Retrieved January 3, 2016.
  35. 1 2 "The Look of Silence": Will New Film Force U.S. to Acknowledge Role in 1965 Indonesian Genocide? Democracy Now! 3 August 2015.
  36. 1 2 US ‘enthusiastically participated’ in genocide. Bangkok Post. April 27, 2014.
  37. ↑ Justin McDonnell (January 23, 2014). Interviews: Joshua Oppenheimer. The Diplomat. Retrieved September 3, 2015.
  38. ↑ Tom Introduces Resolution on Reconciliation in Indonesia. GovNews, 10 December 2014.
  39. ↑ Tom Introduces Resolution on Reconciliation in Indonesia.
  40. ↑ Indonesia urged to hold truth and reconciliation process over massacres. The Guardian. April 13, 2016.
  41. ↑ "BELIEF OF SENIOR INDONESIAN DIPLOMAT THAT INDONESIA WILL SERVER DIPLOMATIC RELA | CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2016-07-21.
  42. ↑ Rust, William. "Transitioning into CIA: The Strategic Services Unit in Indonesia" (PDF). cia.gov. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  43. ↑ Rust, William. "Transitioning into CIA: The Strategic Services Unit in Indonesia" (PDF). cia.gov. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  44. ↑ Fitriani, Aishaa. "The Shadow Play". youtube. Retrieved 22 July 2016.
  45. ↑ "Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report". nsarchive.gwu.edu. Retrieved 2016-05-17.
  46. ↑ "John Prados, The Family Jewels The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power".
  47. ↑ The United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), "Summary of Facts: Investigation of CIA Involvement in Plans to Assassinate Foreign Leaders," June 5, 1975. Source: Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, White House Operations, Richard Cheney Files, Intelligence Series, Box 7, Folder, "Report on CIA Assassination Plots (1)."
  48. ↑ Weiner, Tim (July 15, 1998), "C.I.A., Breaking Promises, Puts Off Release of Cold War Files", New York Times
  49. ↑ U.S. Seeks to Keep Lid on Far East Purge Role. The Associated Press via The Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2001. Retrieved September 4, 2015.
  50. ↑ Margaret Scott (November 2, 2015) The Indonesian Massacre: What Did the US Know? The New York Review of Books. Retrieved November 6, 2015.
This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 11/4/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.