Iran–Oman relations

Iran – Oman relations

Iran
Oman

Iran–Oman relations are bilateral relations between Oman and the Islamic republic of Iran.

Oman and Iran share close diplomatic, economic, and military ties. According to Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service, "Oman has a tradition of cooperation with Iran dating back to the Shah of Iran's regime and Oman has always been less alarmed by the perceived threat from Iran than have the other Gulf states."[1]

Oman is isolated from much of the rest of the Arabian peninsula by a formidable mountain range, while Iran is just across the narrow Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil shipments.

History

Pre-Islamic period

Northern half of Oman (beside modern-day Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, plus Balochistan and Sindh provinces of Pakistan) has been part of the Maka satrapy of the Persian Achaemenid Empire. It was also part of the Parthian and Sassanian empires. During the Muslim conquest of Persia, it was lost to the invading Arab Muslims.

Pahlavi dynasty

During the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran, the two countries had economic ties. During the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, Mohammad Reza Shah, beside Britain, intervened in support of the Omani government.

Islamic Republic of Iran

The Baloch people who are ethnically an Iranian people and speak Balochi language (an Iranian language) are a significant minority, comprising approximately 25% of Oman's population. The majority of Iranians are Shia Muslims, while the majority of the Omani population are Ibadi Muslims.

Unlike the majority of its Gulf neighbours, Oman managed to uphold diplomatic relations with both sides during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988 and strongly supported UN Security Council resolutions to end the conflict. Secret cease-fire talks between the two adversaries were held in Muscat during the war, and although an agreement was never reached during these talks, they did reduce distrust on both sides. Moreover, after the war, Oman mediated talks to restore diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and the United Kingdom.

During the Persian Gulf War, Iran–Oman relations were damaged after Iran began running attacks on tanker movements in the Persian Gulf and placed anti-ship missile launchers along the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf neighbours have since restored their ties and have conducted joint military exercises as recently as February 2011.

Oman's leader Sultan Qaboos travelled to Iran in 2009 for the first time since Iran's 1979 Revolution. Though on two occasions the U.S. has dispatched high-level officials to discuss Iran with Oman, the fact that Oman has avoided publicly expressing any concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program is likely a reason why the two states have managed to maintain strong ties.

In addition to strong diplomatic and political ties, Iran and Oman cooperate economically on several fronts, including energy. Most recently, the Gulf neighbours signed an initial agreement to begin supplying large quantities of natural gas from Iran to Oman, a project that was earlier reported to be worth between $7–12 billion. In addition to these major economic projects, the two countries have opened a joint bank to facilitate their mutual financial dealings, agreed to develop the Kish and Hengam gas fields in the Persian Gulf, and signed a memorandum of understanding for a potential joint petrochemical project valued at $800 million.

On March 12, 2014, Iran sealed a deal to export 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year to Oman, an agreement involves building the subsea Iran–Oman pipeline across the Persian Gulf at a cost of about $1 billion. Oman agreed to buy gas from Iran as far back as 2005 and a later draft deal in 2007 included plans for Oman to process Iranian gas for export as liquefied natural gas (LNG), but the two sides had never finalized terms and Oman had been pressured by the United States to source fuel from alternative suppliers such as Qatar, according to US embassy cables released by Wikileaks.[2][3]

Iran nuclear deal

The Omani government official position on Iran's nuclear program is as follows: "The sultanate hopes Washington will engage in a ‘direct dialogue’ with Teheran to resolve the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program. The sultanate has no reason not to believe Iran's assurances that its program has purely civilian purposes. This region, no doubt, does not want to see any military confrontation or any tension".

Sultan Qaboos played a key role in facilitating the back channel between the United States and Iran that helped lead to the Iran nuclear deal.[4] Oman has always had good relations with the United States while also maintaining a strong relationship with Iran; most other GCC countries actively oppose Iran because they see it as both an economic and ideological threat. Oman's unique neutral position enabled Sultan Qaboos to mediate between the United States and Iran, the motivations for which mainly regard regional security and personal economic gain[5] As early as 2009, according to Wikileaks, Oman offered to arrange secret talks between the US and Iran, which hadn't had diplomatic relations for 30 years. But it was reportedly the detention of three American hikers by Iran (which said they were spies) that brought Oman into a mediating role between the two sides and helped win the release of the detainees. Ironically, efforts to win the release of the hikers turned out to be instrumental in making the clandestine diplomacy possible: after this successful mediation, Sultan Qaboos offered to facilitate a US–Iran rapprochement.[6]

The Iran–US secret talks took on added weight when Obama dispatched William Burns, the deputy secretary of State, and Jake Sullivan, top foreign policy adviser to Vice President Biden, and five technical experts to meet with Iranian officials. Beyond nuclear issues, the US team at the March Oman meeting also raised concerns about Iranian involvement in Syria, Tehran's threats to close the strategically important Strait of Hormuz and the status of Robert Levinson, and two Americans detained in the country. Hoping to keep the channel open, Secretary of State John Kerry then visited Oman in May to maintain that country's mediation role. After Rouhani was elected as president, the American officials were joined at the final secret meeting by chief US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman.[7]

After the deal, regarding Oman's role, President Rouhani said that Oman, not only hosted a number of important meetings, but also "played a critical role in getting these talks off the ground in the first place".[8]

Staff and embassies

Current Iran's ambassador to Oman is Ali Akbar Sibouyeh, replacing Hossein Nooshabadi.

From July 2012 to October 2013, all Iranian interests in the United Kingdom were maintained by the Omani embassy in London.[9]

The Interest Section of the Omani embassy in Ottawa, Canada covers Iran.

See also

References

  1. ↑ https://books.google.com/books?id=jCXhJ4itId0C&pg=PP2&lpg=PP2&dq=%22Oman+has+a+tradition+of+cooperation+with+Iran+dating+back+to+the+Shah+of+Iran%27s+regime+and+Oman+has+always+been+less+alarmed+by+the+perceived+threat&source=bl&ots=dMwwozxbcB&sig=YW-orlOOV9XvT27ed0xUFc46mkM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDEQ6AEwA2oVChMI7cmP8LnEyAIVx-kUCh2mcAaX
  2. ↑ http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-iran-oman-gas-idUSBREA2B24K20140312
  3. ↑ http://www.2b1stconsulting.com/oman-and-iran-planned-gas-pipeline-across-strait-of-ormuz/
  4. ↑ http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-wish-list-led-to-u-s-talks-1435537004
  5. ↑ http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/07/23/oman-the-unsung-hero-of-the-iranian-nuclear-deal/
  6. ↑ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/Olive-Press/2013/1124/The-man-behind-secret-US-Iran-talks-Sultan-Qaboos
  7. ↑ http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/11/24/iran-secret-talks-nuclear-deal/3691199/
  8. ↑ http://omanobserver.om/us-praises-omans-key-role-in-iran-deal/
  9. ↑ "Oman to represent Iran interests in UK". Press TV. Retrieved 11 July 2013.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Iran–Oman relations.
This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 11/19/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.