Operation Blue Star

Operation Blue Star

Akal Takht being repaired by the Indian Government after the attack. It was later pulled down and rebuilt by the Sikh community.[1][2]
Date1–10 June 1984
LocationHarmandir Sahib in Amritsar, Punjab, India
Result
Belligerents

 India

Supported by:
United Kingdom Special Air Service (advisory role)[3][4]		 Khalistani separatists
[5][6][7]
Commanders and leaders
Major General Kuldip Singh Brar
Lt Gen Ranjit Singh Dyal[8]
Lt Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji		 Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale †
Bhai Amrik Singh †
Shabeg Singh †
Strength
10,000 armed troops. of Indian army 9th Division, National Security Guard 175 Parachute Regiment and Artillery units
700 soldiers of CRPF 4th Battalion & BSF 7th Battalion
150 soldiers of Punjab Armed Police and officers from Harmandir Police Station.		 200 Khalistani separatists[9]
Casualties and losses
83 dead[10] 238 combatants killed
492 civilians [11][12] civilians killed(official) Many reports suggested that the civilian casualties were over 5,000.[13]

Operation Blue Star was an Indian military operation which occurred between 1 June and 7 June 1984, ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi[14] in order to establish control[15] over the Harmandir Sahib Complex in Amritsar, Punjab, and remove militant religious leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his militant armed followers from the complex buildings. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had earlier occupied the Harmandir Sahib, fortified the complex and made it his headquarters in April 1983.[16]

The operation had two components—Operation Metal, confined to the Harmandir Sahib complex, and Operation Shop, which raided the Punjabi countryside to capture any suspects.[17] Following it, Operation Woodrose was launched in the Punjab countryside where Sikhs, specifically those carrying a kirpan and protesting,[18] were now targeted.[16][19][20] The operation was carried out by Indian Army troops with tanks, artillery, helicopters, armored vehicles and tear gas.[21][22][23] Casualty figures of Operation Blue Star given by Kuldip Singh Brar put the number of deaths among the Indian army at 83 dead and 249 injured.[24] According to the official estimate presented by the Indian government, 493 civilians were killed,[11][12] though numbers put forward by independent human rights organizations are significantly higher.[25]

In addition, there were claims made that blamed the CBI for seizing historical artifacts and manuscripts in the Sikh Reference Library, before burning it down.[26] The military action led to an uproar amongst Sikhs worldwide and the increased tension following the action led to assaults on members of the Sikh community within India. Many Sikh soldiers in the Indian army mutinied, many Sikhs resigned from armed and civil administrative office and several returned awards and honours they had received from the Indian government.[27]

Four months after the operation, on 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Satwant Singh and Beant Singh who were her two Sikh bodyguards, in what is viewed as an act of vengeance.[16] Subsequently, more than 3,000 Sikhs were killed in the ensuing anti-Sikh riots in 1984.[28] Within the Sikh community itself, Operation Blue Star has taken on considerable historical significance and is often compared to what Sikhs call "the great massacre", following the invasion by the Emir of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Sikh holocaust of 1762.[29]

Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Harmandir Sahib

Sri Harmandir Sahib at night

The main political aim of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, his followers and politicians in Punjab till June 1984 was to pass the democratic Anandpur Resolution[30][31][32] and not explicitly or solely for a separate country of Khalistan.[33][34][35][36] Throughout his career Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale remained in contact with Indira Gandhi.[37][38] Bhindranwale had earlier taken residence in Harmandir Sahib and made it his headquarters in April 1980, when he was accused of the assassination of Nirankari Gurbachan Singh.[39] The Nirankari Baba, also known as Baba Gurbachan, had been the target of an attack by followers of Bhindranwale, outside Harmandir Sahib. On 13 April 1978, Nirankari's Baba Gurbachan is alleged to have ridiculed 10th Guru Gobind Singh in a Nirankari Convention held in Amritsar. This prompted Akhand Kirtani Jatha to lead a protest against the Baba Gurbachan. Both sides clashed with each other and in the ensuing violence, several people were killed: two of Bhindranwale's followers, eleven members of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and three Nirankaris.[40]

In 1982, Bhindranwale and approximately 200 armed followers moved into a guest-house called the Guru Nanak Niwas, in the precinct of Harmandir Sahib.[41] From here he met and was interviewed by international television crews.[41]

By 1983, Harmandir Sahib was being considered by the Indian Govt. as a fort for these 200 armed followers.[42] On 23 April 1983, the Punjab Police Deputy Inspector General A. S. Atwal was shot dead as he left the Harmandir Sahib compound. The following day, after the murder, Harchand Singh Longowal (then president of Shiromani Akali Dal) confirmed the involvement of Bhindranwale in the murder.[43]

Harmandir Sahib compound was fortified by the followers and the surrounding houses were fortified by Indian Armed Forces, which made it evident that Indian Armed Forces never opted for peaceful negotiations with its own citizens. The Statesman reported on 4 July that light machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound.[44] Faced with imminent army action and with the foremost Sikh political organisation, Shiromani Akali Dal (headed by Harchand Singh Longowal), abandoning him, Bhindranwale declared "This bird is alone. There are many hunters after it".[45]

Time magazine described Amritsar in November 1983: "These days it more closely resembles a city of death. Inside the temple compound, violent Sikh fanatics wield submachine guns, resisting arrest by government security forces. Outside, the security men keep a nervous vigil, all too aware that the bodies of murdered comrades often turn up in the warren of tiny streets around the shrine."[46]

On 15 December 1983, Bhindranwale was asked to move out of Guru Nanak Niwas house by members of the Babbar Khalsa who acted with Harcharan Singh Longowal's support. Longowal by now feared for his own safety.[42]

The Operation

The Indian Army used seven Vijayanta Tanks during the operation[47]

According to the Indian government, Operation Blue Star was launched to eliminate Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers who had sought cover in the Amritsar Harmandir Sahib Complex. Yet the Indian Armed Forces attacked all the major Gurdwaras throughout Punjab simultaneously.[48] The armed Sikhs within the Harmandir Sahib were led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and former Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh. Lt. Gen. Kuldip Singh Brar had command of the action, operating under Gen. Sundarji.

Indira Gandhi first asked Lt. Gen. S. K. Sinha, then Vice-Chief of Indian Army and selected to become the next Army chief, to prepare a position paper for assault on the Golden Temple.[49] Lt. Gen. Sinha advised against any such move, given its sacrilegious nature according to Sikh tradition. He suggested the government adopt an alternative solution. A controversial decision was made to replace him with General Arun Shridhar Vaidya as the Chief of the Indian army. General Vaidya, assisted by Lt. Gen. Sundarji as Vice-Chief, planned and coordinated Operation Blue Star.[49]

On 3 June, a 36-hour curfew was imposed on the state of Punjab with all methods of communication and public travel suspended and all the International reporters were asked to leave the state of Punjab immediately.[50][51] The electricity supply was also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state from the rest of the world.[52] Complete media censorship was enforced.[52]

The Indian Army stormed Harmandir Sahib on the night of 5 June under the command of Kuldip Singh Brar. The forces had full control of Harmandir Sahib by the morning of 7 June. There were casualties among the army, heavy casualties among civilians,[53] and the said 200 militants. Sikh leaders Bhindranwale and Shabeg Singh were killed in the operation.[54]

June 1

At 12:40 hrs the CRPF and BSF started firing at "Guru Ram Das Langar" building. The Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force, under orders of the Army, started firing upon the Complex, in which at least eight people died.[55]

June 2

The Indian army had already sealed the international border from Kashmir to Ganga Nagar, Rajasthan. At least seven divisions of army were deployed in villages of Punjab. By nightfall media and the press were gagged and rail, road and air services in Punjab were suspended. Foreigners' and NRIs' entry were also banned. General Gauri Shankar was appointed as the Security Advisor to the Governor of Punjab. The water and electricity supply was cut off.[56][57][58]

June 3

A complete curfew was observed with the army and para-military patrolling all of Punjab. The army sealed off all routes of ingress and exit around the temple complex.

June 4

The army started bombarding the historic Ramgarhia Bunga, the water tank, and other fortified positions. The army used Ordnance QF 25 pounder and destroyed the outer defences laid by General Shabeg Singh. The army then placed tanks and APCs on the road separating the Guru Nanak niwas building. About 2,000 died in for army.[59]

The army helicopters spotted the massive movements, and General K. Sunderji sent tanks and APCs to meet them.[60]

The artillery and small arms firing stopped for a while, and Gurcharan Singh Tohra, former head of SGPC was sent to negotiate with Bindrawale. He was, however, unsuccessful and the firing resumed.

June 5

In the morning, shelling started on the building inside the Harmandir Sahib complex.[61] The 9th division launched a frontal attack on the Akal Takht, although it was unable to secure the building.

19:00 hrs

The BSF and CRPF attacked Hotel Temple View and Brahm Boota Akhara respectively on the southwest fringes of the complex. By 22:00 hours both the structures were under their control.[62] The Army simultaneously attacked various other gurdwaras. Sources mention either 42 or 74 locations.[59]

22:00–07:30 hrs

Late in the evening, the generals decided to launch a simultaneous attack from three sides. 10 Guards, 1 Para Commandos and Special Frontier Force (SFF) would attack from the main entrance of the complex, and 26 Madras and 9 Kumaon battalions from the hostel complex side entrance from the south. The objective of the 10 Guards was to secure the northern wing of the Temple complex and draw attention away from SFF who were to secure the western wing of the complex and 1 Para Commandos who were to gain a foothold in Akal Takht and in Harmandir Sahab, with the help of divers. 26 Madras was tasked with securing the southern and the eastern complexes, and the 9 Kumaon regiment with SGPC building and Guru Ramdas Serai. 12 Bihar was charged with providing a cordon and fire support to the other regiments by neutralising enemy positions under their observance.[63]

As the troops entered the temple from the Northern entrance, they were gunned down by light machine-gun fire from both sides of the steps. The few commandos who did get down the steps were driven back by a barrage of fire from the building on the south side of the sacred pool, and thus they failed to reach the pavement around the Sacred Pool. The commandos and SFF inched pillar by pillar to reach the western wing where they came under fire from Harmandir Sahib itself. They were under strict instructions not to fire at Harmandir Sahib, the sanctum sanctorum, and instead told to focus on Akal Takth.

An initial attempt by the commandos to gain a foothold at Darshani Deori failed as they came under devastating fire, after which several further attempts were made with varying degrees of success. Eventually, other teams managed to reach Darshani Deori, a building north of the Nishan Sahib, and started to fire at the Akal Takth and a red building towards its left, so that the SFF troops could get closer to the Darshani Deori and fire gas canisters at Akal Takth. The canisters bounced off the building and affected the troops instead.

Meanwhile, 26 Madras and 9 Garhwal Rifles (reserve troops) had come under heavy fire from the Langar rooftop, Guru Ramdas Serai and the buildings in the vicinity. Moreover, they took a lot of time in forcing open the heavy Southern Gate, which had to be shot open with tank fire. This delay caused a lot of casualties among the Indian troops fighting inside the complex. Three tanks and an APC had entered the complex (all 3 tanks and the APC were destroyed).

Crawling was impossible as Shabeg Singh had placed light machine guns nine or ten inches above the ground. The attempt caused many casualties among the Indian troops. A third attempt to gain the Pool was made by a squad of 200 commandos from both the. On the southern side, the Madras and Garhwal battalions were not able to make it to the pavement around the pool because they were engaged by positions on the southern side.

Despite the mounting casualties, General Sunderji ordered a fourth assault by the commandos. This time, the Madras battalion was reinforced with two more companies of the 7th Garhwal Rifles under the command of General Kuldip Singh Brar. However, the Madras and Garhwal troops under Brigadier A. K. Dewan once again failed to move towards the parikarma (the pavement around the pool).

Brigadier Dewan reported heavy casualties and requested more reinforcements. General Brar sent two companies of 15 Kumaon Regiment. This resulted in yet more heavy casualties, forcing Brigadier Dewan to request tank support. As the APC inched closer to the Akal Takth it was hit with an anti-tank RPG, which immediately immobilized it. Brar also requested tank support, 20 tanks were sent and only about 4 made their way to the AKAL TAKHT rest were destroyed. The tanks received the clearance to fire their main guns (105 mm high-explosive squash head shells) only at around 7:30 a.m.[64]

June 6

Vijayanta tanks shelled the Akal Takhat. It suffered some damage but the structure was still standing upright. A group trying to escape was mowed down by machine gun fire. The resistance continued from the neighbouring structures of the Akal Takhat.

June 7

The army gained effective control of the Harmandir Sahib complex but it was only after the whole hundreds of years old historic complex was already destroyed by army artillery.

June 8–10

The Army fought about four Sikhs holed up in basement of a tower. A colonel of the commandos was shot dead by an LMG burst while trying to force his way into the basement. By the afternoon of 10 June, the entire operation was over.

Casualties

The Army placed total casualties at:[10]

Unofficial casualty figures were much higher;[65] some suggest that civilian casualties numbered 20,000 and military casualties were 5,000.[66]

Mark Tully and Satish Jacob mention the use of tanks by the army at the Sultanwind area over the civilian Sikhs marching towards Amritsar.[67]

According to the independent sources, the number of dead military personnel was at least 700.[68] In one of his speeches, Rajiv Gandhi, the former prime minister of India, has purportedly said that over 700 soldiers died during the operation.[69] CNN-IBN, on the 25th death anniversary of Indira Gandhi, on 31 October 2009, reported to have lost 365 commandos.[70] Apart from this, an unspecified number of soldiers were reported killed during the fighting at 38 other gurdwaras in Punjab. Strong resistance was reported at Muktsar and Moga.[71] On top of this, there was the prospect that more Indian army personnel may have been victims of mutinies by Sikh soldiers at different military locations across India.[71]

Aftermath

At least 5,000[72] Sikh soldiers mutinied at different locations in India after they received shocking news of the attack, they were upset as no information was being given to them, they left their stations and none of them retaliated with violence towards civilians, the army instead of providing them information and counselling took strict action against the Sikh soldiers who left their stations.[73][74]

The operation also led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984 by two of her Sikh bodyguards,[75][76] triggering the 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The widespread killing of Sikhs, principally in the national capital Delhi and all the Congress ruled states and major cities of India, this state sponsored genocide led to major divisions between the Sikh community and the Indian Government. The army withdrew from Harmandir Sahib later in 1984 under pressure from Sikh demands.[77]

With no action being taken by the Govt. to win back the trust of Sikhs and the denial attitude of Govt.[78] towards all atrocities towards Sikhs General Arun Shridhar Vaidya, the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation Blue Star, was assassinated in 1986 in Pune by two Sikhs, Harjinder Singh Jinda and Sukhdev Singh Sukha. Both were sentenced to death, and hanged on 7 October 1992.

Sikh militants continued to use and occupy the temple compound and on 1 May 1986, Indian paramilitary police entered the temple and arrested 200 militants that had occupied Harmandir Sahib for more than three months.[79] On 2 May 1986 the paramilitary police undertook a 12-hour operation to take control of Harmandir Sahib at Amritsar from several hundred militants, but almost all the major radical leaders managed to escape.[80] In June 1990, the Indian government ordered the area surrounding the temple to be vacated by local residents in order to prevent militants activity around the temple.[81]

Criticisms

The use of artillery in the congested inner city of Amritsar proved deadly to many civilians who were trapped in the buildings in and around Harmandir Sahib due to the strict curfew by Indian armed forces.[82] There were no bystanders as the shoot on sight order during curfew was already in effect. The media blackout throughout the Punjab resulted in widespread doubt regarding the official stories and aided the promotion of hearsay and rumour.[83] The operation is criticised on four main grounds: the choice of time of attack by Government, the heavy casualties, the loss of property, and allegations of human rights violations by Army personnel.

In addition, Indira Gandhi has been accused of using the attack for political ends. Dr. Harjinder Singh Dilgeer stated that Indira Gandhi attacked the Harmandir Sahib complex to present herself as a great hero in order to win forthcoming elections.[84]

Last resort

S. K. Sinha, the GOC of the Indian Army who was sacked just before the attack, had advised the government against the operation.[85] He later criticized the Government's claim that the attack represented a "last resort".[86] He also stated that the operation would have been conducted in an entirely different manner if he had planned it.[87]

He also pointed out that a few days before the operation, the Home Minister had announced that the troops would not be sent to Harmandir Sahib.,[87] but the operation seems to have been in plans much earlier. The General has alleged that the army had been rehearsing the operation in a replica of Harmandir Sahib at a secret location near Chakrata Cantonment in the Doon Valley.[88][89]

Timing

The timing of Operation Blue Star was planned on a Sikh religious day—the martyrdom day of Guru Arjan Dev ji, the founder of the Harmandir Sahib—in order to cause higher casualties among the Sikh community. Sikhs from all over the world visit the temple on this day. Many Sikhs view the timing and attack by the Indian Army as an attempt to inflict maximum casualties on Sikhs and demoralise them,[90] and the government is in turn blamed for the inflated number of civilian dead for choosing to attack on this day. The justification given by the Centre was the announcement made by Longowal that a statewide civil disobedience movement would be launched on 3 June 1984 (which is hard to believe as the followers were already in the Complex and they their numbers were marginal just 200), by refusing to pay land revenue, water and electricity bills, and blocking the flow of grain out of Punjab.[91][92]

The Sikh community's anger and suffering was further increased by comments from leading newspaper editors, such as Ramnath Goenka, terming the operation as "A greater victory than the win over Bangladesh, this is the greatest victory of Mrs. Gandhi."[93]

Media blackout

Before the attack by the army a media blackout was imposed in Punjab.[94] The Times reporter Michael Hamlyn reported that journalists were picked up from their hotels at 5 a.m. in a military bus, taken to the adjoining border of the state of Haryana and "were abandoned there."[94] The main towns in Punjab were put under curfew, transportation was banned, a news blackout was imposed, and Punjab was "cut off from the outside world."[95] A group of journalists who later tried to drive into Punjab were stopped at the road block at Punjab border and were threatened with being shot if they proceeded.[94] Indian nationals who worked with the foreign media also were banned from the area.[94] The press criticized these actions by government as an "obvious attempt to attack the temple without the eyes of the foreign press on them."[96]

Human rights

Brahma Chellaney, the Associated Press's South Asia correspondent, was the only foreign reporter who managed to stay on in Amritsar despite the media blackout.[97] His dispatches, filed by telex, provided the first non-governmental news reports on the bloody operation in Amritsar. His first dispatch, front-paged by the New York Times, The Times of London and The Guardian, reported a death toll about twice of what authorities had admitted. According to the dispatch, about 780 militants and civilians and 400 troops had perished in fierce gunbattles. The high casualty rates among security forces were attributed to "the presence of such sophisticated weapons as medium machine guns and rockets" in the militants' arsenal.[98]

Chellaney also reported that several suspected Sikh militants had been shot with their hands tied.[99] The dispatch, after its first paragraph reference to "several" such deaths, specified later that about "eight to 10" men had been shot in that fashion.[100] In that dispatch, Mr. Chellaney interviewed a doctor who said he was picked up by the army and forced to conduct postmortems despite the fact he had never done any postmortem examination before.[99] The number of casualties reported by Mr. Chellaney was far higher than government reports,[101] and the Indian government, which disputed his casualty figures,[102] accused him of inflammatory reporting.[103] The Associated Press stood by the reports and figures, the accuracy of which was also "supported by Indian and other press accounts" and by reports in The Times and the New York Times.[104]

Similar accusations of highhandedness by the Indian Army and allegations of human rights violations by security forces in Operation Blue Star and subsequent military operations in Punjab have been levelled by Justice V. M. Tarkunde,[105] Mary Anne Weaver,[106] human rights lawyer Ram Narayan Kumar,[107] and anthropologists Cynthia Mahmood and Joyce Pettigrew.[108][109][110]

The Indian Army responded to this criticism by stating that they "answered the call of duty as disciplined, loyal and dedicated members of the Armed Forces of India. . . our loyalties are to the nation, the armed forces to which we belong, the uniforms we wear and to the troops we command".[111]:156

It was later pointed out that as the blockade approach taken by KPS Gill five years later in Operation Black Thunder—when Sikh militants had again taken over the temple complex—was highly successful (as they managed to resolve the stand-off peacefully), Operation Blue Star could have been averted by using similar blockade tactics. The army responded by stating that "no comparison is possible between the two situations", as "there was no cult figure like Bhindranwale to idolise, and no professional military general like Shahbeg Singh to provide military leadership" and "the confidence of militants having been shattered by Operation Blue Star."[111] Furthermore, it is pointed out that the separatists in the temple were armed with machine guns, anti tank missiles and rocket launchers, and that they strongly resisted the army's attempts to dislodge them from the shrine, appearing to have planned for a long standoff, having arranged for water to be supplied from wells within the temple compound and had stocked food provisions that could have lasted months.[111]:153–154

Hindustan Times correspondent Chand Joshi alleged that the army units "acted in total anger" and shot down all the suspects rounded up from the temple complex.[112] Mark Tully and Satish Jacob criticized the Army for burning down the Sikh Reference Library in Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, stating that this was done to destroy the culture of the Sikhs. In The Sikhs of Punjab, Joyce Pettigrew alleges that the army conducted the operation to "suppress the culture, and political will, of a people."[110]

Honours to the soldiers

The soldiers and generals involved in the Operation were presented with gallantry awards, honours, decoration strips and promotions by the Indian president Zail Singh, a Sikh, in a ceremony conducted on 10 July 1985. The act was criticized by authors and activists such as Harjinder Singh Dilgeer, who accused the troops of human rights violations during the operation.[84]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Tatla, Darshan Singh (1993). The politics of homeland : a study of the ethnic linkages and political mobilisation amongst Sikhs in Britain and North America (Thesis). University of Warwick. p. 133.
  2. ↑ http://akaltakhtsahib.com/architecture-history/
  3. ↑ Nicholas Watt, Jason Burke and Jason Deans (14 January 2014). "Cameron orders inquiry into claims of British role in 1984 Amritsar attack". The Guardian. Retrieved 31 January 2014.
  4. ↑ Swami, Praveen (16 January 2014). "RAW chief consulted MI6 in build-up to Operation Bluestar". Chennai, India: The Hindu. Retrieved 31 January 2014.
  5. ↑ K.S. Brar (July 1993). Operation Blue Star: the true story. UBS Publishers' Distributors. pp. 56–57. ISBN 978-81-85944-29-6. Retrieved 9 August 2013.
  6. ↑ Dogra, Cander Suta. "Operation Blue Star - the Untold Story". The Hindu, 10 June 2013. Web. 9 Aug 2013.
  7. ↑ Cynthia Keppley Mahmood (1 January 2011). Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Defenders. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. Title, 91, 21, 200, 77, 19. ISBN 978-0-8122-0017-1. Retrieved 9 August 2013
  8. ↑ "Temple Raid: Army's Order was Restraint". The New York Times. 15 June 1984. Retrieved 6 February 2012.
  9. ↑ Karim, Afsir (1991). Counter Terrorism, the Pakistan Factor. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers. p. 35. ISBN 8170621275.
  10. 1 2 http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/martyrs/home.aspx
  11. 1 2 Martha Crenshaw (1995). Terrorism in Context. Penn State Press. p. 385 of 633. ISBN 978-0-271-01015-1.
  12. 1 2 Singh, Pritam (2008). Federalism, Nationalism and Development: India and the Punjab Economy. Routledge. p. 44. ISBN 978-0-415-45666-1. Retrieved 29 July 2010.
  13. ↑ "Operation BlueStar Facts".
  14. ↑ "Operation BlueStar, 20 Years On". Rediff.com. 6 June 1984. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  15. ↑ Allegations of UK involvement in the Indian operation at Sri Harmandir Sahib, Amritsar 1984 (PDF) (Report). Cabinet Office. February 2014.
  16. 1 2 3 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-operation-blue-star-india-s-first-tryst-with-militant-extremism-2270293
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  18. ↑ Singh Danewalia, Bhagwan (1997). Police and politics in twentieth century Punjab. Ajanta. p. 430. ISBN 9788120204539.
  19. ↑ Singh Dilgeer, Harjinder. The Sikh Reference Book. Denmark: Sikh Educational Trust for Sikh University Centre. p. 699. ISBN 9780969596424.
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  23. ↑ Cook, Bernard A. (2006). Women and War: A Historical Encyclopedia from Antiquity to the Present. ABC-Clio. p. 218. ISBN 1851097708.
  24. ↑ "Army reveals startling facts on Bluestar". Tribune India. 30 May 1984. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  25. ↑ Kumar, Ram (2003). Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab : Final Report, Volume 1. Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab. p. 38. ISBN 9789993353577.
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  27. ↑ Westerlund, David (1996). Questioning The Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics. C. Hurst & Co. p. 1276. ISBN 1-85065-241-4.
  28. ↑ Singh, Pritam (2008). Federalism, Nationalism and Development: India and the Punjab Economy. Routledge. p. 45. ISBN 978-0-415-45666-1. Retrieved 29 July 2010.
  29. ↑ Ram Narayan Kumar; Amrik Singh; Ashok Agrwaal; Jaskaran Kaur (2003). "Part Two". Reduced to ashes : the insurgency and human rights in Punjab : final report. One (Final Report ed.). South Asia Forum for Human Rights. p. 35. ISBN 99933-53-57-4.
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  32. ↑ Joshi, Chand (1985). Bhindranwale: Myth and Reality. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. p. 129. ISBN 0-7069-2694-3.
  33. ↑ Globalization and Religious nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security by Catarina Kinnvall. Routledge, ISBN 978-1-134-13570-7. Page 119
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  35. ↑ Grewal, Jyoti (2007). Betrayed by the state: the anti-Sikh pogrom of 1984. Penguin Books. p. 61. ISBN 9780143063032.
  36. ↑ Kaur, Harminder (1990). Blue Star Over Amritsar. Ajanta Publications (India). p. 154. ISBN 9788120202573.
  37. ↑ "The confusion in the Governor's house in Chandigarh was made worse by Mrs. Gandhi maintaining contact with Bhindranwale. Her go-between was the President of Punjab Congress, Raghunandan Lal Bhatia... This link, which was well known to officials, enhanced Bhindranwale's status and made the Indian administration even more reluctant to grapple with him."Tully, Mark; Satish Jacob (1985). Amritsar; Mrs. Gandhi's last Battle. New Delhi: Rupa & Co. p. 121. ISBN 81-291-0917-4.
  38. ↑ Blank, Jonah (2000). Arrow of The Blue Skinned God: retracing the Ramayana through India. New York: Grove Press. p. 354. ISBN 0-8021-3733-4.
  39. ↑ India in 1984: Confrontation, Assassination, and Succession, by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Asian Survey, 1985 University of California Press
  40. ↑ http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/nightsoffalsehood/falsehood4.htm
  41. 1 2 Singh, Tavleen. "Prophet of Hate:J S Bhindranwale". India Today. Archived from the original on 20 June 2008. Retrieved 22 December 2009.
  42. 1 2 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar – Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (Calcutta: Rupa & Co. by arrangement with Pan Books, London, 1985)
  43. ↑ Longowal said "Whenever the situation becomes ripe for settlement, some violent incident takes place. I know Bhindranwale is behind the murder of the DIG", "(The person behind the murder is) The one who is afraid of losing his seat of power"Indian Express. 27 April 1983. interview with Longowal.
  44. ↑ Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1984, page 79.
  45. ↑ Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale – Life, Mission, and Martydrom by Ranbir S. Sandhu, May 1997
  46. ↑ City of Death, Time, 7 November 1983.
  47. ↑ Singh, Sangat (1992). The Sikhs In History. Uncommon Books. p. 378. ISBN 81-900650-0-9.
  48. ↑
  49. 1 2 Sharma, Cf. Brig. Man Mohan (1998). What Ails The Indian Army. Trishul Publications. pp. 273–75. ISBN 81-85384-25-8.
  50. ↑
  51. ↑ Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. p. 54. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  52. 1 2 Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. pp. 81–82. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  53. ↑
  54. ↑ Ahmed, Ishtiaq (1996). State, Nation, and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 130. ISBN 1-85567-578-1.
  55. ↑ Singh, Sangat: The Sikhs in History
  56. ↑ Hamlyn, Michael (6 June 1984). "Journalists removed from Amritsar: Army prepares to enter Sikh shrine". The Times. p. 36.
  57. ↑ Tully, Mark (1985). Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle. Jonathan Cape.
  58. ↑ "Gun battle rages in Sikh holy shrine". The Times. 5 June 1984. p. 1.
  59. 1 2 Dr.Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, page = 377
  60. ↑ History of Sikhs, Sangat Singh, pp=??
  61. ↑ Sangat Singh, page = 377
  62. ↑ Brar, K.S. (19 92). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. pp. 81–82. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  63. ↑ Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. pp. 61. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  64. ↑ Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P) Limited. pp. 81–110. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  65. ↑ Video of interview with an Indian Army Officer who explains details of how the Sikhs fought, and the number of casualties.
  66. ↑ Kaur, Gunisha (3 June 2013). "Remembering The Massacre Of Sikhs In June Of 1984". Huffington Post.
  67. ↑ Tully and Jacbo, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, page 152
  68. ↑ Chand Joshi, Bhindrawale: Myth and reality, page 161
  69. ↑ Singh, Sangat, Sikhs in History
  70. ↑ CNN-IBN: Archives, the 25th Anniversary
  71. 1 2 Sikhs in History
  72. ↑ Sangat Singh, Sikhs in history, page 383
  73. ↑
  74. ↑ "General promises to punish Sikh mutineers". The New York Times. 2 July 1984. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  75. ↑ "Operation Blue Star (1984) Information, Photos & Videos". YouthTimes.in. YouthTimes.in.
  76. ↑ "1984: Indian prime minister shot dead". BBC News. 31 October 1984. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  77. ↑ "Sikhs, in rally, press the army to quit temple", Sanjoy Hazarika, The New York Times, 3 September 1984.
  78. ↑
  79. ↑ "Indian policemen raid Sikh temple", Steven R. Weishan, New York Times, 1 May 1986.
  80. ↑ New York Times, 2 May 1986.
  81. ↑ "India Uproots Thousands Living Near Sikh Temple", Barbara Crossette, New York Times, 3 June 1990.
  82. ↑
  83. ↑ Anniversary Issue, India Today, 26 December 2005, p 136.
  84. 1 2 "Indira Gandhi had since long been planning for an attack on Darbar Sahib..." Harjinder Singh Dilgeer (2012). Sikh History in 10 Volumes. vol 7, p. 168; 196-197.
  85. ↑ Man Mohan Sharma (1998). What ails the Indian army: a report to the Supreme Commander of the Indian Armed Forces. Trishul Publications. p. 273. ISBN 978-81-85384-25-2. Retrieved 31 March 2013.
  86. ↑ Interview of Lt .Gen Sinha on Operation Blue Star
  87. 1 2 Shreenivas Kumar Sinha (1 September 1992). A soldier recalls. Lancer Publishers. p. 392. ISBN 978-81-7062-161-4. Retrieved 31 March 2013.
  88. ↑ Weaver, Mary Anne (1984). "Sikhs vanish in Indian crackdown". The Sunday Times..
  89. ↑ Mark Tully, Satish Jacob (1985). Amritsar; Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle. London. pp. 58–9.
  90. ↑ Dhillon, Gurdashan Singh. Truth About Punjab (SGPC White Paper). Amristar: Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee.
  91. ↑ Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Volume II: 1839-2004, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 341.
  92. ↑ Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. p. 31. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  93. ↑ Singh, Patwant (1994). "Alienation Is The Key". Sikh Review. Sikhreview.org.
  94. 1 2 3 4 Hamlyn, Michael (6 June 1984). "Journalists removed from Amritsar: Army prepares to enter Sikh shrine". The Times. p. 36.
  95. ↑ "Gun battle rages in Sikh holy shrine". The Times. 5 June 1984. p. 1.
  96. ↑ Hamlyn, Michael (6 June 1984). "Journalists removed from Amritsar: Army prepares to enter Sikh shrine". The Times. p. 36. Its is also apparent that the Indian authorities wish to invade the temple without the eyes of the foreign press upon them. No foreign correspondent is being allowed into Punjab now.
  97. ↑ Hamlyn, Michael (12 June 1984). "Amritsar witness puts death toll at 1000". The Times. p. 7.
  98. ↑ Eric Silver (7 June 1984), "Golden Temple Sikhs Surrender", The Guardian
  99. 1 2 Chellaney, Brahma (14 June 1984). "Sikhs in Amritsar 'tied up and shot'". The Times.
  100. ↑ Chellaney, Brahma (14 June 1984). "Sikh rebels were shot 'at point-blank range'". The Times.
  101. ↑ "Toll in assault on Sikh Temple termed vastly underestimated". The Miami Herald. 11 June 1984.
  102. ↑ "Indian Police Question Reporter on Amritsar". The New York Times. Associated Press. 24 November 1984. Retrieved 14 January 2009.
  103. ↑ "India is set to drop prosecution of AP reporter in Punjab Case". The New York Times. Associated Press. 14 September 1985. p. 5. Retrieved 14 January 2009.
  104. ↑ Stevens (30 October 1984). "India is said to drop prosecution of A. P. reporter in Punjab case =". The New York Times. p. 5. Mr. Chellaney reported a death toll of 1,200 at a time when the Indian Government said the figure was 576. He also reported that 8 to 10 Sikhs had been tied up and shot by soldiers. The Government called his dispatches false and inflammatory. The A. P. defended the accuracy of his reports, which were supported by Indian and other press accounts.
  105. ↑ Judge V M Tarkunde, et al., Oppression in Punjab: Report to the Nation, New Delhi: Citizens for Democracy, 1985, pp. 8–10, 18–19
  106. ↑ Mary Anne Weaver, The Christian Science Monitor, 15 October 1984)
  107. ↑ Ram Narayan Kumar, et al., Reduced to Ashes (Volume One), Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu, Nepal, May 2003, pp. 75)
  108. ↑ I.S. Jaijee. Politics of Genocide: 1984–1998. Ajanta Publishers, New Delhi, India.
  109. ↑ Cynthia Mahmood. Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants. University of Pennsylvania Press.
  110. 1 2 Pettigrew, Joyce (1995). The Sikhs of the Punjab: unheard voices of State and Guerilla violence. Zed Books. ISBN 978-1-85649-355-0. Retrieved 14 July 2010.
  111. 1 2 3 Brar, K.S. (1992). Operation Blue Star: True Story. UBS Publishers Distributors (P), Limited. ISBN 81-7476-068-7.
  112. ↑ Chand Joshi, Bhindrawale: Myth and Reality, page 160

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