Received view of theories

The received view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions which are considered to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. Frederick Suppe describes the position of the received view by saying that it identifies scientific theories with an "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms are given a partial observation interpretation by mean of correspondence rules."^[1] The received view is generally associated with the logical empiricists.

Recently, the received view of theories has been displaced by the semantic view of theories as the dominant position in theory formulation in the philosophy of science.^[2]^[3]^[4]

Notes

↑ Suppe, Frederick (1989), The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. p. 38
↑ Suppe, Frederick (1998). "Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998" (PDF). Philosophy of Science. The University of Chicago Press. 67: S102–S115. doi:10.1086/392812. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
↑ Halvorson, Hans (2012). "What Scientific Theories Could Not Be" (PDF). Philosophy of Science. The University of Chicago Press. 79 (2): 183–206. doi:10.1086/664745. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
↑ Frigg, Roman (2006). "Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories" (PDF). Theoria. The University of Chicago Press. 55 (2): 183–206. Retrieved 14 February 2013.

Philosophy of science

Concepts	Analysis Analytic–synthetic distinction A priori and a posteriori Causality Commensurability Consilience Construct Creative synthesis Demarcation problem Empirical evidence Explanatory power Fact Falsifiability Feminist method Ignoramus et ignorabimus Inductive reasoning Intertheoretic reduction Inquiry Nature Objectivity Observation Paradigm Problem of induction Scientific law Scientific method Scientific revolution Scientific theory Testability Theory choice Theory-ladenness Underdetermination Unity of science

Metatheory of science	Coherentism Confirmation holism Constructive empiricism Constructive realism Constructivist epistemology Contextualism Conventionalism {Deductive-nomological model Hypothetico-deductive model Inductionism} Epistemological anarchism Evolutionism Fallibilism Foundationalism Instrumentalism Pragmatism Model-dependent realism Naturalism Physicalism Positivism-Reductionism-Determinism Rationalism / Empiricism Received view / Semantic view of theories Scientific realism / Anti-realism Scientific essentialism Scientific formalism Scientific skepticism Scientism Structuralism Uniformitarianism Vitalism

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Related topics	Alchemy Criticism of science Epistemology Faith and rationality History and philosophy of science History of science History of evolutionary thought Logic Metaphysics Pseudoscience Relationship between religion and science Rhetoric of science Sociology of scientific knowledge Sociology of scientific ignorance

Philosophers of science by era

Ancient	Plato Aristotle Stoicism Epicurians

Medieval	Averroes Avicenna Roger Bacon William of Ockham Hugh of Saint Victor Dominicus Gundissalinus Robert Kilwardby

Early modern	Francis Bacon Thomas Hobbes René Descartes Galileo Galilei Pierre Gassendi Isaac Newton David Hume

Classical modern	Immanuel Kant Friedrich Schelling Auguste Comte William Whewell Wilhelm Windelband John Stuart Mill Herbert Spencer Pierre Duhem Henri Poincaré Wilhelm Wundt

Late modern	Albert Einstein Bertrand Russell Alfred North Whitehead Rudolf Carnap W. V. O. Quine Bas van Fraassen Carl Gustav Hempel Charles Sanders Peirce Daniel Dennett Hans Reichenbach Ian Hacking Imre Lakatos Jürgen Habermas Karl Pearson Karl Popper Larry Laudan Michael Polanyi Otto Neurath Paul Feyerabend Thomas Kuhn

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