Standstill agreement (India)

A standstill agreement was an agreement signed between the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan and the princely states of the British Indian Empire prior to their integration in the new dominions. The form of the agreement was bilateral between a dominion and a princely state. It provided that all the administrative arrangements then existing between the British Crown and the state would continue unaltered between the signatory dominion (India or Pakistan) and the princely state, until new arrangements were made.[1]

Prior to independence

The draft of the Standstill agreement was formulated on 3 June 1947 by the Political department of the British Indian government. The agreement provided that all the administrative arrangements of 'common concern' then existing between the British Crown and any particular signatory state would continue unaltered between the signatory dominion (India or Pakistan) and the state until new arrangements were made. A separate schedule specified the matters of common concern. During discussion, Jawaharlal Nehru, the future Prime Minister of India, doubted if the agreement should cover only 'administrative' matters. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the future Governor General of Pakistan, gave his view that it should be so.[2]

The standstill agreement was separate from the Instrument of Accession formulated by the States Department around the same time, which was a legal document that involved a surrender of sovereignty to the extent specified in the Instrument.[1]

Both the draft agreements were presented to the Chamber of Princes on 25 July. A States Negotiating Committee was formed to discuss both the agreements, consisting of ten rulers and twelve ministers. After discussion, the Committee finalised both the draft agreements on 31 July.[3]

Some rulers of the princely states attempted to buy time by stating that they would sign the Standstill agreement but not the Instrument of Accession until they had time to decide. In response, the Indian government took the position that it would sign standstill agreements with only those states that acceded.[4] By 15 August 1947, the appointed deadline and the day of Indian independence, all but four princely states interior to India, some 560 of them, signed both the Instrument of Accession and Standstill agreement with India. The exceptions were Hyderabad, which received an extension for a period of two months, Junagadh, and two small states in Kathiawar (Mangrol and Babariawad).[5]

The state of Junagadh executed an Instrument of Accession as well Standstill agreement with Pakistan on 15 August. It was accepted by Pakistan on 13 September.[5] Junagadh was the only state that declared accession to Pakistan by 15 August.[6]

The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, decided to remain independent. It offered to sign standstill agreements with both of the dominions. Pakistan immediately accepted, but India asked for further discussions.

The Khanate of Kalat, at the western periphery of Pakistan, also decided to remain independent. It signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan.

Jammu and Kashmir

Pakistan signed a standstill agreement with the ruler of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India did not sign this instrument. Pakistan launched an invasion of Kashmir despite having signed the Agreement.

Hyderabad State

The Nizam of Hyderabad, who had previously received a three-month extension to agree new arrangements with the Dominion of Inida, wrote to the Government of India on 18 September that he was willing to make a treaty of association with India. But he maintained that an accession would lead to disturbance and bloodshed in the state.[7] On 11 October, Hyderabad sent a delegation to Delhi with a draft Standstill agreement, which was characterised as "elaborate" by V. P. Menon, the secretary of the States Department. The States minister Vallabhbhai Patel rejected any agreement that would not completely cede Defence and External affairs to the Government of India. Upon the advice of Governor General Louis Mountbatten, Menon prepared a new draft agreement which was sent back with the Hyderabad delegation. The Executive Council of the Nizam discussed the agreement and approved it with six votes to three. Nizam expressed acceptance but delayed signing the agreement.[8]

Soon the Nizam came under pressure from Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (Ittehad), the Muslim nationalist party that was active in the state, and backed off from the agreement.[8] Qasim Rizvi, the leader of Ittehad, organised a massive demonstration of several thousand activists to blockade the delegation's departure. He persuaded the Nizam that, since India was then tied up with defending Kashmir, it had insufficient resources to pressure Hyderabad. He claimed that an agreement considerably more favourable to Hyderabad is possible.[9][10] The Nizam then appointed a new delegation dominated by the Executive Council members that opposed the previous agreement.[11] Former Hyderabad bureaucrat Mohammed Hyder called this event the "October Coup". From this point on, Qasim Rizvi began to call the shots in the Hyderabad administration.[10]

The new delegation secured only trivial amendments to the earlier draft of the agreement.[12][10] It laid down that all agreements and administrative arrangements then existing between the British Crown and the Nizam would continue with the Government of India. These included defence, external affairs and communications (the three subjects normally covered in the Instrument of Accession). Agents would be exchanged between Hyderabad and India. The Government of India agreed to renounce the functions of paramountcy. The Standstill agreement was to remain in force for a period of one year.[12] The agreement was signed by the Nizam on 29 November 1947.[13]

Significantly, the agreement did not provide for the Dominion of India to station Indian forces in the state, whereas British India had maintained various cantonments, particularly in Secunderabad, as part of its "subsidiary alliance" with state. Over the course of the next 6 months, the Indian troops were withdrawn from the state.[14]

According to K. M. Munshi, who was appointed as India's Agent General in Hyderabad, Indians felt that entering into a Standstill agreement with Hyderabad meant that India had lost its grip on Hyderabad affairs. The Hyderabad State Congress opposed it because it was seen as a sign of weakness by the government of India.[15] V. P. Menon has stated that Nizam and his advisers viewed the agreement as providing breathing space during which the Indian troops would be withdrawn and the state could build up its position so as to assert independence.[16]

Hyderabad violated all clauses of the agreement: in external affairs, by carrying out intrigues with Pakistan, to which it secretly loaned 15 million pounds; in defence, by building up a large semi-private army; in communications, by interfering with the traffic at the borders and the through traffic of Indian railways.[17] India was also accused of violating the agreement by imposing an economic blockade. It turned out that the state of Bombay was interfering with supplies to Hyderabad without the knowledge of Delhi. There were also delays in arms shipments to Hyderabad from India.[18]

More seriously, the Ittehad promoted vast armed bands of razakars who threatened communal peace inside the state as well as along the border. After multiple rounds of negotiations, the government of India delivered an ultimatum on 31 August 1948, demanding a ban on the razakars and the stationing of Indian troops in the state to keep law and order. When these were denied, India invaded the state on 13 September sending in troops via three access routes. The Nizam surrendered after four days, and agreed to Indian demands.[19]

Subsequently, the Nizam signed the Instrument of Accession in November 1948, joining India.[20]

References

  1. 1 2 Hodson 1969, p. 370.
  2. ↑ Hodson 1969, p. 370; Menon 1956, p. 62
  3. ↑ Hodson 1969, p. 370; Menon 1956, p. 75
  4. ↑ Menon 1956, p. 78.
  5. 1 2 Menon 1956, p. 82.
  6. ↑ Behera 2007, pp. 12–13.
  7. ↑ Menon 1956, p. 222.
  8. 1 2 Menon 1956, p. 225.
  9. ↑ Menon 1956, p. 226.
  10. 1 2 3 Hyder 2012, Chapter: The Beginning of the End.
  11. ↑ Menon 1956, pp. 225–227.
  12. 1 2 Hodson 1969, p. 480.
  13. ↑ Menon 1956, p. 229.
  14. ↑ Menon 1956, pp. 231–232.
  15. ↑ Kamat 2007, p. 216.
  16. ↑ Menon 1956, p. 231.
  17. ↑ Hodson 1969, pp. 480–481.
  18. ↑ Hodson 1969, pp. 480–481; Raghavan 2010, p. 77
  19. ↑ Raghavan 2010, p. 98.
  20. ↑ Chandra, Mukherjee & Mukherjee 2008, p. 96.

Bibliography

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