Iran–United States relations

Iran-United States relations

Iran	United States

There are no formal diplomatic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America. Because the two nations currently do not have direct diplomatic relations, instead of exchanging ambassadors, Iran maintains an interests section at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C.,^[1] while the United States has maintained a corresponding interests section at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran (since 1980).^[2] Since December 2011, the United States has also maintained a virtual embassy online (now a blocked website in Iran).^[3][4]

Relations between the two nations began in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Initially, while Iran was very wary of British and Russian colonial interests during the Great Game, the United States was seen as a more trustworthy Western power, and the Americans Arthur Millspaugh and Morgan Shuster were even appointed treasurers-general by the Shahs of the time. During World War II, Iran was invaded by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, both US allies, but relations continued to be positive after the war until the later years of the government of Mohammad Mossadeq, who was overthrown by a coup organized by the Central Intelligence Agency and aided by the MI6. This was followed by an era of very close alliance and friendship between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime and the U.S. government, which was in turn followed by a dramatic reversal and disagreement between the two countries after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.^[5] During this era, Iran was one of the United States' closest allies.^[6][7][8]

Opinions differ over what has caused the cooling in relations. Iranian explanations include everything from the natural and unavoidable conflict between the Islamic Revolution on the one hand, and perceived American arrogance^[9] and desire for global hegemony on the other.^[10] Other explanations include the Iranian government's need for an external bogeyman to furnish a pretext for domestic repression against pro-democratic forces and to bind the government to its loyal constituency.^[11]

Since 1995, the United States has had an embargo on trade with Iran.^[12] In 2015 the United States led successful negotiations for a nuclear deal intended to dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities, and when Iran complied in 2016 sanctions on Iran were lifted.^[13][14]

According to a 2013 BBC World Service Poll, 5% of Americans view Iranian influence positively, with 87% expressing a negative view, the most unfavorable perception of Iran in the world.^[15] On the other side, research has shown that most of Iranians have positive attitudes towards American people, though not the government.^[16][17] Relations tend to improve when the two countries have overlapping goals, such as repelling Sunni militants.^[18]

Country comparison

	Iran	United States
Populations	79,476,308	319,435,701
Area	1,648,195 km² (636,372 sq mi)	9,857,306 km² (3,805,927 sq mi)
Population density	48/km² (124/sq mi)	34.2/km² (88.2/sq mi)
Capital	Tehran	Washington, D.C.
Largest city	Tehran	New York City
Government	Unitary state, Islamic republic, Theocratic	Federal, Presidential, Constitutional Republic
Current leader	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei	President Barack Obama
Official languages	Persian	English
Main religions	Shia Islam 90–95%[19][20] Sunni Islam 4–8%[21] Christianity 1% Judaism 0.9%.	Christianity 73%, Non-Religious 19.6%,[22] Judaism 1.7%.
GDP (nominal)	$405.540 billion ($5,193 per capita)	$16.768 Trillion ($53,001 per capita)
GDP (PPP)	$974.406 billion ($12,478 per capita)	$16.768 Trillion ($53,001 per capita)
Military expenditures	$14.7 billion[23]	$593 billion[24]

Early relations

The Treaty of Commerce and Navigations (signed in 1856) was the first diplomatic interaction the United States and Persia had. The treaty lasted until 1928. Because the U.S. had little interest in Persian affairs, while U.S. as a trustworthy outsider did not suffer. The Persians again sought the U.S. for help in straightening out its finances after World War I. This mission unlike the last was opposed by powerful vested interests and eventually it was withdrawn with its task uncompleted. Following this there was no special U.S. concern with Iran or any interaction until World War II.^[25]

Political relations between Persia and the United States began when the Shah of Persia, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, officially dispatched Persia's first ambassador, Mirza Abolhasan Shirazi, to Washington D.C. in 1856."^[26] In 1883, Samuel G. W. Benjamin was appointed by the United States as the first official diplomatic envoy to Iran, however; Ambassadorial relations were not established until 1944.^[26]

The first Persian Ambassador to the United States of America was Mirza Albohassan Khan Ilchi Kabir. Americans had been traveling to Iran since the early to mid-1880s, even before political relations existed between the two. Justin Perkins and Asahel Grant were the first missionaries to be dispatched to Persia in 1834 via the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

Amir Kabir, Prime Minister under Nasereddin Shah, also initiated direct contacts with the American government in Washington. By the end of the 19th century, negotiations were underway for an American company to establish a railway system from the Persian Gulf to Tehran.

Until World War II, relations between Iran and the United States remained cordial. As a result, many Iranians sympathetic to the Persian Constitutional Revolution came to view the U.S. as a "third force" in their struggle to break free of British and Russian dominance in Persian affairs. American industrial and business leaders were supportive of Persia's drive to modernize its economy and free itself from British and Russian influence.

• 
  The U.S. Consulate at Arg e Tabriz sits in the line of fire during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. While the city was being attacked and bombed by 4,000 Russian troops in December 1911, Howard Baskerville took to arms, helping the people of Iran.
• 
  Americans wearing jobbeh va kolah (traditional Persian clothes) at the opening of The Majles, January 29, 1924. Mr. McCaskey, Dr. Arthur Millspaugh, and Colonel MacCormack are seen in the photo.
• 
  Morgan Shuster and US officials at Atabak Palace, Tehran, 1911. Their group was appointed by Iran's parliament to reform and modernize Iran's Department of Treasury and Finances.
• 
  McCormick Hall, American College of Tehran, circa 1930, chartered by the State University of New York in 1932. Americans also founded Iran's first modern College of Medicine in the 1870s.
• 
  Joseph Plumb Cochran, American Presbyterian missionary. He is credited as the founder of Iran's first modern Medical School.
• 
  American Memorial School in Tabriz, established in 1881.

In 1909, during the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Howard Baskerville, an American, died in Tabriz while trying to help the constitutionalists in a battle against royalist forces. After the Iranian parliament appointed American financial consultant Morgan Shuster as appointed Treasurer General of Persia in 1911, an American was killed in Tehran by henchmen thought to be affiliated with Russian or British interests. Shuster became even more active in supporting the Constitutional revolution of Persia financially.^[27] When Iran's government ordered Shu'a al-Saltaneh (شعاع السلطنه), the Shah's brother who was aligned with the goals of Imperial Russia in Persia, to surrender his assets, Shuster moved to execute the seizure. Imperial Russia immediately landed troops in Bandar Anzali, demanding a recourse and apology from the Persian government. Russia's General Liakhov subsequently shelled Iran's parliament in Tehran as part of actions to protect Russia's interests during the chain of events, and Morgan Shuster was forced to resign under British and Russian pressure. Shuster's book The Strangling of Persia is a recount of the details of these events and is critical of Britain and Imperial Russia.

The American Embassy first reported to the Iran desk at the Foreign Office in London about the popular view of Britain's involvement in the 1921 coup that brought Reza Shah to power.^[28][29] A British Embassy report from 1932 admits that the British put Reza Shah "on the throne". At that time, Persia did not view the United States as an ally of Britain.

Morgan Shuster was soon followed by Arthur Millspaugh, who was appointed Treasurer General by Reza Shah, and Arthur Pope, who was a main driving force behind the Persian Empire revivalist policies of Reza Shah. The friendly relations between the United States and Iran lasted until the 1950s.

Reign of the Shah

• 
  The Shah with Harry S. Truman in 1949.
• 
  The Shah with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959.
• 
  The Shah with John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara in 1962.
• 
  The Shah with Richard Nixon in 1969.

In 1941 the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran deposed the believed to be Axis leaning Shah and established a supply route of war materiel to the USSR. From 1942 US troops were involved in the operation of this Persian Corridor one of the routes through which the US delivered Lend Lease supplies to the USSR.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi maintained close ties with the United States during most of his reign, which lasted from 1941 until he was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. He pursued a Westernizing, modernizing economic policy, and a strongly pro-Western foreign policy; he also made a number of visits to America, where he was regarded as a friend.

Iran's long border with America's Cold War rival, the Soviet Union, and its position as the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, made Iran a "pillar" of US foreign policy in the Middle East.^[30] Prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, many Iranian students and other citizens resided in the United States, and had a positive and welcoming attitude towards America and Americans.^[5] The other way around, from 1950 to 1979, an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 Americans had visited or lived in Iran, and had often expressed their admiration for the Iranian people.^[5]

Prime Minister Mossadeq and his overthrow

In 1953, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq was overthrown by a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-organized coup, in what has been called "a crucial turning point both in Iran's modern history and in U.S. Iran relations." Many Iranians argue that "the 1953 coup and the extensive U.S. support for the shah in subsequent years were largely responsible for the shah's arbitrary rule," which led to the "deeply anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution.^[31]

Until the outbreak of World War II, the United States had no active policy toward Iran.^[32] When the Cold War began, the United States was alarmed by the attempt by the Soviet Union to set up separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, as well as its demand for military rights to the Dardanelles in 1946. This fear was enhanced by the "loss of China" to communism, the uncovering of Soviet spy rings, and the start of the Korean War.^[33]

In 1952 and 1953, the Abadan Crisis took place when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq began nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Established by the British in the early 20th century, the company shared profits (85% for Britain, and 15% for Iran), but the company withheld their financial records from the Iranian government. By 1951, Iranians supported nationalization of the AIOC, and Parliament unanimously agreed to nationalize its holding of, what was at the time, the British Empire’s largest company. The British retaliated with an embargo on Iranian oil, which was supported by international oil companies. Over the following months, negotiations over control and compensation for the oil were deadlocked, and Iran's economy deteriorated.

American President Truman pressed Britain to moderate its position in the negotiations and to not invade Iran. American policies created a feeling in Iran that the United States was on Mosaddeq's side and optimism that the oil dispute would soon be settled with "a series of innovative proposals to settle" the dispute, giving Iran "significant amounts of economic aid". Mosaddeq visited Washington, and the American government made "frequent statements expressing support for him."^[34]

At the same time, the United States honored the British embargo and, without Truman's knowledge, the CIA station in Tehran had been "carrying out covert activities" against Mosaddeq and the National Front "at least since the summer of 1952".^[35]

1953 Iranian coup d'état

As the Cold War intensified, oil negotiations stalled, and the Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Democratic President Harry S. Truman, the United States helped destabilize Mosaddeq on the theory that "rising internal tensions and continued deterioration ... might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control" by Iran's well organized Tudeh communist party.^[36] In spring and summer 1953, the United States and Britain, through a covert operation of the CIA called Operation Ajax, conducted from the American Embassy in Tehran, helped organize a coup d'état to overthrow the Mossadeq government. The operation initially failed, and the Shah fled to Italy, but a second attempt succeeded, and Mosaddeq was imprisoned.

According to a study of the coup headed by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, intended "to resolve" the "controversy" over who and what were responsible, "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup."^[37]

Post-coup

President Lyndon Johnson welcoming the Shah at the White House while Iranians protest, 1967

Following the coup, the United States helped build up the Shah's regime. In the first three weeks, the American government gave Iran $68 million in emergency aid, and an additional $1.2 billion over the next decade.^[38] In this era that ensued, until the fall of the shah in 1979, Iran was one of the United States' closest allies.^[6][7][8]

During his reign, the Shah received significant American support, frequently making state visits to the White House and earning praise from numerous American presidents. The Shah's close ties to Washington and his Westernization policies soon angered some Iranians, especially the hardline Islamic conservatives.

In America, the coup was originally considered a triumph of covert action but is now considered by many to have left "a haunting and terrible legacy."^[39] In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, called it a "setback for democratic government" in Iran.^[40] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei condemned the admission as "deceitful", complaining that it "did not even include an apology".^[41]

Cultural relations

Relations in the cultural sphere remained cordial. Pahlavi University, Sharif University of Technology, and Isfahan University of Technology, three of Iran's top academic universities were all directly modeled on American institutions, such as the University of Chicago, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania.^[42][43][43] The Shah was generous in awarding American universities with financial gifts. For example, the University of Southern California received an endowed chair of petroleum engineering, and a million dollar donation was given to the George Washington University to create an Iranian Studies program.^[42]

Growth of oil revenues

In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably. Starting in the mid-1960s, this "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" while strengthening the power of the Iranian state vis-a-vis the Iranian public. According to scholar Homa Katouzian, this put the United States "in the contradictory position of being regarded" by the Iranian public because of the 1953 coup "as the chief architect and instructor of the regime," while "its real influence" in domestic Iranian politics and policies "declined considerably".^[44]

1977–1979: Carter administration

The Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi meeting with Alfred Atherton, William H. Sullivan, Cyrus Vance, President Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1977

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, shakes hands with a US Air Force general officer prior to his departure from the United States

In the late 1970s, American President Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights in his foreign policy, including the Shah's regime, which by 1977 had garnered unfavorable publicity in the West for its human rights record.^[45] That year, the Shah responded to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the Shah's regime.^[46][47]

At the same time, Carter angered anti-Shah Iranians with a New Years Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he said:

Under the Shah’s brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure whom I could appreciate and like more.^[48]

Observers disagree over the nature of United States policy toward Iran under Carter as the Shah's regime crumbled. According to historian Nikki Keddie, the Carter administration followed "no clear policy" on Iran.^[49] The American ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, recalled that the U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully". On November 4, 1978, Brzezinski called the Shah to tell him that the United States would "back him to the hilt." At the same time, high-level officials in the State Department believed the revolution was unstoppable.^[50] After visiting the Shah in summer of 1978, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse, reporting, "You've got a zombie out there."^[51] Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in their assurances that the Shah would receive military support.

Another scholar, sociologist Charles Kurzman, argues that, rather than being indecisive or sympathetic to the revolution, the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'etat" even after the regime's cause was hopeless.^[52][53]

The 1979 revolution

The 1979 Revolution, which ousted the pro-American Shah and replaced him with the anti-American Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, surprised the United States government, its State Department and intelligence services, which "consistently underestimated the magnitude and long-term implications of this unrest".^[54] Six months before the revolution culminated, the CIA had produced a report, stating that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation."^[55]

Revolutionary students feared the power of the United States—particularly its Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow a new government. One source of this concern was a book by CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. titled Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. Many students had read excerpts from the book and thought that the CIA would attempt to implement this countercoup strategy.^[56]

Khomeini, who referred to America as the "Great Satan",^[57] instantly got rid of the Shah’s prime minister and replaced him with a moderate politician called Mehdi Bazargan. Until this point, the Carter Administration was still hoping for normal relationships with Iran, sending its National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The Islamic revolutionaries wished to extradite and execute the ousted Shah, and Carter refused to give him any further support or help return him to power. The Shah, suffering from terminal cancer, requested entry into the United States for treatment. The American embassy in Tehran opposed the request, as they were intent on stabilizing relations between the new interim revolutionary government of Iran and the United States.^[47] However, President Carter agreed to let the Shah in, after pressure from Henry Kissinger, Nelson Rockefeller and other pro-Shah political figures. Iranians’ suspicion that the Shah was actually trying to conspire against the Iranian Revolution grew; thus, this incident was often used by the Iranian revolutionaries to justify their claims that the former monarch was an American puppet, and this led to the storming of the American embassy by radical students allied with the Khomeini faction.^[47]

The 1979 Iran hostage crisis

Vice President George H. W. Bush and other VIPs wait to welcome the former hostages to Iran home

On November 4, 1979, the revolutionary group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, angered that the recently deposed Shah had been allowed into the United States, occupied the American embassy in Tehran and took American diplomats hostage. The 52 American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days. In Iran, the incident was seen by many as a blow against American influence in Iran and the liberal-moderate interim government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who opposed the hostage taking and resigned soon after. Some Iranians were concerned that the United States may have been plotting another coup against their country in 1979 from the American embassy.^[58] In the United States, the hostage-taking was seen as a violation of a centuries-old principle of international law that granted diplomats immunity from arrest and diplomatic compounds sovereignty in the territory of the host country they occupy.^[59]

The United States military attempted a rescue operation, Operation Eagle Claw, on April 24, 1980, which resulted in an aborted mission and the deaths of eight American military men. The crisis ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in Algeria on January 19, 1981. On January 20, 1981, the date the treaty was signed, the hostages were released. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (located in The Hague, Netherlands) was established for the purpose of handling claims of American nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the United States. American contact with Iran through The Hague covers only legal matters. The crisis led to lasting economic and diplomatic damage. On April 7, 1980, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, a break which has yet to be restored. Since 21 May 1980, the Swiss Government assumed representation of American interests in Tehran via an interests section.^[2] Iranian interests in the United States are represented by the Iranian Interests Section of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Since 21 May 1980, Switzerland serves as the protecting power of the United States in Iran.

Economic consequences of the Iran hostage crisis

Families wait for the former hostages to disembark the plane.

Before the Revolution, the United States was Iran's foremost economic and military partner. This facilitated the modernization of Iran's infrastructure and industry, with as many as 30,000 American expatriates residing in the country in a technical, consulting, or teaching capacity. Some analysts argue that the transformation may have been too rapid, fueling unrest and discontent among an important part of the population in the country and leading to the Revolution in 1979.

After the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, the United States froze about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. According to American officials, most of those were released in 1981 as part of the deal to release the hostages. Some assets—Iranian officials say $10 billion, but U.S. officials say much less—remain frozen, pending resolution of legal claims arising from the Revolution.

Commercial relations between Iran and the United States are restricted by American sanctions and consist mainly of Iranian purchases of food, spare parts, and medical products as well as American purchases of carpets and food. Sanctions originally imposed in 1995 by President Bill Clinton were renewed by President Bush, who cited the "unusual and extraordinary threat" to American national security posed by Iran. The 1995 executive orders prohibit American companies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran, while banning any "contract for the financing of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran". In addition, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) imposed mandatory and discretionary sanctions on non-American companies investing more than $20 million annually in the Iranian oil and natural gas sectors.

The ILSA was renewed for five more years in 2001. Congressional bills signed in 2006 extended and added provisions to the act; on September 30, 2006, the act was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), as it no longer applied to Libya, and extended until December 31, 2011.

1981–1989: Reagan administration

Iran–Iraq War

American intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in arming Iraq in the Iran–Iraq War, although Bob Woodward states that the United States gave information to both sides, hoping "to engineer a stalemate".^[60] In search for a new set or order in this region, the US government adopted a policy designed to contain both Iran and Iraq economically and militarily in favor of the US's national interest.^[61] During the second half of the Iran–Iraq War, the Reagan Administration pursued several sanction bills against Iran; on the other hand, it established full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein's government by removing it from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984.^[61] According to the American Senate Banking Committee, the administrations of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous dual-use items, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.^[62] The Iran–Iraq War ended with both agreeing to a ceasefire in 1988. In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed regret for that support.^[63]

1983: Hezbollah bombings

The United States contends that Hezbollah, a Shi'ite Islamist organization and client of Iran, has been involved in several anti-American terrorist attacks, including the April 1983 United States Embassy bombing which killed 17 Americans, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing which killed 241 U.S. peace keepers in Lebanon, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. An American district court judge ruled in 2003 that the April 1983 United States Embassy bombing was carried out with Iranian support.^[64]

United States District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth declared that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the 1983 attack in a 2003 case brought by the victims' families. Lamberth concluded that Hezbollah was formed under the auspices of the Iranian government, was completely reliant on Iran in 1983, and assisted Iranian Ministry of Information and Security agents in carrying out the operation.^[65] An American federal court has also found that the Khobar Towers bombing was authorized by Ali Khamenei, then ayatollah of Iran.^[66]

Iran-Contra Affair

In 1986, members of the Reagan administration helped sell weapons to Iran, using the profits to fund anti-communist Contras militants in Nicaragua.^[67] Documents relating to the affair were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials.^[68] In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued a televised statement that the arms sales did not occur.^[69] One week later, Reagan confirmed that weapons had been transferred to Iran. He denied that they were part of an exchange for hostages.^[67]

United States attack of 1988

In 1988, the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis against Iran, claiming that it was retaliation for the Iranian mining of areas of the Persian Gulf as part of the Iran–Iraq War. The American attack was the largest American naval combat operation since World War II.^[70] American action began with coordinated strikes by two surface groups that neutralized the Sassan oil platform and the Sirri oil platform of Iran. Iran lost one major warship and a smaller gunboat. Damage to the oil platforms was eventually repaired.^[71] Iran sued for reparations at the International Court of Justice, stating that the United States breached the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The court dismissed the claim but noted that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on October 19, 1987 (Operation Nimble Archer) and April 18, 1988 (Operation Praying Mantis) cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America."^[72] The American attack helped pressure Iran to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq later that summer.^[73]

1988: Iran Air Flight 655

On July 3, 1988, near the end of the Iran–Iraq War, the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iranian Airbus A300B2, which was on a scheduled commercial flight in Iranian airspace over the Strait of Hormuz. The attack killed 290 civilians from six nations, including 66 children. USS Vincennes was in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will. The United States initially contended that flight 655 was a warplane and then said that it was outside the civilian air corridor and did not respond to radio calls. Both statements were untrue, and the radio calls were made on military frequencies to which the airliner did not have access.^[74][75] According to the Iranian government, the attack was an intentional and unlawful act. Iran refused to accept the idea of mistaken identification, arguing that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, because the aircraft was not on a trajectory that threatened the Vincennes and had not aimed radar at it.^[76] The United States has expressed regret for the loss of innocent life but has not apologized to the Iranian government.^[77] The men of the Vincennes were all awarded Combat Action Ribbons for completion of their tours in a combat zone. Lustig, the air-warfare coordinator, received the Navy Commendation Medal, often given for acts of heroism or meritorious service, but a not-uncommon end-of-tour medal for a second tour division officer. According to the History Channel, the medal citation noted his ability to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure."^[78] However, in 1990, The Washington Post listed Lustig's awards as one being for his entire tour from 1984 to 1988 and the other for his actions relating to the surface engagement with Iranian gunboats. In 1990, Rogers was awarded the Legion of Merit "for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service as commanding officer ... from April 1987 to May 1989." The award was given for his service as the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes, and the citation made no mention of the downing of Iran Air 655.^[79]

1993–2001: Clinton administration

In April 1995, a total embargo on dealings with Iran by American companies was imposed by Bill Clinton. This ended trade, which had been growing following the end of the Iran–Iraq War.^[80] The next year, the American Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions act, designed to prevent other countries from making large investments in Iranian energy. The act was denounced by the European Union as invalid, but it blocked some investment for Iran.

Khatami and Iranian reformers

In January 1998, newly elected Iranian President Mohammad Khatami called for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States in a CNN interview. In the interview, Khatami invoked Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America to explain the similarities between American and Iranian quests for freedom. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded positively, and the countries exchanged of wrestling teams. This also brought freer travel between the countries as well as an end to the American embargo of Iranian carpets and pistachios. Relations then stalled due to opposition from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions, including changes in Iranian policy on Israel, nuclear energy, and support for terrorism.^[81]

Inter-Parliamentary (Congress-to-Majlis) informal talks

On August 31, 2000, four United States Congress members, Senator Arlen Specter, Representative Bob Ney, Representative Gary Ackerman, and Representative Eliot L. Engel held informal talks in New York City with several Iranian leaders. The Iranians included Mehdi Karroubi, speaker of the Majlis of Iran (Iranian Parliament); Maurice Motamed, a Jewish member of the Majlis; and three other Iranian parliamentarians.^[82]

2001–2005: Bush administration, first term

9/11

The U.S. indictment of bin Laden filed in 1998 stated that al-Qaeda "forged alliances . . . with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezbollah for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies."^[83] On May 31, 2001, Steven Emerson and Daniel Pipes wrote in The Wall Street Journal that "Officials of the Iranian government helped arrange advanced weapons and explosives training for Al-Qaeda personnel in Lebanon where they learned, for example, how to destroy large buildings."^[84]

The 9/11 Commission Report stated that 8 to 10 of the hijackers on 9/11 previously passed through Iran and their travel was facilitated by Iranian border guards.^[83][85] The report also found "circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000."^[85] After the commission called for "further investigation" into a possible Iranian role in the attacks, President George W. Bush demanded that Iran sever its ties with al-Qaeda, while saying that in his view, "There was no direct connection between Iran and the attacks of September 11."^[86]

Judge George B. Daniels ruled in a federal district court in Manhattan that Iran bears legal responsibility for providing "material support" to the 9/11 plotters and hijackers in Havlish, et al. v. Osama bin Laden, Iran, et al.^[87][88] Included in Judge Daniels' findings was that Iran "used front companies to obtain a Boeing 757-767-777 flight simulator for training the terrorists", Ramzi bin al-Shibh traveled to Iran in January 2001, and an Iranian government memorandum from May 14, 2001 demonstrates Iranian culpability in planning the attacks.^[87] Two defectors from Iran’s intelligence service testified that Iranian officials had "foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks."^[89] By contrast, the 9/11 Commission "found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware of the specific details of their future operation." In addition, both bin al-Shibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed denied "any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah" and "any other reason for the hijackers' travel to Iran" besides "taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports."^[85]

On Tuesday, September 25, 2001, Iran's fifth president, Mohammad Khatami meeting British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said: "Iran fully understands the feelings of the Americans about the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11." He said although the American administrations had been at best indifferent about terrorist operations in Iran (since 1979), the Iranians instead felt differently and had expressed their sympathetic feelings with bereaved Americans in the tragic incidents in the two cities. He also stated that "Nations should not be punished in place of terrorists." ^[90] According to Radio Farda's website, when the attacks' news was released, some Iranian citizens gathered in front of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran, which serves as the protecting power of the United States in Iran (US interests protecting office in Iran), to express their sympathy and some of them lit candles as a symbol of mourning. This piece of news at Radio Farda's website also states that in 2011, on the anniversary of the attacks, United States Department of State, published a post at its blog, in which the Department thanked Iranian people for their sympathy and stated that they would never forget Iranian people's kindness on those harsh days.^[91] After the attacks, both the President and the Supreme Leader of Iran, condemned the attacks. BBC and Time magazine published reports on holding candlelit vigils for the victims by Iranian citizens at their websites.^[92][93] According to Politico magazine, following the attacks, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, "suspended the usual “Death to America” chants at Friday prayers" temporarily. The military forces of the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with each other to overthrow Taliban regime which had had conflicts with the government of Iran.^[94] Iran's Quds Force helped US forces and Afghan rebels in 2001 uprising in Herat.^[95][96]

"Axis of evil" speech

On January 29, 2002 – 4 months after 9/11, US President Bush gave his "Axis of evil" speech, describing Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, as an axis of evil and warning that the proliferation of long-range missiles developed by these countries constituted terrorism and threatened the United States. The speech caused outrage in Iran and was condemned by reformists and conservatives.^[97]

Since 2003, the United States has been flying unmanned aerial vehicles, launched from Iraq, over Iran to obtain intelligence on Iran's nuclear program, reportedly providing little new information.^[98] The Iranian government has described the surveillance as illegal.^[99]

Alleged "Grand Bargain" proposal

A tractor-trailer from Virginia's Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team loaded aboard a C-5 Galaxy heading for Bam, Iran

On May 4, 2003, the Swiss government sent the U.S. State Department an "unusual", unsigned, one-page memorandum, which was not on official letterhead, and also contained a cover letter by Swiss diplomat Tim Guldimannn, which laid out a "Roadmap" for discussions between Iran and the U.S. Under the heading of "U.S. aims," the document stated that Iran was willing to put "the following aims on the agenda": Accepting "the two-states approach" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ending "material support to Palestinian opposition groups ... from Iranian territory," pressuring Hezbollah "to become an exclusively political and social organization within Lebanon," supporting "political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions" in Iraq, taking "decisive action against any terrorists (above all al Qaeda) on Iranian territory," and fully cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure "there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or possess WMD." Under the heading of "Iran aims," the document stated "the U.S. accepts a dialogue ... and agrees that Iran puts the following aims on the agenda": Ending U.S. efforts to change "the political system" in Iran, abolishing "all sanctions," taking action against the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO), recognizing "Iran's legitimate security interests in the region," and granting Iran "access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology." In the cover letter, Guldimann claimed that he developed the "Roadmap" with Sadeq Kharrazi, "the Iranian ambassador in Paris," and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei "agreed with 85-90% of the paper," although he could not obtain "a precise answer on what exactly the Leader explicitly has agreed."^{[100][101][102]} The Bush administration did not respond to the proposal, although in March 2004 President Bush sent Mohamed ElBaradei to Tehran with the message that "an Iranian representative with the authority to make a deal should go to the U.S. and Bush himself would personally lead" negotiations to "resolve all the issues between us;" according to Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian leadership decided "that we should not negotiate with the U.S.," even though "the Americans had taken the first step."^[101][103]

Nevertheless, in 2007, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristoff and others popularized the notion that "hard-liners in the Bush administration killed discussion" of an Iranian "Grand Bargain" that "could have saved lives in Iraq, isolated Palestinian terrorists and encouraged civil society groups in Iran," with Kristoff concluding: "The record indicates that officials from the repressive, duplicitous government of Iran pursued peace more energetically and diplomatically than senior Bush administration officials—which makes me ache for my country."^[104][105] Kristoff claimed "Iran also sent its own master text of the proposal to the State Department and, through an intermediary, to the White House."^[104] However, available evidence casts doubt on the genuineness of this proposal, which may have merely been an invention of Guldimann, who sought to promote U.S.-Iran rapprochement.^[101][102] For example, Michael Rubin noted that "Guldimann told different people different things about the document's origin," while "the Swiss Foreign Ministry refused to back up Guldimann's account."^[106] Iranian and U.S. officials were engaged in a series of secret, high-level negotiations during 2003, and Iran's UN ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif had met with U.S. diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad on May 3—one day prior to the State Department receiving the alleged "Grand Bargain."^[101][102] Glenn Kessler asked "If Iran was serious, why would such an important diplomatic undertaking be transmitted in such a haphazard way through the Swiss ambassador when one of the supposed co-authors was already holding senior-level talks with U.S. officials?"^[101] Similarly, Rubin declared: "Guldimann's ignorance of these ongoing discussions exposed his fraud."^[102] Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recounted that U.S. officials "couldn't determine what was the Iranians' and what was the Swiss ambassador's" and "nothing that we were seeing in this fax was in consonance with what we were hearing face to face,"^[105][107] former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley called the "Grand Bargain" "the result of freelancing by a Swiss diplomat hoping to be the one to make peace between Iran and the United States,"^[108] and a State Department spokesman described the document as "a creative exercise on the part of the Swiss ambassador."^[107] In a March 30, 2006 email to Trita Parsi, Zarif confessed: "The claims and counter claims about the source of the proposals and motivations of intermediaries remain a mystery for me. What I think is important is the fact that Iran was prepared."^[109]

2003: Border incursions begin

Several claims have been made that the US has violated Iranian territorial sovereignty since 2003, including drones,^[110][111] soldiers,^[112] and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK).^[113] An American RQ-7 Shadow and a Hermes UAV have crashed in Iran.^[111] Seymour Hersh stated that the United States has also been penetrating eastern Iran from Afghanistan in a hunt for underground installations developing nuclear weapons.^[112]

2005–2009: Bush administration, second term

In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. On 8 May 2006, he sent a personal letter to President Bush to propose "new ways" to end Iran's nuclear dispute.^[114] U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley both dismissed it as a negotiating ploy and publicity stunt that did not address American concerns about Iran's nuclear program.^[115] Ahmadinejad later said that "the letter was an invitation to monotheism and justice, which are common to all divine prophets".^[116]

Bush insisted in August 2006 that "there must be consequences" for Iran's continued enrichment of uranium. He said that "the world now faces a grave threat from the radical regime in Iran."^[117] Ahmadinejad invited Bush to a debate at the UN General Assembly, which was to take place on September 18, 2006. The debate was to be about Iran's right to enrich uranium. The invitation was promptly rejected by White House spokesman Tony Snow, who said "There's not going to be a steel-cage grudge match between the President and Ahmadinejad".^[118]

Columbia University students protesting against the university's decision to invite Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the university campus

In November 2006, Ahmadinejad wrote an open letter to the American people,^[119] stating that dialogue was urgently needed because of American activities in the Middle East and that the United States was concealing the truth about relations.^[120]

In September 2007, Ahmadinejad addressed the UN General Assembly. Prior to this, he gave a speech at Columbia University, where university president Lee Bollinger used his introduction to portray the Iranian leader as "astonishingly uneducated" and as a "cruel and petty dictator". Ahmadinejad answered a query about the treatment of gays in Iran by saying: "We don't have homosexuals like in your country. We don't have that in our country. We don't have this phenomenon; I don't know who's told you we have it". An aide later stated that he was misrepresented and was actually saying that "compared to American society, we don't have many homosexuals".^[121] Ahmadinejad was not permitted to lay a wreath at the World Trade Center site. He stated, "Many innocent people were killed there. Some of those people were American citizens, obviously...We obviously are very much against any terrorist action and any killing. And also we are very much against any plots to sow the seeds of discord among nations. Usually, you go to these sites to pay your respects. And also to perhaps to air your views about the root causes of such incidents." When told that Americans believed that Iran exported terrorism and would be offended by the "photo op", he replied, "Well, I'm amazed. How can you speak for the whole of the American nation?...You are representing a media and you're a reporter. The American nation is made up of 300 million people. There are different points of view over there".^[122]

In an April 2008 speech, Ahmadinejad described the September 11 attacks as a "suspect event", saying that all that happened was that "a building collapsed". He stated that the death toll was never published, that the victims' names were never published, and that the attacks were used subsequently as pretext for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.^[123] That October, he expressed happiness about the 2008 global economic crisis and what he called "collapse of liberalism". He said the West has been driven to a dead-end and that Iran was proud "to put an end to liberal economy".^[124] The previous month, he had told the UN General Assembly, "The American empire in the world is reaching the end of its road, and its next rulers must limit their interference to their own borders".^[125]

Iran's nuclear program

Since 2003, the United States has alleged that Iran has a program to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is aimed only at generating electricity. The United States's position is that "a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable",^[126] but officials have denied that the United States is preparing for an imminent strike. The United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany have also attempted to negotiate a cessation of nuclear enrichment activities by Iran.^[127]

In June 2005, Condoleezza Rice said that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head Mohamed ElBaradei should either "toughen his stance on Iran" or not be chosen for a third term as IAEA head.^[128] Both the United States and Iran are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States and other countries were alleged during the May 2005 NPT meeting to be in violation of the NPT through Article VI, which requires them to disarm. The IAEA has stated that Iran is in violation of a Safeguards Agreement related to the NPT, due to insufficient reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use.^[129] Under Article IV, the treaty gives non-nuclear states the right to develop civilian nuclear energy programs.^[130] From 2003 to early 2006, tensions mounted between the United States and Iran while IAEA inspections of sensitive nuclear industry sites in Iran continued.

On March 8, 2006, American and European representatives noted that Iran has enough unenriched uranium hexafluoride gas to make ten atomic bombs, adding that it was "time for the Security Council to act".^[131] The unenriched uranium cannot be used either in the Bushehr reactor, which is a pressurized water reactor, nor in atomic bombs, unless it becomes enriched.

Conservative and pro-Israeli lobbyist groups such as AIPAC state that, "American policy must unabashedly seek to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability. A nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat to Israel and would arm the world's leading sponsor of terrorism with the ultimate weapon."^[132]

"Down with the U.S.A" mural in Tehran, Iran, 2006

Iran fears of attack by the U.S.

In 2006, the United States passed the Iran Freedom and Support Act, which appropriated millions of dollars for human rights Non-governmental organization (NGOs) working in Iran. Several politicians in both countries have claimed the Act is a "stepping stone to war",^[133] although the Act prohibits the use of force against Iran.

In May 2007, Iran's top diplomat Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated that Iran is "ready to talk" to the United States.^[134] That month, Iran announced willingness, under certain conditions, to improve its relations with the United States despite having passed up the opportunity for direct talks at the Iraq conference in Sharm El-Sheikh on May 3, 2007. The conference had been seen by the Americans as an opportunity to get closer to the Iranians and exchange gestures in a public forum.^[135]

U.S. military operations inside Iran

In March 2006, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK), an opposition group closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) killed 24 members of the Iranian security forces. The PEJAK is linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Dennis Kucinich stated in an April 18, 2006, letter to Bush that PEJAK was supported and coordinated by the United States, since it is based in Iraq, which is under the de facto control of American military forces. In November 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker supported this claim, stating that the American military and the Israelis are giving the group equipment, training, and targeting information in order to create internal pressures in Iran.^[136]

On April 3, 2007, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) stated that the United States had supported Jundullah since 2005.^[137] The Washington Times has described Jundullah as a militant Islamic organization based in Waziristan, Pakistan and affiliated with Al-Qaeda that has claimed to kill approximately 400 Iranian soldiers.^[138]

The United States has escalated its covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources.^[139] They state that Bush sought up to $400,000,000 for these military operations, which were described in a secret Presidential Finding and are designed to destabilize Iran's religious leadership. The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since 2007. The scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have been significantly expanded in 2008.^[139]

Iraqi insurgency

Iran has been accused by the United States of giving weapons and support to the Iraqi insurgency (which includes the terrorist group al-Qaeda). The United States State Department states that weapons are smuggled into Iraq and used to arm Iran's allies among the Shiite militias, including those of the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army.^[140] Evidence for this is that weapons, including mortars, rockets and munitions bear Iranian markings. U.S. commanders report that these bombs inflicted 30 percent of all American military casualties in Iraq excluding Anbar province, where these weapons have not been found. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence has obtained satellite photographs of three training camps for Iraqi insurgents near Iran's capital where they are allegedly trained guerilla tactics, kidnapping and assassination.^[141]

Admiral and United States Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell stated in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations that there is overwhelming evidence that Iran is arming the insurgency in Iraq, "The Iranians today, we have clear evidence, are providing the very weapons that are causing U.S. servicemen and women to die. That’s clear, that’s not refuted, that’s not hawkish, that’s not shaded. That is the fact." He stated that Iran is providing explosively formed projectiles, a deadly weapon to the Shiite militants in Iraq.^[142] During his address to the United States Congress on September 11, 2007, Commanding officer for the United States forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus noted that the multinational forces in Iraq have found that Iran's Quds force has provided training, equipment, funding, and direction to terrorists. "When we captured the leaders of these so-called special groups … and the deputy commander of a Lebanese Hezbollah department that was created to support their efforts in Iraq, we’ve learned a great deal about how Iran has, in fact, supported these elements and how those elements have carried out violent acts against our forces, Iraqi forces and innocent civilians."^[143] In a speech on 31 January 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that Iran was supporting attacks against Coalition forces in Iraq.^[144]

Beginning in 2014, the United States and Iran began unofficially limited cooperation with one another in the fight against the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).^[145][146]

2006 sanctions against Iranian institutions

Pushing for international sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program, the United States accused Iran of providing logistical and financial support to Shi'a militias in Iraq. Iran denied this claim.^[147] The American government imposed sanctions on an Iranian bank on September 8, 2006, barring it from direct or indirect dealings with American financial institutions. The move against Bank Saderat Iran was announced by the undersecretary for treasury, who accused the bank of transferring funds for terrorist groups, including $50,000,000 to Hezbollah. While Iranian financial institutions are barred from directly accessing the American financial system, they are permitted to do so indirectly through banks in other countries. He said the United States government would also persuade European financial institutions not to deal with Iran.^[148]

2007 US raids Iran Consulate General

In 2007, US forces raided the Iranian Consulate General located in Erbil, Iraq and arrested five staff members. Sources said that American forces landed their helicopters around the building, broke through the consulate’s gate, disarmed the guards, confiscated documents, arrested five staff members, and left for an undisclosed location. People living in the neighborhood were told they could not leave their homes. Three people who left their homes were arrested, and a wife of one of these men confirmed her husband's arrest.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Kamynin said that the raid was an unacceptable violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Kurdistan Regional Government also expressed their disapproval.

At a hearing in Iraq on January 11, 2007, United States Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told Rice that the Bush Administration did not have the authority to send American troops on cross-border raids. Biden said, "I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need congressional authority to do that. I just want to set that marker".^[149] Biden sent a follow-up letter to the White House asking for an explanation on the matter.

The same day, Iran's foreign ministry sent a letter to Iraq's foreign ministry, asking Iraq to stop the United States from interfering with Iraq-Iran relations. The official said, "We expect the Iraqi government to take immediate measures to set the aforesaid individuals free and to condemn the US troopers for the measure. Following up on the case and releasing the arrestees is a responsibility of primarily the Iraqi government and then the local government and officials of the Iraqi Kurdistan".

On November 9, American forces released two Iranian diplomats after 305 days,^[150] as well as seven other Iranian citizens. The officials were captured in the raid, and the others had been picked up in different parts of the country and held for periods ranging from three months to three years.^[151] American officials said, "The release followed a careful review of individual records to determine if they posed a security threat to Iraq, and if their detention was of continued intelligence value".^[151] American forces still hold 11 Iranian diplomats and citizens.

IRGC terrorist designation

The United States has opposed the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) based on "the group's growing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as its support for extremists throughout the Middle East".^[152] The United States branded the IRGC a terrorist organization,^[153] and Iran responded by declaring the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Army to be terrorist organizations.^[154] The Iranian resolution cited American involvement in dropping nuclear bombs in Japan in World War II, using depleted uranium munitions in the Balkans, bombing and killing Iraqi civilians, and torturing terror suspects in prisons.^[155]

Michael Rubin, a senior research fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, said he feared the IRGC designation "might exculpate the rest of the regime when, in reality, the IRGC's activities cannot be separated from the state leadership of Supreme Leader Khamenei or President Ahmadinejad".^[156] The Iranian newspaper Kayhan quoted the commander of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards as threatening to deal heavier blows against the United States in response to the designation.^[157] Mohammad Khatami, former Reforms Front Iranian President hoped to "remind those in the U.S. Congress or elsewhere working for the benefit of the American nation to stand against these measures or the wall between the two countries grow taller and thicker".^[158]

This is the first time that official armed units of sovereign states are included in a list of banned terrorist groups.^[159] Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, a former consultant to the UN's program of Dialogue Among Civilizations,^[160] stated in Asia Times Online that the move has possible legal implications: "Under international law, it could be challenged as illegal, and untenable, by isolating a branch of the Iranian government for selective targeting. This is contrary to the 1981 Algiers Accord's pledge of non-interference in Iran's internal affairs by the US government".^[161] News leaks about the prospective designation worried European governments and private sector firms, which could face prosecution in American courts for working with the IRGC.^[162]

2008 Naval dispute

The American government has stated that naval stand-offs between Iranian speedboats and American warships occurred in the Strait of Hormuz in December 2007 and January 2008. American officials accused Iran of harassing and provoking their naval vessels, but Iran denied the claim. The United States presented audio and video footage of the incident, which included threats made to the Americans. Iranians have told The Washington Post that the accent in the recording does not sound Iranian. Iran has accused the United States of creating a "media fuss" and has released its own abridged video recording of the incident, which does not contain threats.^{[74][163][164]} There has been significant confusion as to the source of the threatening radio transmissions. According to the newspaper Navy Times, the incident could have been caused by a locally famous heckler known as the "Filipino Monkey".^{[165][166][167]}

Covert action against Iran

In 2008, New Yorker reporter Seymour Hersh detailed American covert action plans against Iran involving the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Special Forces.^[168] Journalist David Ignatius of the Washington Post asserted that American covert action "appears to focus on political action and the collection of intelligence rather than on lethal operations".^[169] Iranian commentator Ali Eftagh stated that the covert actions are being made public by the American government as a form of psychological warfare.^[170]

Other events (2007–2008)

A meeting in Baghdad between Iranian and American diplomats was "the first formal direct contact after decades during which neither country has been willing to talk to the other."^[171] Asia Times commentator Kaveh L Afrasiabi noted that success in United States-Iran nuclear negotiations depends on Iranian perception of American respect.^[172]

A former Iranian diplomat, Nosratollah Tajik, was arrested in the UK and accused by the United States of smuggling arms. He initially appeared in court on April 19, 2007, fighting extradition to the US.^[173] The case is still ongoing.^[174]

Congressional Resolution 362^[175] calls for a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. As of June 2, 2008, the resolution had 146 co-sponsors.^[176] In January 2009, The New York Times reported that the United States had rejected a 2008 appeal from Israel to attack Iran's main nuclear complex.^[177]

2009–present: Obama administration

The ministers of foreign affairs of the United States and Iran, John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif, meeting in Lausanne (Switzerland, 16 March 2015).

Two days after Barack Obama was elected president in November 2008, Ahmadinejad issued the first congratulatory message to a newly elected American president since 1979: "Iran welcomes basic and fair changes in U.S. policies and conducts. I hope you will prefer real public interests and justice to the never-ending demands of a selfish minority and seize the opportunity to serve people so that you will be remembered with high esteem".^[178]

In his inaugural speech, President Obama said:

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West—know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

Ahmadinejad issued a list of grievances, including the 1953 coup, support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq War, and the Iran Air Flight 655 incident.^[179] In March 2009, an official delegation of Hollywood actors and filmmakers met with their Iranian counterparts in Tehran as a symbol of United States–Iran relations, but Javad Shamghadri, the Arts Adviser to Ahmadinejad, rejected it and said, "Representatives of Iran’s film industry should only have an official meeting with representatives of the academy and Hollywood if they apologize for the insults and accusations against the Iranian nation during the past 30 years".^[180]

On March 19, 2009, the beginning of the festival of Nowruz, Obama spoke directly to the Iranian people in a video saying, "The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right—but it comes with real responsibilities".^[181]

On October 7, 2015, other than this year's nuclear deal, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that no further negotiations between two countries will ever occur.^[182]

Roxana Saberi and detained diplomats

In April 2009, Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi was sentenced to eight years in prison after being convicting of spying for the United States. She was accused of possessing a classified document but denied the charge. After spending four months in prison, she was released in May, and the charge was dropped.^[183][184]

On July 9, 2009, the United States released five Iranian diplomats (Mohsen Bagheri, Mahmoud Farhadi, Majid Ghaemi, Majid Dagheri and Abbas Jami), who had been held since January 2007.^[185] Some analysts believe this was a part of hostage exchange deal between the countries.^[186] The U.S. State Department said the release was not part of a deal with Iran but was necessary under an American-Iraqi security pact.^[187]

Iranian presidential elections 2009

On June 12, 2009, Obama said of the Iranian presidential election: "We are excited to see what appears to be a robust debate taking place in Iran".^[188] Ahmadinejad's landslide win, which led to fraud allegations and widespread protests, received little comment from the United States. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs stated, "Like the rest of the world, we were impressed by the vigorous debate and enthusiasm that this election generated, particularly among young Iranians. We continue to monitor the entire situation closely, including reports of irregularities".^[189] Vice President Joe Biden said, "It sure looks like the way they're suppressing speech, the way they're suppressing crowds, the way in which people are being treated, that there's some real doubt".^[190] On June 15, State Department spokesman Ian Kelly declared that the US was "deeply troubled by the reports of violent arrests and possible voting irregularities".^[191]

Detention of U.S. hikers over Iraqi border

Three American hikers were arrested on July 31, 2009, in Iran after they crossed into Iranian territory. Reports say the hikers accidentally crossed into Iran while hiking between Halabja and Ahmad Awa in the Kurdish Region of Iraq.^[192]

Al-Qaeda prisoners

Since the beginning of the War in Afghanistan, the United States believes that Al-Qaeda operatives have snuck into Iran. The United States has expressed concern about Iran possibly letting these prisoners leave the country, in violation of a UN treaty.^[193]

Iranian Nuclear Deal

American and Iranian foreign affairs ministers shaking hands at the end of successful negotiations about future of Iran nuclear program, Vienna

The U.S. and Iran, collectively with the P5+1, signed a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program in July 2015.^[194]

Following the agreement, the U.S. endorsed a U.N. Security Council resolution recognizing Iran's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. Iran reaffirmed its commitment against pursuing any nuclear weapon.^[195] Under the agreement, the "breakout time" — the time in which it would be possible for Iran to make enough nuclear fissle material for a single nuclear weapon — will increase from two to three months to one year; this would be in place for ten years.^[196]

Once the IAEA has verified that Iran has reduced its uranium stockpile and centrifuges and disclosed information about its past nuclear-related activities, the UNSC, U.S. and EU will lift economic sanctions against Iran.^[197]

Strict enforcement of currency embargo

In the case of United States v. Banki, on June 5, 2010, a U.S. citizen was convicted of violating the Iran Trade Embargo by failing to request Iranian currency transfer licenses in advance from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Disappearance of Shahram Amiri

Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri disappeared in May 2009, and Iran accused the United States of abducting him. On the July 13, 2010, the BBC reported that Amiri had taken refuge in the Iranian interests section of Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C. and sought help to reach Iran.^[198]

Drone incidents

On 4 December 2011, an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel UAV operated by the CIA was captured by Iranian forces near the city of Kashmar. Iran claimed the drone was not only flying in sovereign airspace, but was commandeered by its cyber warfare unit and safely brought to the ground. The US initially claimed the drone had malfunctioned and crashed in Iranian airspace, only to later admit the drone was intact anonymously when footage was shown on Iranian television.^[199]

In November 2012, an Iranian Su-25 fighter jet fired on a similar MQ-1 over international waters. In November 2012, two Iranian Su-25s fired on a US drone over the Persian Gulf. The Su-25s fired at least two bursts of cannon fire, and after the drone began moving away, the Iranian aircraft chased it and did aerial loops around it before breaking off and returning to base. On 12 March 2013, an Iranian F-4 fighter jet began pursuing a US MQ-1 over international waters. The F-4 was warned against coming closer by two US fighter jets, at which point it broke off.^[200][201]

Threats to close Persian Gulf

On December 28, 2011, Iranian navy chief Admiral Habibollah Sayyari was reported to have said that it would be "very easy" for Iran to close the Straits of Hormuz.^[202]

On Jan 3, 2012 Iran's army chief Ataollah Salehi warned "We recommend to the American warship that passed through the Strait of Hormuz and went to Gulf of Oman not to return to the Persian Gulf". However, this was laterly denied by the Defense Minister of Iran.^[203] The warship is believed to be the American aircraft carrier the USS John C. Stennis which recently vacated the area as Iran conducted a 10-day naval exercise near the Strait of Hormuz. Salehi was also quoted as saying "We have no plan to begin any irrational act but we are ready against any threat."^[204] The US Navy responded that it will continue with its regularly scheduled deployments, in accordance with international maritime conventions.^[205]

In 2012, the United States Navy was warned that Iran was preparing suicide attack boats and was building up its naval forces in the Gulf region. At a briefing in Bahrain, Vice Admiral Mark Fox told reporters the US Navy's Fifth Fleet could prevent Iran from blocking the Strait of Hormuz.^[206]

Iran's modern navy consists of both its regular navy and a naval component of its Revolutionary Guard Corps, the latter of which has strongly focused on the development of asymmetric capabilities. This focus was largely born of the Iran–Iraq War (and, more specifically, during the Tanker War of 1984–88), when Iran attempted to control shipping through the SoH.^[207] In order to close the strait, the Iranian navy would have to rely on its arsenal of Anti Ship Cruise Missiles and submarine laid Naval Mines to deny passage through the strait, as well as deny any efforts by the United States Fifth Fleet to re-open the strait. The fact that Iran had specifically built up its Navy's capabilities to match this intent does give this threat some credibility. A brief summary of the Iranian Navy's capabilities are as follows:

• Surface vessels: Although Iran does have a small number of conventional surface ships such as corvettes and missile boats, it has also built or acquired many small- and medium-size fast attack craft (FAC). These FACs typically have the capability to carry armaments such as heavy machine guns or rocket launchers, as well as torpedoes and anti-ship missiles. Some are also equipped to act as covert minelayers. Iran would likely use these small boats as "swarms" in order to overwhelm a larger ship's defenses.
• Submarines and torpedoes: Iran has three KILO-class diesel-electric submarines, as well as seven YONO-class, and one NAHANG-class, midget submarines. These submarines are most likely intended to be used for mine-laying, as well as special and anti-shipping operations. Iran also has a recently expanded torpedo capability.
• Missiles and rockets: Iran prides itself on having a large arsenal of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). This arsenal includes: variants of the Chinese Silkworm missile; extended-range variants of the Rad missile (a follow-on to the Seersucker) that can perform evasive maneuvers and carry warheads up to 500 kg (1,000 lbs); the Noor missile, which is an upgraded version of the Chinese C-802 and is deployed in mobile batteries along Iran's coast and islands; and the diverse Kosar series of small ASCMs which are reportedly truck-mounted and deployed on Iran's Gulf islands. With this suite of missiles, Iran can target any part of the SoH, and much of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as well. Iran also maintains a number of rocket systems (some of which are gyro-stabilized for use on boats), as well as shore-based artillery rockets (the Fajr series). Many of these systems would be based along the relatively mountainous Iranian coastline, which lends itself well to the shielding and bunkering of such assets.
• Naval mines: The Iranian navy fully appreciates the power of the naval mine and considers mine-laying one of its most important missions. As such, Iran has procured or produced a wide variety of naval mines (an estimated 2,000 in total), to include: bottom-moored contact mines; moored and bottom influence mines using magnetic, acoustic, and pressure fuses; limpet mines for special operations; drifting mines; and remote-controlled mines. In terms of minelayers, Iran could use its submarines and conventional navy ships, but realistically almost any boat can lay mines, and Iran would likely also use small boats and civilian vessels to do so.

The actual ability of Iran to close the strait has been questioned numerous times, with estimates of the time that Iran would be able to sustain the closure ranging from a few days^[208] to over a hundred days^[209] Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2007 that Iran could not close the strait for more than 2 weeks even if it was willing to sacrifice all its naval assets. On the other hand, in another study conducted by Talmadge in 2008, she analysed the capability of Iran to conduct the area denial operation against the capability of the US to reopen the gulf with minimal threat to forces. The conclusion of that study was a timeline of between 37 and 112 days overall.

US Supreme Court decision about frozen Iranian assets

In April 2016, US Supreme Court ruled Iran must pay almost $2bn to victims of 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.^[210] In response, Iranian parliament voted a bill that would obligate the government to claim compensation from the United States for its hostile actions against Iran (including 1953 Iranian coup d'état and United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war).^[211] Under the rules of combat, U.S. troops have no clear legal right to sue. But the judge ruled that the troops were on a peacekeeping mission under peacetime rules of engagement. Therefore, survivors and family members could sue Iran under a 1996 law that allows U.S. citizens to take legal action against nations that sponsor terrorism.^[212]

Rapprochement

Barack Obama speaking with Hassan Rouhani on 27 September 2013

The visit by President Hassan Rouhani of Iran to New York City in September 2013 was hailed as major progress in Iran's relations with United States. Rouhani previously said that his government was ready to hold talks with the United States after thirty two years.^[213] However, he rejected U.S. President Barack Obama's request for a meeting with him. On 27 September, a day after the two countries' foreign ministers met during the P5+1 and Iran talks, Rouhani and Obama spoke by telephone, the two countries' highest political exchange since 1979.^[214][215] The call led to protests by Iranian conservatives who chanted "death to America" when Rouhani returned to Tehran.^[216] On the 34th anniversary of the embassy siege, tens of thousands of supporters of a more hardline approach to relations gathered at the site of the former U.S. embassy to denounce rapprochement. It was the largest such gathering in recent years. Conversely, a majority of Iranian citizens saw the progression of peace talks with the United States as a sign of hope for a future of an alliance between the two nations.^[217]

On the 23 July 2015, Barack Obama announced his intention to restore diplomatic relations between the two nations following the agreement on Iran's nuclear programme. This was welcomed by Hassan Rouhani. In August 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has labeled Iran the "number one state sponsor of terror in the world".^[218]

Although most of Iranians thought they are extending their bilateral relations beyond the agreement, Iran's Supreme Leader said: "Tehran will not negotiate with the United States on any issue after the nuclear talks."^[219]

On September 28, 2015, an unplanned and "accidental" encounter between U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarif occurred on the sidelines of a luncheon at the United Nations General Assembly, with the two men reportedly shaking hands. It was the first handshake between a U.S. President and a top Iranian diplomat since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who was present, also introduced Obama to two senior Iranian officials also involved in the JCPOA nuclear negotiations. The exchange was originally reported in Iranian media and was said to have lasted "less than a minute"; it was immediately condemned by conservative Iranian MP Mansour Haghighatpour, a member of the committee on national security and foreign policy, who called for Zarif to publicly apologize.^[220]

Economic relations

Trade between Iran and the United States reached $623 million in 2008. According to the United States Census Bureau, American exports to Iran reached $93 million in 2007 and $537 million in 2008. American imports from Iran decreased from $148 million in 2007 to $86 million in 2008.^[221][222] This data does not include trade conducted through third countries to circumvent the trade embargo. It has been reported that the United States Treasury Department has granted nearly 10,000 special licenses to American companies over the past decade to conduct business with Iran.^[223]

U.S. exports to Iran include cigarettes (US$73 million), corn (US$68 million); chemical wood pulp, soda or sulfate (US$64 million); soybeans (US$43 million); medical equipment (US$27 million); vitamins (US$18 million); and vegetable seeds (US$12 million).^[222] In 2010, U.S. exports to Iran dropped by 50% to $281.8 million.^[221]

In May 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama lifted a trade embargo of communications equipment and software to non-government Iranians.^[224] In June 2013, the Obama administration expanded its sanctions against Iran, targeting its auto industry and, for the first time, its currency.^[225]

As of January 2014, the successful conclusion and implementation of an interim diplomatic agreement restricting Iranian nuclear development, negotiated between Iran and major world powers in Geneva, has led to the release of some of Iran's frozen overseas assets as well as a partial lifting of sanctions previously placed upon Iranian trade in automotive parts, petrochemicals, and precious metals. The United States government has also pledged to continue renewing the exemptions to oil sanctions currently enjoyed by states such as India and South Korea, key customers of the Iranian oil sector. Restrictions placed upon the insurance against loss of Iranian seagoing vessels have also been waived at the completion of the 2013 agreements in Geneva.

According to a 2014-study by NIAC, sanctions cost U.S. over $175b in lost trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities.^[226]

According to Business Monitor International:^[227]

The tentative rapprochement between Iran and the US, which began in the second half of 2013, has the potential to become a world-changing development, and unleash tremendous geopolitical and economic opportunities, if it is sustained. Tehran and Washington have been bitter enemies since 1979, when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the pro-American Shah and replaced him with a virulently anti-Western Islamist regime. Since then, Iran has been at the vanguard of countries actively challenging the US-led world order. This has led to instability in the Middle East, and Iran's relative isolation in international affairs. Yet, if Iran and the US were to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could decline sharply, and Iran could come to be perceived as a promising emerging market in its own right.

— Business Monitor International (January 2014)

See also

• Iran–United States relations after 1979
• American Iranian Council
• American military action against Iran
• United States national emergency with respect to Iran
• Carter Doctrine
• Chicago's Persian heritage crisis
• Den of Espionage
• Granting US Visa to UN Member-States Officials
• Iran-America Society
• Iranian Americans
• Famous Americans in Iran
• Iran and state-sponsored terrorism
• United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war
• Lawrence Franklin espionage scandal
• List of Iranian Ambassadors to the United States
• Opposition to military action against Iran
• Tehrangeles
• 2011–12 Strait of Hormuz dispute
• Comprehensive agreement on Iranian nuclear program
• Going to Tehran
• Israel will not exist in 25 years
• Little Satan

References

1. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2010-06-26. Retrieved 2010-06-27.
2. Embassy of Switzerland in Iran - Foreign Interests Section, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (page visited on 4 April 2015).
3. "Virtual Embassy Tehran". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
4. "Home - Tehran, Iran - Virtual Embassy of the United States". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
5. Bayor, Ronald H. (2011). Multicultural America: An Encyclopedia of the Newest Americans (Vol. 2). ABC-CLIO. p. 1097. ISBN 9780313357862. Retrieved 7 January 2016.
6. Jenkins, Philip. (2006). Decade of Nightmares : The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America page 153. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 978-0198039723
7. Little, Douglas. (2009). American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. page 145. Univ of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0807877616
8. Murray, Donette. (2009). US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations Since the Islamic Revolution page 8. Routledge. ISBN 978-1135219895
9. Q&A With the Head of Iran's New America's Desk online.wsj.com APRIL 1, 2009
10. Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader, by Karim Sadjadpour March 2008 p.20

    It is natural that our Islamic system should be viewed as an enemy and an intolerable rival by such an oppressive power as the United States, which is trying to establish a global dictatorship and further its own interests by dominating other nations and trampling on their rights. It is also clear that the conflict and confrontation between the two is something natural and unavoidable. [Address by Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, to students at Shahid Beheshti University, May 12, 2003]

11. The New Republic, Charm Offensive by Laura Secor April 1, 2009

    To give up this trump card—the non-relationship with the United States, the easy evocation of an external bogeyman—would be costly for the Iranian leadership. It would be a Gorbachevian signal that the revolution is entering a dramatically new phase—one Iran's leaders cannot be certain of surviving in power.

12. "History of Iran: Islamic Revolution of 1979". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
13. "Iran Complies With Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are Lifted". The New York Times. 17 January 2016. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
14. "With Iran Nuclear Deal Implemented, What Happens Next?". The New York Times. 17 January 2016. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
15. 2013 World Service Poll BBC
16. Shahghasemi, E., Heisey, D. R., & Mirani, G. (October 01, 2011). How do Iranians and U.S. Citizens perceive each other: A systematic review. Journal of Intercultural Communication, 27.
17. Shahghasemi, E., & Heisey, D. R. (January 01, 2009). The Cross-Cultural Schemata of Iranian-American People Toward Each Other: A Qualitative Approach. Intercultural Communication Studies, 18, 1, 143-160.
18. The Middle East and North Africa 2003, eur, 363, 2002
19. Walter Martin (2003-10-01). Kingdom of the Cults, The. Baker Books. p. 421. ISBN 978-0-7642-2821-6. Retrieved 2013-06-24. Ninety-five percent of Iran's Muslims are Shi'ites.
20. Bhabani Sen Gupta (1987). The Persian Gulf and South Asia: prospects and problems of inter-regional cooperation. South Asian Publishers. p. 158. ISBN 978-81-7003-077-5. Shias constitute seventy-five percent of the population of the Gulf. Of this, ninety-five percent of Iranians and sixty of Iraqis are Shias.
21. CIA World Factbook. "Iran". Retrieved 7 August 2012.
22. Pew Research Center (2012). "US Religious Landscape Survey".
23. http://www.americanactionforum.org/research/irans-military-budget-after-the-nuclear-deal/
24. http://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison
25. Alexander, Yonah (1980). The United States and Iran: a documented history. Aletheia Books. ISBN 9780890933787.
26. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, David W. Lesch, 2003, ISBN 0-8133-3940-5, p.52
27. Ibid. p.83
28. Zirinsky M.P. Imperial Power and dictatorship: Britain and the rise of Reza Shah 1921–1926. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 24, 1992. p.646
29. • Foreign Office 371 16077 E2844 dated 8 June 1932.
    • The Memoirs of Anthony Eden are also explicit about Britain's role in putting Reza Khan in power.
    • Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran since 1921. Longman. 2003 ISBN 0-582-35685-7 p.26-31
30. Twin Pillars to Desert Storm : America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush by Howard Teicher ; Gayle Radley Radley, Harpercollins, 1993
31. Gasiorowski, writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.261
32. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.86
33. Byrne writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, , p.201, 206, 212, 219, 204–5
34. Gasiorowski writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.273
35. Gasiorowski writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.243
36. Gasiorowski writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.230-1
37. Gasiorowski writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.274
38. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.257
39. Kinzer, 2003, p.215
40. "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, 04-19-2000.
41. [Associated Press, "Iran's Top Leader Slams U.S. Gesture as Deceitful," March 25, 2000] quoted in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiii.
42. "Trends by Region: MIDDLE EAST and Penn's Global Engagement, University of Pennsylvania University Archives". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
43. Exporting MIT. Stuart W. Leslie and Robert Kargon. Osiris, volume 21 (2006), pages 110–130 doi:10.1086/507138
44. Katouzian writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004 p.23
45. Abrahamian, Iran (1982), p. 498–9.
46. Abrahamian, Iran (1982), pp. 501–3.
47. "Daugherty - Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United States". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
48. GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF ISLAMIZATION, hosted by ca-c.org
49. Keddie, Modern Iran (2003), p. 235.
50. Keddie, Modern Iran (2003), pp. 235–6.
51. Shawcross, The Shah's Last Ride (1988), p. 21.
52. Kurzman, Charles, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, Harvard University Press, 2004, p.157
53. Sheikhneshin, Arsalan Ghorbani (2009). "Iran and the US: Current Situation and Future Prospects". Journal of International and Area Studies. 16 (1): 93–113.
54. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) IN PERSIA.
55. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Iran. Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978. Staff Report, Washington, D.C., p. 7.
56. Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (1982), p. 23. "It was abundantly clear to me that the students were obsessed with the idea that the Americans might be preparing to mount another counter-coup. Memories of 1953 were uppermost in their minds. They all knew about Kermit Roosevelt's book Countercoup, and most of them had read extracts from it. Although, largely owing to intervention by the British, who were anxious that the part they and the oil company had played in organizing the coup should not become known, this book had been withdrawn before publication, a few copies of it had got out and been duplicated."
57. Katz, Mark N. (2010). "Iran and Russia". In Wright, Robin B. The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy. United States Institute of Peace. p. 186. ISBN 978-1-60127-084-9.
58. "Stephen Kinzer on US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror". Democracy Now!.
59. "Doing Satan's Work in Iran", The New York Times, November 6, 1979
60. Woodward, Bob (2005). Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987. New York City: Simon & Schuster. p. 507.
61. Simbar, Reza (2006). "Iran and the US: Engagement or Confrontation". Journal of International and Area Studies. 13 (1): 73–87.
62. Reid, Tim (2002-12-31). "How US helped Iraq build deadly arsenal". The Sunday Times. London. Retrieved 2010-07-10.
63. Albright's speech on Iran-U.S. relations, Reuters, Alexander's Gas and Oil Connection, 17 March 2000.
64. April 1983 United States Embassy bombing#note-0
65. "Iran responsible for 1983 Marine barracks bombing, judge rules. CNN May 30, 2003. Archived December 6, 2008, at the Wayback Machine.
66. http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/2006/2000CV2329-12036-12222006a.pdf
67. Ronald Reagan (November 13, 1986). "Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy". Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved September 3, 2006.
68. "Excerpts From the Iran-Contra Report: A Secret Foreign Policy". New York Times. 1994. Retrieved May 5, 2010.
69. • Wolf, Julie (2000). "The Iran-Contra affair". The American Experience: Reagan. PBS / WGBH.
70. Love, Robert William. History of the U.S. Navy. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992. ISBN 0-8117-1863-8 p. 787
71. Peniston, Bradley (2006). "No Higher Honor: Photos: Operation Praying Mantis". Retrieved 2009-02-02.
72. International Court of Justice. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). Accessed December 12, 2006.
73. Peniston, Bradley (2006). No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-661-5., p. 217.
74. "Iranian Boats May Not Have Made Radio Threat, Pentagon Says". Washington Post. January 11, 2008.
75. 1988: US warship shoots down Iranian airliner
76. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) — Iranian submission: Part IV B, The shooting down of flight IR 655, International Court of Justice. retrieved 2007-01-20
77. The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression By Farhang Rajaee University Press of Florida
78. "Military Blunders – Iran Air Shot Down – 3 July 1988". Archived from the original on 2007-05-18. Retrieved 2007-05-18. History.com
79. "Medals Go To Top Officers in Charge of Vincennes". The Orlando Sentinel. 24 April 1990. Retrieved 24 October 2011.
80. Keddie, Modern Iran (2003), p.265
81. Keddie, Modern Iran, (2003) p.272
82. Crossette, Barbara (September 1, 2000). "For Iran's Visiting Legislators, A Useful, Low-Key Exchange" (PDF). New York Times. Retrieved 2006-06-16.
83. Zagorin, Adam, and Joe Klein, 9/11 Commission Finds Ties Between al-Qaeda and Iran, Time, July 16, 2004.
84. Emerson, Steven, and Daniel Pipes, Terrorism on Trial, The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2001.
85. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 240-41. ISBN 0-393-32671-3
86. Timmerman, Ken, Lawsuit: Iran Knew About 9/11 Attack, Newsmax, May 19, 2011.
87. U.S. District Court Rules Iran Behind 9/11 Attacks, PRNewswire, December 23, 2011.
88. Timmerman, Ken, Federal judge: Iran shares responsibility for 9/11 terror attacks, The Daily Caller, December 16, 2011.
89. Weisner, Benjamin, and Scott Shane, Court Filings Assert Iran Had Link to 9/11 Attacks, The New York Times, May 19, 2011.
90. P.I.R.I News Headlines (Tue 80/07/03 A.H.S). The Official Site of the Office of the President of Iran. Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 25 September 2001. Permanent Archived Link. Original page and URL are not available online now. (Website's Homepage at that time (Title: Presidency of The Islamic Republic of Iran, The Official Site))
91. تشکر وزارت خارجه آمریکا از همدردی ایرانیان با قربانیان ۱۱ سپتامبر. (Persian). Radio Farda. Sunday, September 11, 2011. (Iranian Hijri date: ۱۳۹۰/۰۶/۲۰). Permanent Archived Link. Retrieved and Archived on June 30th, 2016. Mechanized Translation by Google Translate is available, here.
92. Corera, Gordon (September 25, 2006). "Iran's gulf of misunderstanding with US". BBC News. Retrieved May 22, 2010. Permanent Archived Link.
93. Iran mourns America's dead Time
94. 34 Years of Getting to No with Iran - POLITICO Magazine. Politico Magazine. Barbara Slavin. November 19, 2013. Permanent Archived Link. Permanent Archived Link at WebCite. Retrieved and archived on July 4th, 2016.
95. USATODAY.com - Iran helped overthrow Taliban, candidate says. USA Today. Posted 6/9/2005 10:00 PM and Updated 6/9/2005 11:37 PM. Permanent Archived Link
96. Iranian Special Forces Reportedly Fight Alongside US in Battle for Herat. Permanent Archived Link
97. news.bbc.co.uk
98. Linzer, Dafna (February 13, 2005). "U.S. Uses Drones to Probe Iran For Arms". The Washington Post. Retrieved May 5, 2010.
99. "Iran Protests U.S. Aerial Drones". The Washington Post. November 8, 2005. Retrieved May 5, 2010.
100. "Roadmap". Scribd. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
101. Kessler, Glenn (2013-12-09). "Fact Checker: Kerry's claim that Iran offered Bush a nuclear deal in 2003". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
102. Rubin, Michael (2007-10-22). "The Guldimann Memorandum: The Iranian "roadmap" wasn't a roadmap and wasn't Iranian". Middle East Forum. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
103. Sahimi, Muhammad (2012-05-12). "Former Iran Nuclear Negotiator: Bush Negotiation Bid Was Rebuffed". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 2016-04-08.
104. Kristoff, Nicholas D. (2007-04-29). "Diplomacy at Its Worst". The New York Times. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
105. ""Grand Bargain" Fax: A Missed Opportunity?". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
106. Rubin, Michael (2010-02-18). "About that 2003 Iran 'Grand Bargain'...". National Review. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
107. Kessler, Glenn (2007-02-14). "2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
108. Hadley, Stephen J. "The George W. Bush Administration". United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
109. "Parsi's collaboration with Iranian ambassador to UN". Iranian American Forum. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
110. U.S. Uses Drones to Probe Iran For Arms, February 13, 2005, Washington Post
111. Iran Protests U.S. Aerial Drones, November 8, 2005, Washington Post
112. http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_fact
113. Kucinich Questions The President On US Trained Insurgents In Iran: Sends Letter To President Bush Archived May 25, 2006, at the Wayback Machine., Dennis Kucinich, April 18, 2006
114. "Timeline: US-Iran ties." BBC News. Retrieved 29-10-2006.
115. Vick, Karl. "No Proposals in Iranian's Letter to Bush, U.S. Says." The Washington Post. Retrieved 29-10-2006.
116. "President says his letter to President Bush was invitation to Islam." Islamic Republic News Agency. Retrieved 29-10-2006.
117. "CNN.com - U.N.: Sanctions loom, Iran keeps enriching - Aug 31, 2006". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
118. "No 'steel-cage, grudge match' between Bush, Ahmadinejad." CNN. Retrieved 10-01-2007.
119. "Ahmadinejad's letter to Americans." CNN. Retrieved 26-01-2008.
120. "Message of H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Republic of Iran to the American People." Fox News. Retrieved 29-11-2006.
121. "President misquoted over gays in Iran: aide | International | Reuters". Reuters. 2007-10-10. Retrieved 2009-06-21.
122. Gendar, Alison (2007-09-21). "Well, if you're gonna be like that, I won't go to WTC". New York Daily News. Retrieved 2010-03-10.
123. "Ahmadinejad: 9/11 'suspect event'". BBC News. 2008-04-16. Retrieved 2009-06-21.
124. "Iran mulling dynamic, progressive economy, prez". Mathaba.net. 2008-10-31. Retrieved 2009-06-21.
125. "Statement by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" (PDF). United Nations. 23 September 2008. p. 8. Retrieved 2008-10-31.
126. Blair's Next War, May 4, 2005, Dave Wearing
127. http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Mar/24-427575.html
128. "BBC NEWS - Americas - US agrees to back UN nuclear head". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
129. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, IAEA
130. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Archived January 19, 2010, at the Wayback Machine.
131. US demands drastic action as Iran nuclear row escalates, Ian Traynor, The Guardian, March 9, 2006
132. http://www.aipac.org/learn/issues/issue-display?issueid=%7B1A989C8D-72FF-41B7-9A4B-02067A73CAD3%7D
133. Kucinich Speaks Out Against House Bill That Lays The Ground Work For War Against Iran
134. "TIME". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
135. [Dead link.... Dar Al Hayat]
136. Hersh, Seymour M. (November 20, 2006). "The Next Act". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2006-11-19.
137. Ross, Brian; Christopher Isham (2007-04-03). "The United States Secret War Against Iran". American Broadcasting Company. Retrieved 2007-04-03.
138. Massoud, Ansari (January 16, 2006). "Sunni group vows to behead Iranians". Washington Times. Retrieved 2007-04-05.
139. "Dan Froomkin - Cheney's Fingerprints".
140. "Chapter 6 -- State Sponsors of Terror Overview". U.S. Department of State. 2006-04-28. Retrieved 2007-08-04.
141. Caldwell, Robert (2007-08-03). "Iran and Syria's proxy war in Iraq". Bend Weekly. Retrieved 2007-08-04.
142. Kaplan, Eben (2007-07-28). "McConnell Cites 'Overwhelming Evidence' of Iran's Support for Iraqi Insurgents". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2007-11-09.
143. Bowers, Carol (2007-09-11). "Iran Playing 'Destabilizing Role' in Iraq". U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved 2007-11-09.
144. "Al-Maliki: Iraq won't be battleground for U.S., Iran". CNN. 31 January 2007. Archived from the original on 2 February 2007. Retrieved 31 January 2007.
145. "US airstrikes to support Iranian Revolutionary Guard's offensive in Iraq?". RT International. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
146. Martin Chulov. "Iraq crisis: Iran and US join fight against Sunni jihadis of Isis". the Guardian. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
147. "Iraq prime minister to visit Iran". Al Jazeera. September 9, 2006.
148. "People's Daily Online -- U.S. imposes sanctions on Iranian bank". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
149. Senators fear Iraq war may spill to Iran, Syria Reuters Jan 11, 2007
150. "رادیو زمانه -Radiozamaneh". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
151. "BBC NEWS - Middle East - US releases nine Iranians in Iraq". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
152. "Iranian Unit to Be Labeled 'Terrorist'". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
153. "Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2007-10-25. Archived from the original on 2010-05-27. Retrieved 2010-07-12.
154. "Iran's parliament votes to label CIA, U.S. Army 'terrorist' groups". CNN. 2007-09-29. Retrieved 2010-07-12.
155. "Iran's Parliament Signs Resolution to Label CIA, Army as 'Terrorist Organizations'". Fox News. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
156. "Breaking Christian News - Religion Headlines". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
157. "Iran Guards warn U.S. of heavier blows ahead: report". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
158. U.S. intellectuals prevent extremist views: Khatami
159. "BBC NEWS - Middle East - US 'to blacklist Iranian Guards'". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
160. "iranian.com: Kaveh L. Afrasiabi". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
161. "Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US steps closer to war with Iran". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
162. James Rosen. "U.S. Officials Begin Crafting Iran Bombing Plan". Fox News. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
163. "Inter Press Service - News and Views from the Global South". Archived from the original on 2008-01-13.
164. "Official Version of Naval Incident Starts to Unravel". Common Dreams.
165. ‘Filipino Monkey’ behind threats? – Navy News, opinions, editorials, news from Iraq, photos, reports – Navy Times
166. "Prankster linked to US-Iran incident". Television New Zealand. Reuters. January 15, 2008. Archived from the original on May 16, 2011. Retrieved October 5, 2011.
167. "Did a Radio Prank Escalate Iran-U.S. Confrontation?". NPR.org. 14 January 2008. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
168. Hersh, Seymour (2008-07-07). "Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.". The New Yorker.
169. "David Ignatius - Spy Games in Iran". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
170. "Ali Ettefagh". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
171. "The revolution strikes back." The Economist. July 21, 2007. Vol. 384, Iss. 8538; pg. 2
172. by Kaveh L Afrasiabi (July 25, 2008). "For Iran, respect above all else". Asia Times.
173. Arms accused diplomat in UK court, BBC News, April 19, 2007
174. "Tehran Times". Tehran Times. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
175. "Bill Text - 110th Congress (2007-2008) - THOMAS (Library of Congress)". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
176. "House Resolution Calls for Naval Blockade against Iran: America’s powerful pro-Israel lobby pressures the US Congress", Global Research, June 18, 2008
177. (January 11, 2009) Report: U.S. rejected Israeli plea to attack Iran CNN
178. Archived November 9, 2008, at the Wayback Machine.
179. "Iran Not Likely To Meet Obama Halfway". NPR.org. 29 January 2009. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
180. Nazila Fathi (2009-03-01). "Despite Hopes of Hollywood Visit, Iran's Leaders Stick to the Same Script". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-03-18.
181. "Obama offers Iran 'new beginning'". BBC News. March 20, 2009. Retrieved January 5, 2010.
182. Pestano, Andrew V. (October 7, 2015). "Iran's Khamenei warns against 'forbidden' U.S. negotiations". UPI. Retrieved October 8, 2015.
183. Fathi, Nazila (2009-04-18). "Iran Sentences U.S. Journalist to 8 Years". The New York Times. Retrieved May 5, 2010.
184. "Roxana Saberi On Her Imprisonment in Iran". NPR. May 28, 2009.
185. "U.S. Hands 5 Detained Iranians to Iraq". The New York Times. 2009-07-09.
186. Omid Memarian (April 30, 2009). "Hostage Diplomacy: Roxana Saberi and the Three Jailed Iranian Diplomats". Huffington Post.
187. , BBC "US Releasese Five Iranians in Iraq," July 10, 2009
188. "Remarks on Passage of Kids Tobacco Legislation, an Answer on Iranian Elections". whitehouse.gov. 2009-06-13. Retrieved 2009-06-13.
189. "Statement by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on the Iranian Election". whitehouse.gov. 2009-06-13. Retrieved 2009-06-13.
190. Ramin Mostaghim; Borzou Daragahi (June 14, 2009). "Iran election anger boils; Ahmadinejad defends results". The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved June 14, 2009.
191. "US 'troubled' over Iran election". Al Jazeera English. April 15, 2009. Retrieved April 15, 2009.
192. "U.S. calls for Iran's information about three missing Americans". XinhuaNet. August 4, 2009.
193. "Iran Seen Loosening Restrictions on Al-Qaeda - Analysis - NTI". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
194. "The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon". The White House. Retrieved 16 July 2015.
195. "Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2231 (2015), Endorses Joint Comprehensive Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme". United Nations. United Nations Publications. 20 July 2015. Retrieved 10 August 2015. The Security Council today coalesced around a sweeping resolution that endorsed the 14 July agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme
196. Eric Bradner, What's in the Iran nuclear deal? 7 key points, CNN (2 April 2015).
197. Mai-Duc, Christine; Richter, Paul (14 July 2015). "Who gave up what in the Iran nuclear deal". Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles, United States. Retrieved 16 July 2015.
198. BBC 13 July 2010 Missing Iranian scientist appears at embassy in US
199. "Iran airs footage of downed US drone". PressTV. Archived from the original on 20 December 2012. Retrieved 15 December 2012.
200. Brian Evestine (14 March 2013). "U.S. fighters warn Iranian jet trailing UAV". Army Times. Retrieved 15 March 2013.
201. "FIRST ON CNN: Iranian jets fire on U.S. drone". CNN. November 8, 2012.
202. "Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz?". TIME.com. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
203. "نگفتیم تنگه هرمز را می بندیم" (in Persian). BBC Persian.
204. "Iran warns U.S. carrier to stay out of Persian Gulf" AP, 3 January 2012.
205. "U.S. says will continue to deploy warships in Persian Gulf despite Iranian threats." Haaretz, 3 January 2012.
206. "US Navy accuses Iran of preparing 'suicide boats'." Reuters. February 13, 2012.
207. "A Strait Comparison: Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz Closure Event" Schroden, Jonathan September 2011
208. Anthony H. Cordesman. "Iran, Oil, and Strait of Hormuz," report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2007
209. Caitlin Talmadge. "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," International Security 33 (Summer 2008), 82-117.
210. U.S. top court rules Iran bank must pay 1983 bomb victims , Reuters
211. Iran parliament votes to fast-track US compensation bill , Press TV
212. Lengel, Allan (May 31, 2003). "Judge: Iran Behind '83 Beirut Bombing". The Washington Post. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 2016-06-03.
213. "Iran Seeks Engagement With The United States By Akbar E. Torbat". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
214. Obama speaks with Iranian President Rouhani NBC News 27 September 2013
215. Obama talks to Rouhani: First direct conversation between American and Iranian presidents in 30 years National Post 27 September 2013
216. Marcus George (28 September 2013). "Iranians cheer, protest over Rouhani's historic phone call with Obama". Reuters. Dubai. Retrieved 30 September 2013.
217. "Iranians cry 'death to America' in huge rally". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
218. "Kerry says United States, Egypt return to 'stronger base' in ties". 2 August 2015. Reuters.
219. Khamenei says Iran will not negotiate with U.S. beyond nuclear talks Reuters
220. "Obama engages Iranian foreign minister in historic handshake at UN". Associated Press. September 29, 2015. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
221. http://previous.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=119065&sectionid=3510213
222. http://www.nitc.co.ir/iran-daily/1387/3300/html/economy.htm
223. "Report: U.S. Treasury approved business with Iran." AP, 24 December 2010.
224. "U.S. Lifts Iran Sanctions on Laptops, Mobile Phones". Bloomberg.
225. "U.S. targets Iran's currency in new sanctions". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
226. http://tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/117072-iran-sanctions-cost-us-over-175b-in-lost-trade-study
227. "Iran-US Rapprochement: Historic Opportunities Beckon". Business Monitor International. January 10, 2014. Archived from the original on March 23, 2014.

Further reading

• Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. and Abbas Maleki, Iran's Foreign Policy After September 11. Booksurge, 2008.
• Blight, James G. and Janet M. Lang, et al. Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.
• Crist, David. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, Penguin Press, 2012.
• Emery, Christian. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
• Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story: An Insider's Account of America's Iranian Adventure and Its Consequences for the Future. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
• Morris M. Mottale, Wading Through Conflict: America and the Middle East. Turin, Italy: 2013.
• Shannon, Michael K., "American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era," Diplomatic History 39 (Sept. 2015), 661–88.
• Akbar E. Torbat, "A Glance at US Policies toward Iran: Past and Present," Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 2004), pp. 85–94.
• Martin Waehlisch, "The Iran-United States Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 37 (Spring 2012), pp. 23–34.
• Harold Lee Wise, Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
• Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror. Ithaca Press, 2007.
• Bill, James A (1988). The Eagle and the Lion: the tragedy of American-Iranian relations. New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press.

External links

• History of Iran – U.S. relations
  • Timeline - New York Times
  • Virtual Embassy of the United States in Iran
• Articles and debates about Iran by Council on Foreign Relations