Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Also known as Tamil Tigers
Leader(s) V. Prabhakaran (KIA)
Dates of operation 5 May 1976 (1976-05-05) – 18 May 2009 (2009-05-18)
Motives The creation of the independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east of Sri Lanka.
Ideology Tamil nationalism
Status Inactive. Militarily defeated in May 2009.[1]
Annual revenue US$200–300 million prior to the military defeat.[2][3]
Means of revenue Donations from expatriate Tamils, extortion,[4] shipping, sales of weapons and taxation under LTTE-controlled areas.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil: தமிழீழ விடுதலைப் புலிகள் Tamiḻīḻa viṭutalaip pulikaḷ, Sinhalese: දෙමළ ඊළාම් විමුක්ති කොටි Dhemala īlām vimukthi koti, commonly known as the LTTE or the Tamil Tigers) was a militant organisation that was based in northeastern Sri Lanka. Founded in May 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, it waged a secessionist nationalist insurgency[5][6][7] to create an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north and east of Sri Lanka for Tamil people.[8] This campaign led to the Sri Lankan Civil War, which ran from 1983 until 2009, when the LTTE was defeated by the Sri Lankan military during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa.[9][10]

Due to its military victories, policies, call for national self-determination and constructive Tamil nationalist platform the LTTE was supported by major sections of the Tamil community.[11] University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) claimed that "by combination of internal terror and narrow nationalist ideology the LTTE succeeded in atomizing the community. It took away not only the right to oppose but even the right to evaluate, as a community, the course they were taking. This gives a semblance of illusion that the whole society is behind the LTTE."[12]

At the height of its power, the LTTE possessed a well-developed militia and carried out many high-profile attacks, including the assassinations of several high-ranking Sri Lankan and Indian politicians. The LTTE was the only militant group to assassinate two world leaders:[13] former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.[5][14][15] The LTTE invented suicide belts[13] and pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks in warfare.[13] It also acquired and used light aircraft in some of its attacks.[16] It is currently proscribed as a terrorist organisation by 32 countries, including the United States, European Union and India, but has support amongst Tamils in Tamil Nadu, India.[17] Velupillai Prabhakaran headed the organisation from its inception until his death in 2009.[18]

Historical inter-ethnic imbalances between majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil populations are alleged to have created the background for the origin of the LTTE. Post independent Sri Lankan governments attempted to rectify the disproportionate favouring and empowerment of Tamil minority by the colonial rulers,[5][19] which led to exclusivist ethnic policies[5] including the ″Sinhala Only Act[5] and gave rise to separatist ideologies among many Tamil leaders.[5] By the 1970s, initial non violent political struggle for an independent mono-ethnic Tamil state was used as justification for a violent secessionist insurgency led by the LTTE.[5][19] Over the course of the conflict, the Tamil Tigers frequently exchanged control of territory in north-east Sri Lanka with the Sri Lankan military, with the two sides engaging in intense military confrontations. It was involved in four unsuccessful rounds of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government over the course of the conflict. At its peak in 2000, the LTTE was in control of 76% of the landmass in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.[20]

At the start of the final round of peace talks in 2002, the Tamil Tigers controlled a 15,000 km2 area. After the breakdown of the peace process in 2006, the Sri Lankan military launched a major offensive against the Tigers, defeating the LTTE militarily and bringing the entire country under its control. Victory over the Tigers was declared by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa on 16 May 2009,[21] and the LTTE admitted defeat on 17 May 2009.[22] Prabhakaran was killed by government forces on 19 May 2009. Selvarasa Pathmanathan succeeded Prabhakaran as leader of the LTTE, but he was later arrested in Malaysia and handed over to the Sri Lankan government in August 2009.[23]



In the early 1970s, United Front government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike introduced the policy of standardisation to rectify the low numbers of Sinhalese being accepted into university in Sri Lanka. A student named Satiyaseelan formed Tamil Manavar Peravai (Tamil Students League) to counter this.[24][25] This group comprised Tamil youth who advocated the rights of students to have fair enrollment. Inspired by the failed 1971 insurrection of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, it was the first Tamil insurgent group of its kind.[26] It consisted of around 40 Tamil youth, including Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran (later, the leader of the Sivakumaran group), K. Pathmanaba (one of the founder members of EROS) and Velupillai Prabhakaran, an 18-year-old youth from single caste-oriented Valvettithurai (VVT).[27] In 1972, Prabhakaran teamed up with Chetti Thanabalasingam, Jaffna to form the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), with Thanabalasingham as its leader.[28] After he was killed, Prabhakaran took over.[29] At the same time, Nadarajah Thangathurai and Selvarajah Yogachandran (better known by his nom de guerre Kuttimani) were also involved in discussions about an insurgency.[30] They would later (in 1979) create a separate organisation named Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) to campaign for the establishment of an independent Tamil Eelam. These groups, along with another prominent figure of the armed struggle, Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran, were involved in several hit-and-run operations against pro-government Tamil politicians, Sri Lanka Police and civil administration during the early 1970s. These attacks included throwing bombs at the residence and the car of SLFP Jaffna Mayor, Alfred Duraiyappah, placing a bomb at a carnival held in the stadium of Jaffna city (now "Duraiyappah stadium") and Neervely bank robbery. The 1974 Tamil conference incident also sparked the anger of these militant groups. Both Sivakumaran and Prabhakaran attempted to assassinate Duraiyappah in revenge for the incident. Sivakumaran committed suicide on 5 June 1974, to evade capture by Police.[31] On 27 July 1975, Prabhakaran assassinated Duraiyappah, who was branded as a "traitor" by TULF and the insurgents alike. Prabhakaran shot and killed the Mayor when he was visiting the Krishnan temple at Ponnalai.[28][32]

Founding and rise to power

The LTTE was founded on 5 May 1976 as the successor to the Tamil New Tigers. Uma Maheswaran became its leader, and Prabhakaran its military commander.[33] A five-member committee was also appointed. It has been stated that Prabhakaran sought to "refashion the old TNT/new LTTE into an elite, ruthlessly efficient, and highly professional fighting force",[32] by the terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna. Prabhakaran kept the numbers of the group small and maintained a high standard of training.[34] The LTTE carried out low-key attacks against various government targets, including policemen and local politicians.

TULF support

Tamil United Liberation Front leader Appapillai Amirthalingam, who was in 1977 elected as the Opposition leader of Sri Lanka Parliament, clandestinely supported the LTTE. Amirthalingam believed that if he could exercise control over the Tamil insurgent groups, it would enhance his political position and pressure the government to agree to grant political autonomy to Tamils. Thus, he provided letters of reference to the LTTE and to other Tamil insurgent groups to raise funds. Both Uma Maheswaran (a former surveyor) and Urmila Kandiah, first female member of the LTTE, were prominent members of the TULF youth wing.[28] Maheswaran was the secretary of TULF Tamil Youth Forum, Colombo branch. Amirthalingam introduced Prabhakaran to N. S. Krishnan, who later became the first international representative of LTTE. It was Krishnan who introduced Prabhakaran to Anton Balasingham, who later became the chief political strategist and chief negotiator of LTTE, which split for the first time in 1979. Uma Maheswaran was found to be having a love affair with Urmila Kandiah, which was against the code of conduct of LTTE. Prabhakaran ordered him to leave the organisation.[35] Uma Maheswaran left LTTE and formed People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1980.

In 1980, Junius Richard Jayewardene's government agreed to devolve power by the means of District Development Councils upon the request of TULF. By this time, LTTE and other insurgent groups wanted a separate state. They had no faith in any sort of political solution. Thus the TULF and other Tamil political parties were steadily marginalised and insurgent groups emerged as the major force in the north. During this period of time several other insurgent groups came into the arena, such as EROS (1975), TELO (1979), PLOTE (1980), EPRLF (1980) and TELA (1982). LTTE ordered civilians to boycott the local government elections of 1983 in which TULF contested. Voter turnout became as low as 10%. Thereafter, Tamil political parties were largely unable to represent Tamil people as insurgent groups took over their position.[28]

Thirunelveli attack, 1983

See also: Four Four Bravo
LTTE leaders at Sirumalai camp, Tamil Nadu, India in 1984 while they are being trained by RAW (from L to R, weapon carrying is included within brackets) – Lingam; Prabhakaran's bodyguard (Hungarian AK), Batticaloa commander Aruna (Beretta Model 38 SMG), LTTE founder-leader Prabhakaran (pistol), Trincomalee commander Pulendran (AK-47), Mannar commander Victor (M203) and Chief of Intelligence Pottu Amman (M 16).

The LTTE carried out its first major attack[36] on 23 July 1983, when they ambushed Sri Lanka Army patrol Four Four Bravo at Thirunelveli, Jaffna. Thirteen Sri Lankan servicemen were killed in the attack, leading to the Black July.

Some consider Black July to be a planned rampage against the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, in which the JVP movement and sections of the government were implicated.[37][38]

Many outraged Tamil youths joined Tamil militant groups to fight the Sri Lankan government, in what is considered a major catalyst to the insurgency in Sri Lanka.[39]

Indian support

In reaction to various geo-political (see Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War) and economic factors, from August 1983 to May 1987, India, through its intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided arms, training and monetary support to six Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent groups including the LTTE. During that period, 32 camps were set up in India to train these 495 LTTE insurgents,[40] including 90 women who were trained in 10 batches.[41] The first batch of Tigers were trained in Establishment 22 based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand. The second batch, including LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman,[42] trained in Himachal Pradesh. Prabakaran visited the first and the second batch of Tamil Tigers to see them training.[43] Eight other batches of LTTE were trained in Tamil Nadu. Thenmozhi Rajaratnam alias Dhanu, who carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and Sivarasan—the key conspirator were among the militants trained by RAW, in Nainital, India.[44]

In April 1984, the LTTE formally joined a common militant front, the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), a union between LTTE, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).[45]

Clashes with other insurgent groups

TELO usually held the Indian view of problems and pushed for India's view during peace talks with Sri Lanka and other groups. LTTE denounced the TELO view and claimed that India was only acting on its own interest. As a result, the LTTE broke from the ENLF in 1986. Soon fighting broke out between the TELO and the LTTE and clashes occurred over the next few months.[46][47] As a result, almost the entire TELO leadership and at least 400 TELO militants were killed by the LTTE.[48][49][50] The LTTE attacked training camps of the EPRLF a few months later, forcing it to withdraw from the Jaffna peninsula.[45][48] Notices were issued to the effect that all remaining Tamil insurgents join the LTTE in Jaffna and in Madras, where the Tamil groups were headquartered. With the major groups including the TELO and EPRLF eliminated, the remaining twenty or so Tamil insurgent group were then absorbed into the LTTE, making Jaffna an LTTE-dominated city.[48]

Another practice that increased support by Tamil people was LTTE's members taking an oath of loyalty which stated LTTE's goal of establishing a state for the Sri Lankan Tamils.[46][51] In 1987 LTTE established the Black Tigers, a unit responsible for conducting suicide attacks against political, economic, and military targets,[52] and launched its first suicide attack against a Sri Lankan Army camp, killing 40 soldiers. LTTE members were prohibited from smoking cigarettes and consuming alcohol in any form. LTTE members were required to avoid their family members and avoid communication with them. Initially LTTE members were prohibited from having love affairs or sexual relationships as it could deter their prime motive, but this policy changed after Prabhakaran married Mathivathani Erambu in October 1984.[35]

IPKF period

In July 1987, faced with growing anger among its own Tamils and a flood of refugees,[45] India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time by initially airdropping food parcels into Jaffna. After negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Though the conflict was between the Tamil and Sinhalese people, India and Sri Lanka signed the peace accord instead of India influencing both parties to sign a peace accord among themselves. The peace accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas, with Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to surrender. India was to send a peacekeeping force, named the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), part of the Indian Army, to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional council.[53][54]

War against IPKF

Although the Tamil militant organisations did not have a role in the Indo-Lanka agreement,[46] most groups, including EPRLF, TELO, EROS, and PLOTE, accepted it.[55][56] LTTE rejected the accord because they opposed EPRLF's Varadaraja Perumal as the chief ministerial candidate for the merged North Eastern Province.[54] The LTTE named three alternate candidates for the position, who India rejected.[55] The LTTE subsequently refused to hand over their weapons to the IPKF.[46] After three months of tensions, LTTE declared war on IPKF on 7 October 1987.[57]

Thus LTTE engaged in military conflict with the Indian Army, and launched its first attack on an Indian army rations truck on 8 October, killing five Indian para-commandos who were on board by strapping burning tires around their necks.[58] The government of India stated that the IPKF should disarm the LTTE by force.[58] The Indian Army launched assaults on the LTTE, including a month-long campaign, Operation Pawan to win control of the Jaffna Peninsula. The ruthlessness of this campaign, and the Indian army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations, made it extremely unpopular among many Tamils in Sri Lanka.[59][60]

Premadasa government support

The Indian intervention was also unpopular among the Sinhalese majority. Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa pledged to withdraw IPKF as soon as he is elected president during his presidential election campaign in 1988. After being elected, in April 1989, he started negotiations with LTTE. President Premadasa ordered the Sri Lanka Army to clandestine handed over arms consignments to the LTTE to fight the IPKF and its proxy, the Tamil National Army (TNA). These consignments include RPG guns, mortars, self-loading rifles, T81 automatic rifles, T56 automatic rifles, pistols, hand grenades, ammunition, and communications sets.[61] Moreover, millions of dollars was also passed on to the LTTE.[62]

After IPKF

The last members of the IPKF, which was estimated to have had a strength of well over 100,000 at its peak, left the country in March 1990 upon the request of President Premadasa. Unstable peace initially held between the government and the LTTE, and peace talks progressed towards providing devolution for Tamils in the north and east of the country. A ceasefire held between LTTE and the government from June 1989 to June 1990, but broke down as LTTE massacred 600 police officers in the Eastern Province.[63]

Fighting continued throughout the 1990s, and was marked by two key assassinations carried out by the LTTE: those of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, using suicide bombers on both occasions. The fighting briefly halted in 1994 following the election of Chandrika Kumaratunga as President of Sri Lanka and the onset of peace talks, but fighting resumed after LTTE sank two Sri Lanka Navy boats in April 1995.[64] In a series of military operations that followed, the Sri Lanka Army recaptured the Jaffna Peninsula.[65] Further offensives followed over the next three years, and the military captured large areas in the north of the country from the LTTE, including areas in the Vanni region, the town of Kilinochchi, and many smaller towns. From 1998 onward, the LTTE regained control of these areas, which culminated in the capture in April 2000 of the strategically important Elephant Pass base complex, located at the entrance of the Jaffna Peninsula, after prolonged fighting against the Sri Lanka Army.[66]

Mahattaya, a one-time deputy leader of LTTE, was accused of treason by the LTTE and killed in 1994.[67] He is said to have collaborated with the Indian Research and Analysis Wing to remove Prabhakaran from the LTTE leadership.[68]

2002 ceasefire

An LTTE bicycle infantry platoon north of Kilinochchi in 2004

In 2002, the LTTE dropped its demand for a separate state,[69] instead demanding a form of regional autonomy.[70] Following the landslide election defeat of Kumaratunga and Ranil Wickramasinghe coming to power in December 2001, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire.[71] The Sri Lankan Government agreed to the ceasefire, and in March 2002 the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed. As part of the agreement, Norway and other Nordic countries agreed to jointly monitor the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.[72]

Six rounds of peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE were held, but they were temporarily suspended after the LTTE pulled out of the talks in 2003 claiming "certain critical issues relating to the ongoing peace process".[73][74] In 2003 the LTTE proposed an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). This move was approved of by the international community but rejected by the Sri Lankan President.[75] The LTTE boycotted the presidential election in December 2005. While LTTE claimed that the people under its control were free to vote, it is alleged that they used threats to prevent the population from voting. The United States condemned this.[76][77]

A mother of a dead LTTE cadre raises the Tamil Eelam flag on Maaveerar Naal 2002 in Germany

The new government of Sri Lanka came into power in 2006 and demanded to abrogate the ceasefire agreement, stating that the ethnic conflict could only have a military solution, and that the only way to achieve this was by eliminating the LTTE.[78] Further peace talks were scheduled in Oslo, Norway, on 8 and 9 June 2006, but cancelled when the LTTE refused to meet directly with the government delegation, stating its fighters were not being allowed safe passage to travel to the talks. Norwegian mediator Erik Solheim told journalists that the LTTE should take direct responsibility for the collapse of the talks.[79] Rifts grew between the government and LTTE, and resulted in a number of ceasefire agreement violations by both sides during 2006. Suicide attacks,[80] military skirmishes, and air raids took place during the latter part of 2006.[81][82] Between February 2002 to May 2007, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission documented 3,830 ceasefire violations by the LTTE, with respect to 351 by the security forces.[83] Military confrontation continued into 2007 and 2008. In January 2008 the government officially pulled out of the Cease Fire Agreement.[84]


See also: Colonel Karuna

In the most significant show of dissent from within the organisation, a senior LTTE commander named Colonel Karuna (nom de guerre of Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan) broke away from the LTTE in March 2004 and formed the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (later Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal), amid allegations that the northern commanders were overlooking the needs of the eastern Tamils. The LTTE leadership accused him of mishandling funds and questioned him about his recent personal behaviour. He tried to take control of the eastern province from the LTTE, which caused clashes between the LTTE and TMVP. The LTTE has suggested that TMVP was backed by the government,[85] and the Nordic SLMM monitors corroborated this.[86] It was later revealed that UNP Member of Parliament Seyed Ali Zahir Moulana had played an important role in the defection of Colonel Karuna from the LTTE to the Government.[87]

Military defeat

Main article: Eelam War IV

Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as the president of Sri Lanka in 2005. After a brief period of negotiations, LTTE pulled out of peace talks indefinitely.[88] Sporadic violence had continued and on 25 April 2006, LTTE tried to assassinate Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka.[89] Following the attack, the European Union proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.[90] A new crisis leading to the first large-scale fighting since signing of the ceasefire occurred when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the Mavil Oya (Mavil Aru) reservoir on 21 July 2006, and cut the water supply to 15,000 villages in government controlled areas.[91] This dispute developed into a full-scale war by August 2006.

Defeat in the East

Eelam War IV had commenced in the East. Mavil Aru came under the control of the Sri Lanka Army by 15 August 2006. Systematically, Sampoor, Vakarai, Kanjikudichchi Aru and Batticaloa also came under military control. The military then captured Thoppigala, the Tiger stronghold in Eastern Province on 11 July 2007. IPKF had failed to capture it from LTTE during its offensive in 1988.[92]

Defeat in the North

Sporadic fighting had been happening in the North for months, but the intensity of the clashes increased after September 2007. Gradually, the defence lines of the LTTE began to fall. The advancing military confined the LTTE into rapidly diminishing areas in the North. Prabhakaran was seriously injured during air strikes carried out by the Sri Lanka Air Force on a bunker complex in Jayanthinagar on 26 November 2007.[93] Earlier, on 2 November 2007, S. P. Thamilselvan, who was the head of the rebels' political wing, was killed during another government air raid.[94] On 2 January 2008, the Sri Lankan government officially abandoned the ceasefire agreement. By 2 August 2008, LTTE lost the Mannar District following the fall of Vellankulam town. Troops captured Pooneryn and Mankulam during the final months of 2008.

On 2 January 2009, the President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, announced that the Sri Lankan troops had captured Kilinochchi, the city which the LTTE had used for over a decade as its de facto administrative capital.[95][96][97] On the same day, President Rajapaksa called upon LTTE to surrender.[83] It was stated that the loss of Kilinochchi had caused substantial damage to the LTTE's public image,[96] and that the LTTE was likely to collapse under military pressure on multiple fronts.[98] As of 8 January 2009, the LTTE abandoned its positions on the Jaffna peninsula to make a last stand in the jungles of Mullaitivu, their last main base.[99] The Jaffna Peninsula was captured by the Sri Lankan Army by 14 January.[100] On 25 January 2009, SLA troops "completely captured" Mullaitivu town, the last major LTTE stronghold.[101]

President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared military victory over the Tamil Tigers on 16 May 2009, after 26 years of conflict.[102] The rebels offered to lay down their weapons in return for a guarantee of safety.[103] On 17 May 2009, LTTE's head of the Department of International Relations, Selvarasa Pathmanathan conceded defeat, saying in an email statement, "this battle has reached its bitter end".


With the end of the hostilities, 11,664 LTTE members, including 595 child soldiers surrendered to the Sri Lankan military.[104] Approximately 150 hardcore LTTE cadres and 1,000 mid-level cadres escaped to India.[105] The government took action to rehabilitate the surrendered cadres under a National Action Plan for the Re-integration of Ex-combatants while allegations of torture, rape, and murder were reported by international human rights bodies.[106] They were divided into three categories; hardcore, non-combatants, and those who were forcibly recruited (including child soldiers). Twenty-four rehabilitation centres were set up in Jaffna, Batticaloa, and Vavuniya. Among the apprehended cadres, there had been about 700 hardcore members. Some of these cadres were integrated into State Intelligence Services to tackle the internal and external networks of LTTE.[107] By August 2011, government had released more than 8,000 cadres, and 2,879 remained.[108]

Continued operations

After the death of LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the most powerful members of the organisation, Selvarasa Pathmanathan (alias KP) was its sole first generation leader left alive. He assumed duty as the new leader of LTTE on 21 July 2009. A statement was issued, allegedly from the Executive Committee of the LTTE, stating that Pathmanathan had been appointed leader of the LTTE.[109] 15 days after the announcement, on 5 August 2009, a Sri Lankan military intelligence unit, with the collaboration of local authorities, captured Pathmanathan in the Tune Hotel, Downtown Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.[110] Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence alleges that Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan of the Tamil Eelam People's Alliance (TEPA) in Norway, Suren Surendiran of British Tamils Forum (BTF), Father S. J. Emmanuel of Global Tamil Forum (GTF), Visvanathan Rudrakumaran of Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) and Sekarapillai Vinayagamoorthy alias Kathirgamathamby Arivazhagan alias Vinayagam, a former senior intelligence leader are trying to revive the organisation among the Tamil diaspora.[2][111][112][113] Subsequently, in May 2011, Nediyavan, who advocates an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan state, was arrested and released on bail in Norway, pending further investigation.[114]


LTTE women's wing marching in a parade.

The LTTE was viewed as a disciplined and militarised group with a leader of significant military and organisational skills.[11] Three major divisions of the LTTE were the military,intelligence and political wings.

The military wing consisted of at least 11 separate divisions including the conventional fighting forces, Charles Anthony Brigade[115] and Jeyanthan Brigade;[116] the suicide wing called the Black Tigers; naval wing Sea Tigers, air-wing Air Tigers, LTTE leader Prabhakaran's personal security divisions, Imran Pandian regiment and Ratha regiment;[117] auxiliary military units such as Kittu artillery brigade, Kutti Sri mortar brigade, Ponnamman mining unit and hit-and-run squads like Pistol gang. Charles Anthony brigade was the first conventional fighting formation created by LTTE. Sea Tiger division was founded in 1984, under the leadership of Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan alias Soosai. LTTE acquired its first light aircraft in the late 1990s. Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Shankar was instrumental in creating the Air Tigers.[118][119] It carried out 9 air attacks since 2007, including a suicide air raid targeting Sri Lanka Air Force headquarters, Colombo in February 2009. LTTE is the only terrorist-proscribed organisation to acquire aircraft. LTTE intelligence wing consisted of Tiger Organisation Security Intelligence Service aka TOSIS, run by Pottu Amman, and a separate military intelligence division. It was forbidden for the LTTE members to consume tobacco and alcohol. Illicit sex was also prohibited. Each member carried a cyanide capsule with orders to use if captured.[120]

Aircraft in LTTE possession[83]
Type of Aircraft Quantity
Microlight aircraft 2
ZLIN 143 5
Helicopters 2
Unmanned aerial vehicles 2

Politically the LTTE was never serious about a political solution,[121] it operated a systematic and powerful political wing, which functioned like a separate state in the LTTE controlled area. In 1989, it established a political party named People's Front of Liberation Tigers, under Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya. It was abandoned soon after. Later, S. P. Thamilselvan was appointed the head of the political wing. He was also a member of the LTTE delegation for Norwegian brokered peace talks. After the death of Thamilselvan in November 2007, Balasingham Nadesan was appointed as its leader.[122] Major sections within the political wing include International peace secretariat, led by Pulidevan, LTTE Police, LTTE court, Bank of Tamil Eelam, Sports division and the "Voice of Tigers" Radio broadcasting station of LTTE.

LTTE used female cadres for military engagements. Its women's' wing consisted of Malathi and Sothiya Brigades.

The LTTE also controlled a powerful international wing called the "KP branch", controlled by Selvarasa Pathmanathan, "Castro branch", controlled by Veerakathy Manivannam alias Castro, and "Aiyannah group" led by Ponniah Anandaraja alias Aiyannah.


Kilinochchi district court ín LTTE-administered Tamil Eelam

During its active years, the LTTE had established and administered a de facto state under its control, named Tamil Eelam with Kilinochchi as its administrative capital, and had managed a government in its territory, providing state functions such as courts, a police force, a human rights organization, and a humanitarian assistance board.[123] a health board, and an education board.[75] It ran a bank (Bank of Tamil Eelam), a radio station (Voice of Tigers) and a television station (National Television of Tamil Eelam).[124] In the LTTE-controlled areas, women reported lower levels of domestic violence because "the Tigers had a de facto justice system to deal with domestic violence."[125]

In 2003, the LTTE issued a proposal to establish an Interim Self Governing Authority in the 8 districts of the North and East which it controlled. The ISGA was to be entrusted with powers such as the right to impose law, collect taxes and oversee the rehabilitation process until a favorable solution was reached after which elections would be held. The ISGA would consist of members representing the LTTE, GoSL and the Muslim community. According to the proposal, this LTTE administration intended to be a secular one with principal emphasis on prohibition of discrimination and protection of all communities.[126]


The LTTE was a self-styled national liberation organization with the primary goal of establishing an independent Tamil state. Although it had dabbled with Marxism, Tamil nationalism was the primary focus of its ideology.[127] The LTTE was influenced by Indian freedom fighters such as Subhas Chandra Bose.[128] LTTE denied being a separatist movement and saw itself as fighting for self-determination and restoration of sovereignty in what they called their homeland.[129] Despite most Tigers being Hindus, the LTTE was an avowedly secular organization hence religion did not play any significant part in their ideology.[130] The Tiger leader criticized what he saw as the oppressive features of traditional Hindu Tamil society such as the caste system and gender inequality.[131] The LTTE presented itself as a revolutionary movement seeking widespread change within Tamil society rather than only independence from the Sri Lankan state; therefore its ideology included removal of caste discrimination and support for women's liberation.[132] The Tiger leader also expressed his political philosophy as being "revolutionary socialism" which constituted the creation of an "egalitarian society".[133]

Global network

LTTE had developed a large international network since the days of N. S. Krishnan, who served as its first international representative. In the late 1970s, TULF parliamentarian and opposition leader A. Amirthalingam provided letters of reference for fundraising, and V. N. Navaratnam, who was an executive committee member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), introduced many influential and wealthy Tamils living overseas to Tamil insurgent leaders.[28] Navaratnam also introduced LTTE members to the members of Polisario Front, a national liberation movement in Morocco, at a meeting held in Oslo, Norway.[28] In 1978, during the world tour of Amirthalingam (with London-based Eelam activist S. K. Vaikundavasan), he formed the World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC), which was later found to be an LTTE front organisation.[134] The global contacts of LTTE grew steadily since then. At the height of its power, LTTE had 42 offices worldwide. The international network of LTTE engages in propaganda, fundraising, arms procurement, and shipping.[43]

There were three types of organisations that engage in propaganda and fund raising—Front, Cover, and Sympathetic. Prior to the ethnic riots of 1983, attempts to raise funds for a sustaining military campaign were not realised. It was the mass exodus of Tamil civilians to India and western countries following the Black July ethnic riots, which made this possible. As the armed conflict evolved and voluntary donations lessened, LTTE used force and threats to collect money.[135][136] LTTE was worth US$200–300 million at its peak.[2][3] The group's global network owned numerous business ventures in various countries. These include investment in real estate, shipping, grocery stores, gold and jewellery stores, gas stations, restaurants, production of films, mass media organisations (TV, radio, print), and industries. It was also in control of numerous charitable organisations including Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, which was banned and had its funds frozen by the United States Treasury in 2007 for covertly financing terrorism.[137]

Arms Procurement and shipping activities of LTTE were largely clandestine. Prior to 1983, it procured weapons mainly from Afghanistan via the Indo-Pakistani border. Explosives were purchased from commercial markets in India. From 1983 to 1987, LTTE acquired a substantial amount of weapons from RAW and from Lebanon, Cyprus, Singapore, and Malaysia-based arms dealers. LTTE received its first consignment of arms from Singapore in 1984 on board the MV Cholan, the first ship owned by the organisation. Funds were received and cargo cleared at Chennai Port with the assistance of M. G. Ramachandran, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu.[138] In November 1994, the LTTE was able to purchase 60 tonnes of explosives (50 tonnes of TNT and 10 tonnes of RDX) from Rubezone Chemical plant in Ukraine, providing a forged Bangladeshi Ministry of Defense end-user certificate.[139] Payments for the explosives were made from a Citibank account in Singapore held by Selvarasa Pathmanathan. Consignment was transported on board MV Sewne. The same explosives were used for the Central Bank bombing in 1996. Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia remained the most trusted outposts of LTTE, after India alienated it after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

A LTTE Sea Tiger fast attack fiberglass boat passing a Sri Lankan freighter sunk by the Sea Tigers just north of the village of Mullaitivu, North-eastern Sri Lanka

Since late 1997, North Korea became the principal country to provide arms, ammunition, and explosives to the LTTE. The deal with North Korean government was carried out by Ponniah Anandaraja alias Aiyannah, a member of World Tamil Coordinating Committee of the United States and later, the accountant of LTTE.[43] He worked at the North Korean embassy in Bangkok since late 1997. LTTE had nearly 20 second-hand ships, which were purchased in Japan, and registered in Panama and other Latin American countries.[140] These ships mostly transported general cargo, including paddy, sugar, timber, glass, and fertiliser. But when an arms deal was finalised, they travelled to North Korea, loaded the cargo and brought it to the equator, where the ships were based. Then on board merchant tankers, weapons were transferred to the sea of Alampil, just outside the territorial waters in Sri Lanka's Exclusive Economic Zone. After that, small teams of Sea Tigers brought the cargo ashore. The Sri Lanka Navy, during 2005–08 destroyed at least 11 of these cargo ships belonged to LTTE in the international waters.[141][142]

LTTE's last shipment of weapons came in March 2009, towards the end of the war. Merchant vessel Princess Iswari went from Indonesia to North Korea under captain Kamalraj Kandasamy alias Vinod, loaded the weapons and came back to international waters beyond Sri Lanka. But due to the heavy naval blockades set up by Sri Lankan Navy, it could not deliver the arms consignment. Thus it dumped the weapons in the sea. The same ship, after changing its name to MV Ocean Lady, arrived in Vancouver with 76 migrants, in October 2009.[143] In December 2009, Sri Lanka Navy apprehended a merchant vessel belonged to LTTE, "Princess Chrisanta" in Indonesia and brought it back to Sri Lanka.[144]

The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (USSFRC) and Ethiopian based Jimma Times[145] claimed that the Eritrean government had provided direct military assistance, including light aircraft to LTTE, during the 2002–03 period when the LTTE was negotiating with the Sri Lankan government via the Norwegian mediators.[146][147] It was also alleged that Erik Solheim, the chief Norwegian facilitator, helped LTTE to establish this relationship.[148] None of these claims have since been verified. These allegations and a suspicion from within the Sri Lankan armed forces, that LTTE had considerable connections and assets in Eritrea and that its leader Prabhakaran may try to flee to Eritrea in the final stages of war, prompted the Sri Lankan government to establish diplomatic relations with Eritrea in 2009.[149][150] None of the allegations have since been verified.

Proscription as a terrorist group

32 countries have listed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.[151][152] As of January 2009, these include:

The first country to ban the LTTE was its brief one-time ally, India. The Indian change of policy came gradually, starting with the IPKF-LTTE conflict, and culminating with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. India opposes the new state Tamil Eelam that LTTE wants to establish, saying that it would lead to Tamil Nadu's separation from India, despite the leaders and common populace of Tamil Nadu considering themselves Indian. Sri Lanka itself lifted the ban on the LTTE before signing the ceasefire agreement in 2002. This was a prerequisite set by the LTTE for the signing of the agreement.[162][163] The Indian Government extended the ban on LTTE considering their strong anti-India posture and threat to the security of Indian nationals.[164]

The European Union banned LTTE as a terrorist organisation on 17 May 2006. In a statement, the European Parliament said that the LTTE did not represent all Tamils and called on it to "allow for political pluralism and alternate democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka".[90]

In October 2014, the European Court of Justice annulled the anti-terrorism sanctions and several other restrictions placed on the LTTE in 2006. The court noted that the basis of proscribing the LTTE had been based on "imputations derived from the press and the Internet" rather than on direct investigation of the group's actions, as required by law.[165][166] Later, in March 2015, the EU reimposed the sanctions and restrictions.[167][168][169]

The LTTE leader Prabhakaran contested the terrorist designation of his organization, asserting that the international community had been influenced by the "false propaganda" of the Sri Lankan state and said that there was no coherent definition of the concept of terrorism. He also maintained that the LTTE was a national liberation organization fighting against "state terrorism" and "racist oppression".[170] Following 9/11, in an effort to distance his organization from the "real terrorists", the LTTE leader expressed sympathy to the Western powers engaged in a war against international terrorism and urged them to provide "a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of terrorism that would distinguish between freedom struggles based on the right to self-determination and blind terrorist acts based on fanaticism." He also expressed concern over states with human rights abuses like Sri Lanka joining the alliance in the war against terrorism as "posing a threat to the legitimate political struggles of the oppressed humanity subjected to state terror."[171][172]

Karen Parker, an attorney specializing in human rights and humanitarian law, argued that the LTTE was not a terrorist organization but "an armed force in a war against the government of Sri Lanka." She characterized the war waged by the LTTE as "a war of national liberation in the exercise of the right of self-determination."[173]


Political figures who were considered as assassinated by LTTE[83]
Position/Status Number
President of Sri Lanka 1
Ex-Prime Minister of India 1
Presidential candidate 1
Leaders of political parties 10
Cabinet ministers 7
Members of Parliament 37
Members of provincial councils 6
Members of Pradeshiya Sabha 22
Political party organisers 17
Mayors 4

The LTTE has been condemned by various groups for assassinating political and military opponents. The victims include Tamil moderates who coordinated with the Sri Lanka Government and Tamil paramilitary groups assisting the Sri Lankan Army. The assassination of the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa is attributed to LTTE. The seventh Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber Thenmozhi Rajaratnam on 21 May 1991.[174] On 24 October 1994, LTTE detonated a bomb during a political rally in Thotalanga-Grandpass, which killed most of the prominent politicians of the United National Party, including presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake MP, Cabinet ministers Weerasinghe Mallimarachchi and G. M. Premachandra, Ossie Abeygunasekara MP and Gamini Wijesekara MP.[175][176]

LTTE sympathisers justify some of the assassinations by arguing that the people attacked were combatants or persons closely associated with Sri Lankan military intelligence. Specifically in relation to the TELO, the LTTE has said that it had to perform preemptive self-defence because the TELO was in effect functioning as a proxy for India.[177]

Suicide attacks

Main article: Black Tigers
Kopay memorial for fallen Tamil combatants

One of the main divisions of LTTE included the Black Tigers, an elite fighting wing of the movement, whose mission included carrying out suicide attacks against enemy targets.[178] From ancient times, the Tamil civilization saw War as an honorable sacrifice and fallen heroes and kings were worshiped in the form of a Hero stone. Heroic martyrdom was glorified in ancient Tamil literature. The Tamil kings and warriors followed an honour code similar to that of Japanese Samurais and committed suicide to save the honor.[179] The Black Tigers wing of the LTTE is said to reflect some of these elements of Tamil martial traditions including the practice of the worship of fallen heroes (Maaveerar Naal) and martial martyrdom. All soldiers of LTTE carried a suicide pill around their necks to escape captivity and torture by enemy forces.[180]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, LTTE was the first insurgent organisation to use concealed Explosive belts and vests.[181][182] The specialised unit that carried out suicide attacks was named the Black Tigers. According to the information published by the LTTE, the Black Tigers carried out 378 suicide attacks between 5 July 1987, and 20 November 2008.[83] Out of the deceased, 274 were male and 104 were female.

Many of these attacks have involved military objectives in the north and east of the country, although civilians have been targeted on numerous occasions, including during a high-profile attack on Colombo International Airport in 2001 that caused damage to several commercial airliners and military jets, killing 16 people.[183] The LTTE was responsible for a 1998 attack on the Buddhist shrine and UNESCO world heritage site Sri Dalada Maligawa in Kandy that killed eight worshipers. The attack was symbolic in that the shrine, which houses a tooth of the Buddha, is the holiest Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka.[184] Other Buddhist shrines have been attacked, notably the Sambuddhaloka Temple in Colombo, in which nine worshippers were killed.[185]

Black Tiger wing had carried out attacks on various high-profile leaders both inside and outside Sri Lanka.[186] It had successfully targeted three world leaders, the only insurgent group to do so. That includes the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India on 21 May 1991,[187][188] the assassination of Ranasinghe Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka on 1 May 1993,[189] and the failed assassination attempt of Chandrika Kumaratunga, the Sri Lankan President on 18 December 1999, which resulted in the loss of her right eye.[190][191][192]

The killed Black Tiger cadres were highly glorified and their families were given the "Maha Viru family" status. Those cadres were given a chance to have his/her last supper with the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, which was a rare honour one would get in the LTTE controlled area. This, in turn motivated LTTE cadres to join the Black Tiger wing.[193]

On 28 November 2007, an LTTE suicide bomber named Sujatha Vagawanam detonated a bomb hidden inside her brassiere in an attempt to kill Sri Lankan minister Douglas Devananda.[194] This was recorded in the security cameras inside Devananda's office. It is one of the few unsuspected detonations of an explosive by a suicide bomber recorded by a camera.[195][196]

Human rights violations

The United States Department of State states that its reason for banning LTTE as a proscribed terrorist group is based on allegations that LTTE does not respect human rights and that it does not adhere to the standards of conduct expected of a resistance movement or what might be called "freedom fighters".[197][198][199][200] The FBI has described the LTTE as "amongst the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world".[201] Other countries have also proscribed LTTE under the same rationale. Numerous countries and international organisations have accused the LTTE of attacking civilians and recruiting children.[174] Despite the allegations of human rights abuses, LTTE has been noted for its lack of use of sexualized violence or rape as a tactic.[202]

Attacks on civilians

The LTTE has launched attacks on civilian targets several times. Notable attacks include the Aranthalawa Massacre,[203] Anuradhapura massacre,[204] Kattankudy mosque massacre,[205] the Kebithigollewa massacre,[206] and the Dehiwala train bombing.[207] Civilians have also been killed in attacks on economic targets, such as the Central Bank bombing.[207][208] The LTTE leader Prabhakaran denied allegations of killing civilians, claiming to condemn such acts of violence; and claimed that LTTE had instead attacked armed home guards who were "death-squads let loose on Tamil civilians" and Sinhalese settlers who were "brought to the Tamil areas to forcibly occupy the land."[209][210] The state-sponsored settlements of Sinhalese in the northern and eastern parts of the island which the LTTE considered to be the traditional homeland of Tamils became "the sites of some of the worst violence."[211] According to the International Crisis Group, the Sri Lankan government implemented the military-led settlements of Sinhalese community in Tamil areas in order to create "a buffer to the expansion of LTTE control" and to "undermine Tamil nationalist claims on a contiguous north-eastern Tamil homeland." The continuous inflow of Sinhalese settlers in Tamil areas since the 1950s had become a source of inter-ethnic violence and had been one of the major grievances expressed by the LTTE. As armed Sinhalese villages were established in Tamil areas, many Tamil families were forcibly displaced by the army from their traditional villages and the LTTE retaliated by attacking the settlers.[212][213]

Child soldiers

The LTTE has been accused of recruiting and using child soldiers to fight against Sri Lankan government forces.[214][215][216] The LTTE was accused of having up to 5,794 child soldiers in its ranks since 2001.[217][218] Amid international pressure, the LTTE announced in July 2003 that it would stop conscripting child soldiers, but UNICEF[219][220] and Human Rights Watch[221] have accused it of reneging on its promises, and of conscripting Tamil children orphaned by the tsunami.[222] On 18 June 2007, the LTTE released 135 children under 18 years of age. UNICEF, along with the United States, states that there has been a significant drop in LTTE recruitment of children, but claimed in 2007 that 506 child recruits remain under the LTTE.[223] A report released by the LTTE's Child Protection Authority (CPA) in 2008 stated that less than 40 soldiers under age 18 remained in its forces.[224] In 2009 a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations said the Tamil Tigers "continue to recruit children to fight on the frontlines", and "use force to keep many civilians, including children, in harm's way".[225] Although some children were forcefully recruited, many voluntarily joined the LTTE after witnessing or experiencing abuses by Sri Lankan security forces, seeking to "protect their families or to avenge real or perceived abuses."[226]

The LTTE argues that instances of child recruitment occurred mostly in the east, under the purview of former LTTE regional commander Colonel Karuna. After leaving the LTTE and forming the TMVP, it is alleged that Karuna continued to forcibly kidnap and induct child soldiers.[227][228]

Ethnic cleansing

The LTTE is responsible for forcibly removing, or ethnic cleansing,[229][230] of Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control. The eviction of Muslim residents happened in the north in 1990, and the east in 1992. The expulsion of Muslims had more to do with disagreements over ethnic identity and politics than with religion as the Sri Lankan Muslims did not support the LTTE or the creation of an independent Tamil state and they do not identify with the ethnic Tamils despite being a Tamil-speaking people.[231][232] The LTTE also saw Muslims as a threat to 'national security' as they alleged their Muslim cadres had defected from their movement to join the Sri Lankan military and paramilitary forces who were allegedly responsible for attacks on Tamil civilians.[233]

Initially young Muslims joined the Tamil militant groups in the early years of Tamil militancy.[234] Muslim ironmongers in Mannar fashioned weapons for the LTTE. In its 1976 Vaddukoddai Resolution, LTTE condemned the Sri Lankan government for "unleashing successive bouts of communal violence on both the Tamils and Muslims".[235] LTTE later undertook its anti-Muslim campaigns as it began to view Muslims as outsiders, rather than a part of the Tamil nation. Local Tamil leaders were disturbed by the LTTE's call for the eviction of Muslims in 1970.[236] In 2005, the International Federation of Tamils claimed that the Sri Lankan military purposefully stoked tensions between Tamils and Muslims, in an attempt to undermine Tamil security.[237] As Tamils turned to the LTTE for support, the Muslims were left with the Sri Lankan state as their sole defender, and so to the LTTE, the Muslims had legitimised the role of the state, and were thus viewed as Sri Lankans.[237]

Execution of prisoners of war

LTTE had executed prisoners of war on a number of occasions, in spite of the declaration in 1988, that it would abide by the Geneva Conventions. One such incident was the mass murder of 600 unarmed Sri Lankan Police officers in 1990, in Eastern Province, after they surrendered to the LTTE on the request of President Ranasinghe Premadasa.[238] Police officers were promised safe conduct and subsequent release; they were instead taken to the jungle, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs, before being made to lie down on the ground to be subsequently shot.[239] In 1993, LTTE killed 200 Sri Lanka Army soldiers, captured in the naval base at Pooneryn, during the Battle of Pooneryn.[240]

War crimes

There are allegations that war crimes were committed by the Sri Lankan military and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam during the Sri Lankan Civil War, particularly during the final months of the conflict in 2009. The alleged war crimes include attacks on civilians and civilian buildings by both sides; executions of combatants and prisoners by both sides; enforced disappearances by the Sri Lankan military and paramilitary groups backed by them; acute shortages of food, medicine, and clean water for civilians trapped in the war zone; and recruitment of child soldiers by the Tamil Tigers.[241][242]

A panel of experts appointed by UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon to advise him on the issue of accountability with regard to any alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the civil war found "credible allegations" which, if proven, indicated that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil Tigers.[243][244][245] The panel has called on the UNSG to conduct an independent international inquiry into the alleged violations of international law.[246][247]

Other criminal activities

One factor that has greatly benefited the LTTE has been its sophisticated international support network. While some of the funding obtained by the LTTE is from legitimate fundraising, a significant portion is obtained through criminal activities, extortion among Tamil diaspora,[248][249] involving sea piracy, human trafficking, drug trafficking and gunrunning.[250][251][252][253]

Sea piracy

The LTTE has been accused of hijacking several vessels and ships in waters outside Sri Lanka,[254] including Ocean Trader (in October 1994), Irish Mona (in August 1995), Princess Wave (in August 1996), Athena (in May 1997), Misen (in July 1997), Morong Bong (in July 1997), MV Cordiality (in September 1997), Princess Kash (in August 1998), Newko (in July 1999), Uhana (in June 2000), Fuyuan Ya 225 (Chinese trawler, in March 2003), MV Farah III (in December 2006) and City of Liverpool (in January 2007).[254][255][256][257][258][259] The MV Sik Yang, a 2,818-ton Malaysian-flag cargo ship which sailed from Tuticorin, India on 25 May 1999, went missing in waters near Sri Lanka. The fate of the ship's crew of 15 is unknown. It was suspected that the vessel was hijacked by the LTTE to be used as a phantom vessel. Later, in 1999 it was confirmed that the vessel had been hijacked by the LTTE.[254][256]

Likewise, the crew of a Jordanian ship, MV Farah III, that ran aground near LTTE-controlled territory off the island's coast, accused the Tamil Tigers of risking their lives and forcing them to abandon the vessel which was carrying 14,000 tonnes of Indian rice.[260]

Arms smuggling

The LTTE members operated a cargo company called "Otharad Cargo" in the United Arab Emirates. There are reports that the LTTE met Taliban members and discussed the "Sharjah network", which existed in the Sharjah emirate of the United Arab Emirates. The Sharjah network was used by Victor Bout, an arms-smuggling Russian intelligence agent, to provide the Taliban with weapons deliveries and other flights between Sharjah and Kandahar. Otharad Cargo reportedly received several consignments of military hardware from the Sharjah network.[261][262]

The Mackenzie Institute claimed that LTTE's secretive international operations of the smuggling of weapons, explosives, and "dual use" technologies is attributed to the "KP Branch", headed by Selvarasa Pathmanathan prior to 2002.[263] It also claims that the most expertly executed operation of the KP Branch was the theft of 32,400 rounds of 81 mm mortar ammunition purchased from Tanzania destined for the Sri Lanka Army. Being aware of the purchase of 35,000 mortar bombs, the LTTE made a bid to the manufacturer through a numbered company and arranged a vessel of their own to pick up the load. Once the bombs were loaded into the ship, the LTTE changed the name and registration of their ship. The vessel was taken to Tiger-held territory in Sri Lanka's north instead of transporting it to its intended destination.[263] In 2002, Prabhakaran appointed Castro as the international chief of LTTE. He overtook the responsibilities of arms smuggling and related activities from Pathmanathan.

People smuggling

Most of the smuggling of Tamil people to western countries was carried out by LTTE. It had largely benefited from this. The prices charged by LTTE to go to countries such as Canada was significantly higher than the normal cost to travel. In addition, money had to be paid to obtain "exit visas" to leave LTTE controlled areas.[264] After the war, LTTE's main business has been people smuggling. A cost of LKR 4 million per immigrant was "enforced" by LTTE operatives.[265] LTTE's people smuggling ships included MV Ocean Lady, which appeared in October 2009 off Canada's British Columbia coast with 76 Tamil asylum seekers; MV Sun Sea, arrived in August 2010 off British Columbia, with 492 asylum seekers[266] and MV Alicia, carrying 80 illegal immigrants, but was intercepted by Indonesian authorities in July 2011, allegedly heading towards Canada or New Zealand.[264]


LTTE had coerced Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka to give it money, by threatening the safety of their relatives or property in areas under its control.[267][268][269]

Money laundering

In 2008 - 2009, a report on ″Money laundering and the financing of terrorism″ to the European Union Committee stated a case study related to the LTTE which evidenced the implantation of this terrorist group in number of EU member states.[270] In January 2011, Swiss authorities arrested several LTTE members on money laundering.[271] They were all later released.

Passport forgery

In the early 1990s, Canadian authorities uncovered a passport forgery scheme run by Canadian Tamils with links to the LTTE, including one of its founding members.[272][273] In December 2010, Spanish and Thai police uncovered another passport forgery scheme attributed to LTTE.[274]

Drug trafficking

A number of intelligence agencies have accused LTTE of involvement in drug trafficking. In 2010, citing Royal Canadian Mounted Police sources, Jane's Intelligence Review said the LTTE controls a portion of the one billion dollar drug market in the Canadian city of Montreal.[256] It also states narcotics smuggling using its merchant ships, is one of the main ways of earning money out of its $300 million annual income. The U.S. Department of Justice states that LTTE has historically served as the drug couriers moving narcotics into Europe.[275] Indian authorities accused LTTE operatives of previously bringing narcotics to Mumbai from Mandsaur District of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab border. The drugs were then transported to coastal towns in Tamil Nadu such as Tuticorin, Rameswaram, Ramanathapuram, Nagapattinam and Kochi, in Kerala State.[276]

Credit card fraud

LTTE was also involved in credit card fraud, in the United Kingdom. In 2010, STF arrested the mastermind behind this fraud, Neshanadan Muruganandan alias Anandan. LTTE had cloned credit cards using PIN and card numbers obtained from unsuspecting card holders in the United Kingdom, and funds were later transferred out of their accounts.[277][278][279] In 2007, Norwegian authorities sentenced six LTTE members for skimming more than 5.3 million Norwegian kroner in a similar credit card scam.[280]

Cyber attacks

In August 1997, an organisation calling themselves the Internet Black Tigers claimed responsibility for the E-mail harassment of various Sri Lankan networks around the world. The group sent mass Emails which contained the text "We are the Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to disrupt your communications". They were also responsible for repeated attacks on official sites of numerous other governments. [note 1] The LTTE is also accused of having pioneered online fund raising through solicitation and various cyber crimes including identity theft and credit card fraud.[286]

LTTE is also known to use the internet for criminal profit. In such an attack on Sheffield University's computer system they were able to capture legitimate user IDs and passwords of well respected academics and to use them for propaganda and fund raising in a covert manner.[281][283]

See also


  1. According to Indrajit Banerjee, "This cyber attack in 1997 on Sri Lankan government and consulate network was the first recorded incident on internet terrorism by a conventional terrorist group".A Tamil tiger wing called ″Internet Black Tigers″ were involved in this attack and they were also responsible for repeated attacks on official sites of numerous other governments[281][282][283][284][285]


  1. "Rebels admit defeat in Sri Lankan civil war | | The Detroit News". Retrieved 30 May 2009.
  2. 1 2 3 "LTTE international presents an enduring threat". Lakbima News. July 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  3. 1 2 "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE" (PDF). International Crisis Group. February 2010. Retrieved 24 August 2011.
  4. Shanaka Jayasekara (October 2007). "LTTE Fundraising & Money Transfer Operations". Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sherman, Jake (2003). The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 198. ISBN 978-1-58826-172-4.
  6. Thiranagama, Sharika (2011). In My Mother's House: Civil War in Sri Lanka. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 108.
  7. Åke Nordquist, Kjell (2013). Gods and Arms: On Religion and Armed Conflict. Casemate Publishers. p. 97.
  8. "Sri Lanka – Living With Terror". Frontline. PBS. May 2002. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  9. "SCENARIOS-The end of Sri Lanka's quarter-century war". Reuters. 16 May 2009.
  10. "Sri Lanka Rebels Concede Defeat". Voice of America. Colombo. 17 May 2009.
  11. 1 2 Wilson, A. J. (2000). Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism:Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Sydney: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. pp. 24,131–132. ISBN 1-85065-338-0. OCLC 237448732.
  12. "History of the Organisation". The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). January 2000. Retrieved 30 June 2015.
  13. 1 2 3 "Taming the Tamil Tigers". Federal Bureau of Investigation. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1 October 2008. Retrieved 7 March 2009.
  14. Pavlović, Zoran (2009). Terrorism and security. New York: Chelsea House Publishers. Retrieved 18 January 2014.
  15. "Ethnic cleansing: Colombo". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 13 April 2007.
  16. "Sri Lanka rebels in new air raid". BBC News. BBC News. 29 April 2007. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  17. "Majority in Tamil Nadu favours backing LTTE: Poll". Silicon India News. March–May 2009. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  18. Mark Tran (May 2009). "Prabhakaran's death and fall of LTTE lead to street celebrations in Sri Lanka". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 24 August 2011.
  19. 1 2 Picciotto, Robert., Weaving, Rachel. (2006). Security And Development: Investing In Peace And Prosperity. London: Routledge. p. 171. ISBN 978-0-415-35364-9.
  20. "Humanitarian Operation Timeline, 1981–2009". Ministry of Defence (Sri Lanka). Retrieved 2 August 2011.
  21. "President to announce end of war". Times Online. 17 May 2009. Retrieved 16 May 2009.
  22. From correspondents in Colombo (17 May 2009). "Tamil Tigers admit defeat in civil war after 37-year battle". Archived from the original on 19 May 2009. Retrieved 17 May 2009.
  23. D.B.S. Jeyaraj (9 August 2009). "'Operation KP': the dramatic capture and after". Chennai, India: The Hindu.
  24. T. Sabaratnam. "Pirapaharan, Chapter 42". Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  25. Taraki Sivaram (May 1994). "The Exclusive Right to Write Eelam History". Tamil Nation. Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  26. T. Sabaratnam. "The JVP and Tamil militancy". BottomLine. Archived from the original on 29 September 2008. Retrieved 17 August 2011.
  27. "Formation of the TULF: A formal background" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 October 2011. Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  28. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rohan Gunaratna (December 1998). "International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency". Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  29. Stewart Bell. Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World. Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  30. "Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Tamil View". Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  31. "Pon Sivakumaran, The first Martyr decided to die than suffer the torture in the event of enemy capture". Sri Lanka Newspapers. Retrieved 17 August 2011.
  32. 1 2 Hoffman, Bruce (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 139. ISBN 978-0231-126-99-1.
  33. Jeyaraj, D. B. S. (5 May 2012). "Thirty Sixth Birth Anniversary of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam". Retrieved 5 May 2012.
  34. Gunaratna, Rohan, "The Rebellion in Sri Lanka: Sparrow Tactics to Guerrilla Warfare (1971–1996)," p. 13.
  35. 1 2 T. Sabaratnam (December 2003). "Pirapaharan, Chapter 21, The Split of the LTTE". Retrieved 27 July 2011.
  36. Najamuddin, Jamila (17 May 2010). "Children of a lesser God". The Daily Mirror. Retrieved 5 May 2012.
  37. "The massacres in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983 | Sciences Po Encyclopédie des violences de masse". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  38. Sieghart, Paul. "Sri Lanka: a mounting tragedy of errors" (PDF). International Commission of Jurists. pp. 76–77. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  39. "Sri Lankan families count cost of war", BBC News, 23 July 2008.
  40. "LTTE: the Indian connection". Sunday Times. 1997. Retrieved 25 July 2011.
  41. "Uppermost in our minds was to save the Gandhis' name". Express India. 1997. Retrieved 25 July 2011.
  42. "Pottu Amman: Patient but ruthless Tiger". The Nation. 2009. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  43. 1 2 3 "Transcript- Rohan Gunaratne". Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. 2010. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  44. "Killing Rajiv Gandhi: Dhanu's sacrificial metamorphosis in death". 2009. Retrieved 25 July 2011.
  45. 1 2 3 Russell R. Ross; Andrea Matles Savada (1988). "Tamil Militant Groups". Sri Lanka: A Country Study. Retrieved 2 May 2007.
  46. 1 2 3 4 Hellmann-rajanayagam, D. (1994). The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity. Franz Steiner Verlag. p. 164. ISBN 978-3-515-06530-6.
  47. O'Ballance, Edgar (1989). The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973–88. London: Brassey's. p. 61. ISBN 0-08-036695-3.
  48. 1 2 3 O'Ballance, Edgar (1989). The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973–88. London: Brassey's. p. 62. ISBN 0-08-036695-3.
  49. Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam (June 2000). Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. University of British Columbia Press. p. 128. ISBN 978-0-7748-0760-9.
  50. M. R. Narayan Swamy (August 1995). Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas. South Asia Books. pp. 191–198. ISBN 978-81-220-0386-4.
  51. Roberts, M. (2005). "Tamil Tiger "Martyrs": Regenerating Divine Potency?". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 28 (6): 493–514. doi:10.1080/10576100590950129. Retrieved 6 April 2008.
  52. Harrison, Frances (26 November 2002). "'Black Tigers' appear in public". BBC News. BBC News. Retrieved 2 September 2007.
  53. The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (April 1989), pp. 401–15.
  54. 1 2 Stokke, K.; Ryntveit, A.K. (2000). "The Struggle for Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka". A Journal of Urban and Regional Policy. 31 (2): 285–304. doi:10.1111/0017-4815.00129.
  55. 1 2 O'Ballance, Edgar (1989). The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973–88. London: Brassey's. pp. 91–4. ISBN 0-08-036695-3.
  56. Brown, Michael E., Coté, Owen R. Jr., Lynn-Jones, Sean M. (2010). Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses. New York: MIT Press. p. 214. ISBN 978-0-262-51464-4.
  57. "Shocking disclosures – Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) played double game in Sri Lanka". Tamils Sydney. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  58. 1 2 O'Ballance, Edgar (1989). The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973–88. London: Brassey's. p. 100. ISBN 0-08-036695-3.
  59. "Statistics on civilians affected by war from 1974–2004" (PDF). NorthEast Secretariat on Human Rights (NESOHR). January 2006. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  60. "History of the Organisation". University Teachers for Human Rights. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  61. "Chapter 55: Assassination of Athulathmudali". Asia Times. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  62. "Arming the enemy – Handing over arms to the LTTE". Lanka Library. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  63. "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story, Chapter 44: Eelam war – again". K. T. Rajasingham. Asia Times. 2002. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  64. "A Look at the Peace Negotiations". Inter Press Service. 2003. Archived from the original on 3 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  65. "Jaffna falls to Sri Lankan army". BBC News. BBC News. 5 December 1995. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  66. V. S. Sambandan (April 2000). "The fall of Elephant Pass". Hindu Net. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  67. AI 1996 Annual Report – Sri Lanka entry.
  68. "The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 22". Retrieved 31 January 2013.
  69. Bulathsinghala, Frances (19 September 2002). "LTTE drops demand for separate state". DAWN. Thailand. Retrieved 5 May 2012.
  70. Samuel M. Katz (2004). At Any Cost: National Liberation Terrorism. Twenty-First Century Books. ISBN 0-8225-0949-0.
  71. V.S., Sambandan (25 December 2004). "LTTE for talks". Chennai, India: The Hindu. Retrieved 20 April 2008.
  72. Sri Lanka: New Killings Threaten Ceasefire, Human Rights Watch, 28 July 2004.
  73. "Lankan PM calls LTTE to end talk deadlock". The Times of India. 2 June 2003. Archived from the original on 13 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  74. "Business community urges LTTE to get back to negotiating table". Sunday Observer. The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon. 27 April 2003. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  75. 1 2 McConnell, D. (2008). "The Tamil people's right to self-determination" (PDF). Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21 (1): 59–76. doi:10.1080/09557570701828592. Retrieved 25 March 2008.
  76. Pathirana, Saroj (23 November 2005). "LTTE supported Rajapakse presidency?". BBC News. BBC News. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  77. Ratnayake, K. (19 November 2005). "Rajapakse narrowly wins Sri Lankan presidential election". World Socialist Web Site. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  78. R. Cheran (April 2009) 9, 2009/UN+calls+for+ceasefire+fire+in+Sri+Lanka UN calls for ceasefire fire in Sri Lanka at The Real News
  79. Pathirana, Saroj (9 June 2006). "Collapse of talks". BBC News. BBC News. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  80. "PM condemns suicide bomb attack in Sri Lanka". New Zealand Government. 17 October 2006. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  81. "Military Launches Airstrike Against LTTE After Suicide Bombing in Sri Lanka". Global Insight. 2007. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  82. "Bomb targets Sri Lanka army chief". BBC News. BBC News. 25 April 2006. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  83. 1 2 3 4 5 "Humanitarian Operation – Factual Analysis, July 2006 – May 2009" (PDF). Ministry of Defence (Sri Lanka). 1 August 2011. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016.
  84. "Government ends ceasefire with Tamil Tigers". France 24 International News. France 24. Agence France-Presse. 2 January 2008. Archived from the original on 7 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  85. "Karuna removed from the LTTE". TamilNet report. 6 March 2004.
  86. "Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 September 2006.
  87. "Online edition of Sunday Observer - Business". Retrieved 2015-11-09.
  88. "EU ban on LTTE urged". BBCNews. 23 April 2006.
  89. "Bomb targets Sri Lanka army chief". BBC News. 25 April 2006. Retrieved 4 January 2010.
  90. 1 2 "European Union bans LTTE". Amit Baruah. Chennai, India: The Hindu. 31 May 2006.
  91. "Sri Lanka forces attack reservoir". BBC News. 6 August 2006. Retrieved 4 January 2010.
  92. "Sri Lanka declares fall of rebel east, Tigers defiant". Reuters. 11 July 2007. Retrieved 11 July 2007.
  93. "Prabhakaran injured in air attack". Ministry of Defence. 19 December 2007. Retrieved 26 December 2007.
  94. "Senior Tamil Tiger leader killed". BBC News. 2 November 2007. Retrieved 31 December 2007.
  95. Reddy, B. Muralidhar (3 January 2009). "Kilinochchi captured in devastating blow to LTTE". The Hindu. Chennai, India: The Hindu. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  96. 1 2 Mahendra (3 January 2009). "The fall of rebel headquarters: what does it hold for Sri Lanka?". Xinhuanet. Xinhua News Agency. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  97. "Sri Lanka Says Troops Have Rebel Capital". New York Times. Associated Press. 2 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  98. "Editorial: A blow to global terror". The Island Online. Upali Newspapers. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  99. "Army 'takes more Tiger territory'". BBC News. BBC News. 8 January 2009. Retrieved 8 January 2009.
  100. Johnson, Ed (14 January 2009). "Sri Lankan Military Seizes Last Rebel Base on Jaffna Peninsula". Bloomberg. Bloomberg L.P. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  101. "Last Tamil Tiger bastion 'taken'". BBC News. BBC News. 25 January 2009. Retrieved 25 January 2009.
  102. Sri Lanka army 'defeats rebels', BBC, 16 May 2009
  103. Fears of mass suicide as Tamil Tigers face final defeat, The Times, 17 May 2009
  104. "Sri Lankan experience proves nothing is impossible". The Sunday Observer. 5 June 2011. Retrieved 5 June 2011.
  105. "Colombo recalls splendid victory". The Pioneer. 31 August 2011. Retrieved 31 August 2011.
  106. "The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka". Human rights Watch. 3 February 2010. Retrieved 3 February 2010.
  107. "Sri Lanka "Taming The Tigers"". March 2011. Retrieved 1 August 2011.
  108. "Rehabilitation in final stages". Daily Mirror. 8 August 2011. Retrieved 9 August 2011.
  109. "New political formation of LTTE claimed". TamilNet. 21 July 2009. Retrieved 26 July 2009.
  110. "LTTE New Leader Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) arrested in Malaysia and transported to Sri Lanka". Tamil Sydney. 6 August 2009. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  111. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)". May 2002. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  112. "Lies Agreed Upon". Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence. 1 August 2011. Archived from the original on 24 November 2011. Retrieved 28 January 2012.
  113. "Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyawan". 14 August 2009. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  114. "LTTE's Nediyavan released on bail in Norway". Lanka Puvath. May 2011. Archived from the original on 5 October 2011. Retrieved 28 July 2011.
  115. "Charles Anthony Brigade retrained". DefenceNet. 7 February 2007. Retrieved 8 October 2008.
  116. "Army commandos join the battle". DefenceNet. 16 March 2007. Retrieved 17 December 2008.
  117. "For This All that Blood was Shed". Sri Lanka Watch. 13 April 2009. Retrieved 31 July 2011.
  118. Tiger Air Wing participates in celebrations. TamilNet, 28 November 1998.
  119. Tigers confirm Air wing. TamilNet, 27 November 1998.
  120. Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, p.252.
  121. "Tamils caught between the devil and deep deep blue sea". Sri Lanka Democracy Forum. Retrieved 1 August 2011.
  122. "Nadesan to head LTTE political wing". Chennai Online. November 2007. Retrieved 31 July 2011.
  123. Stokke, K. (2006). "Building the Tamil Eelam State: emerging state institutions and forms of governance in LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka". Third World Quarterly. 27 (6): 1021–1040. doi:10.1080/01436590600850434.
  124. Ranganathan, M. (2002). "Nurturing a Nation on the Net: The Case of Tamil Eelam". Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 8 (2): 51–66. doi:10.1080/13537110208428661. Retrieved 2008-03-25.
  125. "Sri Lanka: women in conflict". openDemocracy. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  126. "Full text: Tamil Tiger proposals". British Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 30 June 2015.
  127. "The American government's assessment of Prabhakaran". LankaWeb. Archived from the original on 24 October 2007. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  128. "Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Interview 'How I Became a Freedom Fighter' April 1994". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  129. Hashim, Ahmed S. (2013-05-28). When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 85. ISBN 0812206487.
  130. "Suicide Bombs Potent Tools of Terrorists". Washington Post. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  131. "Velupillai Pirabaharan - Womens International Day 1992". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  132. Alison, Miranda (2009-01-21). Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno-National Conflict. Routledge. p. 126. ISBN 9781134228942.
  133. "Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Interview". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  134. "World Tamil Coordinating Committee representative arrested in New York says U.S. Justice Department". Tamil Nation. December 2007. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  135. "Tamil Canadians Dismiss Extortion Claims". 27 August 1999. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  136. "Dutch authorities seek permission to question KP and other former LTTE leaders in Sri Lanka". Colombo Page. 24 May 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  137. "Tamil Rehabilitation Organization and its U.S. Branch Shut Down". 4 December 2007. Archived from the original on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  138. T. Sabaratnam. "Foundation for Tamil Eelam". Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  139. T. Sabaratnam (7 March 1998). "Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka: Deadly and Armed to the Teeth". New York Times. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  140. "LTTE runs illegal operations overseas – Minister Gunawardena". 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  141. "LTTE ships still being used for illegal activities". Lanka Puvath. 2011. Archived from the original on 5 October 2011. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  142. "Sri Lanka Navy destroy three LTTE ships and demolish their arms shipment capabilities". Sri Lanka Navy. 2007. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  143. "Tamil Migrant Ship M/V Sun Sea will arrive Canada by Aug 14th". Asian Tribune. 2010. Retrieved 29 July 2011.
  144. "The acquired LTTE ship, "PRINCESS CHRISANTA" brought in to Colombo Harbour by Sri Lanka Navy". Sri Lanka Navy. 2009. Archived from the original on 2 November 2011. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  145. "Sri Lanka finds LTTE fighter planes in Eritrea – Report". Jimma Times. 2009. Archived from the original on 3 October 2011. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  146. "Eritrea providing direct military assistance to LTTE – USSFRC". Ministry of Defense. 2007. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  147. "Axis of Evil: Norway-LTTE-Eritrea, and call to 'expose double standard of the West'". Asian Tribune. 2007. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  148. "Norway, Solheim helped establish LTTE-Eritrea links for arms deals". Lanka Web. 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  149. "Prabhakaran`s latest fireworks aimed at hitting headlines". Lanka Newspapers. 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  150. "Sri Lanka Goes After LTTE assets in Eritrea « The Eight Man Team". Retrieved 31 January 2013.
  151. "Council on Foreign Relations". Archived from the original on 26 May 2010.
  152. "MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base". Archived from the original on 19 August 2014.
  153. "Indian Court upholds LTTE ban". BBC News. 11 November 2008. Retrieved 11 February 2009.
  154. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations". U.S. Government, Office of Counterterrorism. 11 October 2005. Archived from the original on 5 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  155. "Treasury Targets U.S. Front for Sri Lankan Terrorist Organization". US Department of the Treasury. 11 February 2009. Archived from the original on 17 February 2009. Retrieved 11 February 2009.
  156. "Proscribed terrorist groups". UK Government, Home Office. Archived from the original on 24 December 2008. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  157. "Council Common Position 2009/67/CFSP". Council of the European Union. 26 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  158. "Currently listed entities: LTTE". Canadian Government. 28 November 2008. Archived from the original on 19 November 2006. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  159. "Thalayasingam Sivakumar (Appellant) v Minister of Employment and Immigration (Respondent)". Canadian Government. 4 November 1993. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  160. "Peace talks team for Thailand finalised: Government lifts LTTE proscription". Daily News. 5 September 2002. Archived from the original on 18 January 2012. Retrieved 11 February 2009.
  161. Government Information Department (7 January 2009). "LTTE is banned by the SL Govt: with immediate effect". Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka. Archived from the original on 11 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  162. "Timeline: Sri Lanka". BBC News. BBC News. 6 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  163. Kasturisinghe, Channa (11 January 2009). "LTTE ban: Step towards law and order in regained areas". The Nation. Retrieved 23 May 2012.
  164. "India extends ban on LTTE". 14 July 2012.
  165. "EU court overturns Tamil Tiger sanctions but maintains asset freeze". Retrieved 20 October 2014.
  166. "European court annuls sanctions on LTTE". Deccan Chronicle. Retrieved 20 October 2014.
  167. "LTTE Ban In EU Remains". The Sunday Leader. Retrieved 3 May 2015.
  168. "EU reimposes ban on LTTE: SL". The Daily Mirror. Retrieved 3 May 2015.
  169. "Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/521 of 26 March 2015 updating and amending the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision 2014/483/CFSP". Access to European Union law. Retrieved 3 May 2015.
  170. "LTTE to intensify struggle for self-determination if reasonable political solution is not offered soon". TamilNet. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  171. "Maha Veerar Naal Address, மாவீரர் நாள் 2001". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  172. "Prabhakaran asks West to redefine terrorism". The Hindu. Retrieved 2016-06-27.
  173. "LTTE not a terrorist organisation - Karen Parker". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  174. 1 2 "Suicide terrorism: a global threat". Jane's Information Group. 20 October 2000. Archived from the original on 4 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  175. "Q&A: Sri Lanka, killing of Former Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadiragamar was killed by LTTE in 2005. elections". BBC. February 2009. Retrieved 10 May 2007.
  176. "Sri Lanka: Searching for a solution". BBC. 11 August 1999. Retrieved 10 May 2007.
  177. T. S. Subramanian (August 1999). "Chronicle of murders". Hindu Net. Archived from the original on 9 July 2010.
  178. Stanford.
  179. South Asian Folklore: An Encyclopedia : Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka(2003), p. 386.
  180. Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis: Towards a Resolution (2002), p. 76.
  181. "Sri Lanka (LTTE) Historical Background". IISS Armed Conflict Database. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2003. Archived from the original on 12 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  182. "Taming the Tamil Tigers". Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1 October 2008. Retrieved 7 March 2009.
  183. Venkataramanan, K (24 July 2001). "LTTE Attacks Colombo Airport, Airbase". India. Press Trust of India. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  184. "LTTE's bomb Attack – Sri Dalada Maligawa in Sri Lanka". Society for Peace, Unity and human Rights in Sri Lanka. January 1998. Archived from the original on 22 January 2009. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  185. "LTTE Tamil Tiger suicide bomb attack near Sambuddhaloka temple in Colombo, Sri Lanka targeting civilians". Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights in Sri Lanka. 16 May 2008. Archived from the original on 31 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  186. Gambetta, D. (26 May 2005). Making sense of suicide missions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 60–70. ISBN 978-0-19-927699-8.
  187. "Tamil Tiger 'regret' over Gandhi". BBC. 27 June 2006. Retrieved 10 May 2007.
  188. "We killed Rajiv, confesses LTTE". The Times of India. 28 June 2006. Retrieved 10 May 2007.
  189. Baker, Mark (16 September 2002). "Hopes high for end to Sri Lanka war". The Age. Melbourne. Retrieved 10 May 2007.
  190. "Sri Lanka: In the name of clemency". Front Line. 21 January 2000. Archived from the original on 21 May 2006. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  191. "Analysis: Questions about the Bomb Blasts". K.T.Rajasingham. 2 January 2000. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  192. "The Mission of Truth −3". Ministry of Defense, Sri Lanka. Retrieved 18 June 2011.
  193. "Unmasking of Prabhakaran". Retrieved 10 August 2011.
  194. "Minister Douglas Devananda: More detail emerges on the suicide attack". Asian Tribune. 28 November 2007. Retrieved 10 August 2011.
  195. "Caught on camera: Lanka bra bomber's blast". IBN Live. 1 December 2007. Retrieved 10 August 2011.
  196. (video)
  197. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (28 February 2005). "Sri Lanka". Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004. United States Department of State. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  198. United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions (5 September 2006). UN Expert welcomes Proposed Sri Lanka Commission. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  199. Ganguly, Meenakshi (11 September 2006). "Sri Lanka: time to act". Open Democracy. Human Rights Watch.
  200. Clapham, Andrew (27 January 2006). "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors" (PDF). Academy of European Law, European University Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 February 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  201. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (10 January 2008). "Taming The Tamil Tigers". U.S. Federal Government, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  202. "No, war doesn't have to mean rape". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  203. Nadira Gunatilleke (24 May 2007). "Aranthalawa massacre, one of the darkest chapters in Lankan history". Daily News. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  204. "Sri Lanka Tamil Terror". The Time. 27 May 1985. Archived from the original on 14 January 2009. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  205. "Human rights violations in a context of armed conflict". Amnesty International USA. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  206. David Shelby (15 June 2006). "United States Condemns Terrorist Attack on Sri Lankan Bus". US Department of State. Archived from the original on 2 February 2009. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  207. 1 2 "Timeline of the Tamil conflict". BBC News. 4 September 2000. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  208. "1996: Fifty dead in Sri Lanka suicide bombing". BBC News. 31 January 1996. Retrieved 4 January 2009.
  209. "Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Interview "The Eye of the Tiger"". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  210. "Tamil National Leader Hon. V. Pirapaharan's Military Campaign messages". Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  211. Bose, Sumantra (2009-06-30). Contested Lands. Harvard University Press. p. 21. ISBN 9780674028562.
  212. "Sri Lanka's North I: The Denial of Minority Rights" (PDF). International Crisis Group. pp. 22–23. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  213. "THE LONG SHADOW OF WAR THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN POSTWAR SRI LANKA" (PDF). Oakland Institute. pp. 20–22. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  214. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (23 February 2000). "Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices". United States Department of State. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  215. "Human Rights Watch World Report 2006 – Sri Lanka". United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 18 January 2006. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  216. "Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict: Sri Lanka". Human Rights Watch. January 2003. Archived from the original on 16 May 2007. Retrieved 13 February 2009.
  217. Raman, Nachammai (29 November 2006). "Outrage over child soldiers in Sri Lanka". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  218. "UN plea to Tigers on child troops". BBC News. BBC News. 14 February 2006. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  219. "UN says Sri Lankan group continues to recruit child soldiers". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 27 April 2007. Archived from the original on 28 October 2007. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  220. "Children being caught up in recruitment drive in north east". United Nations Children's Fund. 26 June 2004. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  221. "Sri Lanka: Child Tsunami Victims Recruited by Tamil Tigers". Human Rights Watch. 13 January 2005. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  222. "Tamil Tigers 'drafting children'". BBC News. BBC News. 13 January 2005. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  223. "Sri Lanka: Amnesty International urges LTTE to live up to its pledge to end child recruitment". Amnesty International. 10 July 2007. Archived from the original on 22 October 2007. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  224. "Status of UNICEF database on underage LTTE members". Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 23 January 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  225. "Security Council open debate on children and armed conflict: Statement by SRSG Radhika Coomaraswamy". Relief Web. 29 April 2009. Retrieved 15 May 2009.
  226. "Living in Fear". Human Rights Watch. 2004-11-11. Retrieved 2016-06-11.
  227. "Agreements Reached Between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam". Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. 23 February 2006.
  228. "Karuna faction recruiting child soldiers in Lanka: UN". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 31 January 2008. Archived from the original on 7 November 2012. Retrieved 7 March 2009.
  229. "Tamil Tigers: A fearsome force". BBC News. BBC News. 2 May 2000. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  230. Reddy, B. Muralidhar (13 April 2007). "Ethnic cleansing: Colombo". The Hindu. Chennai, India: The Hindu. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  231. Nubin, Walter (2002-01-01). Sri Lanka: Current Issues and Historical Background. Nova Publishers. p. 11. ISBN 9781590335734.
  232. Morland, Paul (2016-05-23). Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict. Routledge. p. 67. ISBN 9781317152927.
  233. Dixit, Priya; Stump, Jacob L. (2015-06-26). Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies. Routledge. ISBN 9781317692942.
  234. McGilvray, Dennis B. (2008-04-16). Crucible of Conflict: Tamil and Muslim Society on the East Coast of Sri Lanka. Duke University Press. p. 11. ISBN 0822389185.
  235. Pararajasingham, Ana (December 2005). The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities (PDF). International Federation of Tamils (IFT). p. 25. ISBN 0-9775092-0-6. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  236. "The Expulsion And Expropriation of Muslims in the North". University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), Sri Lanka. 2001. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  237. 1 2 Pararajasingham, Ana (December 2005). The Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities (PDF). International Federation of Tamils (IFT). p. 16. ISBN 0-9775092-0-6. Retrieved 9 February 2009.
  238. "Recalling the saddest day in Lankan Police history". Lanka Newspapers. Lanka Newspapers. 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
  239. "Killing of 774 policemen". Rivira. Rivira. 2011. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
  240. "Strategic Pooneryn's fall a humiliating blow to Tiger Supremo; Battle of Pooneryn efficiently accomplished". Sri Lanka Army. Sri Lanka Army. Retrieved 12 June 2011.
  241. "Sri Lanka: US War Crimes Report Details Extensive Abuses". Human Rights Watch. 22 October 2009. Retrieved 17 January 2010.
  242. "Govt.: LTTE Executed Soldiers". The Sunday Leader. 8 December 2010. Retrieved 17 January 2010.
  243. "Report of the UNSG's panel of experts on accountability in SL". The Island, Sri Lanka. 16 April 2011.
  244. "UN panel admits international failure in Vanni war, calls for investigations". TamilNet. 16 April 2011.
  245. "Summary of UN Panel report". Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka). 16 April 2011.
  246. "Sri Lankan military committed war crimes: U.N. panel". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 16 April 2011.
  247. "Leaked UN report urges Sri Lanka war crimes probe". France24. 16 April 2011. Archived from the original on 3 May 2011.
  248. Wadhwaney, Rohit William (11 May 2006). "Lankan expats 'forced to fund LTTE'". Gulf Times. Gulf Publishing & Printing. Archived from the original on 4 February 2009. Retrieved 13 February 2009.
  249. Becker, Jo (14 March 2006). "Funding the "Final War" LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora" (PDF). Human Rights Watch: 1–5. Retrieved 13 February 2009.
  250. Rabasa, Angel; Chalk, Peter; Cragin, Kim; Daly, Sara A.; Gregg, Heather S.; Karasik, Theodore W.; O’Brien, Kevin A.; Rosenau, William (2006). Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (PDF). RAND Corporation. pp. 101–108. ISBN 978-0-8330-3932-3. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  251. "US criticises Tamil Tiger smuggling". BBC News. BBC News. 12 February 2003. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  252. "Sri Lankan pleads guilty in Tamil Tigers arms plot". Channel NewsAsia. MediaCorp. 11 May 2007. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  253. Ross, Barbara (16 October 2007). "Sri Lankan terror gang busted in ATM heist plot". The New York Daily News. Daily News. Retrieved 10 February 2009.
  254. 1 2 3 Lehr, Peter (2006). Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism. New York: Routledge. pp. 26–27. OCLC 847387581.
  255. Parashar, Swati (2008). Maritime Counter-terrorism: A Pan-Asian Perspective. India: Pearson Education India. pp. 45,187–189. OCLC 842893248.
  256. 1 2 3 The LTTE in brief Ministry of Defence and Urban Development - Sri Lanka, p 7. Retrieved on 19 January 2014
  257. HUMANITARIAN OPERATION FACTUAL ANALYSIS JULY 2006 – MAY 2009 Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. Ministry of Defence and Urban Development - Sri Lanka, p 19. Retrieved on 19 January 2014
  258. "Jordan confirms Tamil Tigers pirated ship: Reports crew members are safe". Colombo: Asian tribune. 24 December 2006. Retrieved 19 January 2014.
  259. Marine News.
  260. "Jordanian crew slam Tigers for piracy". Chennai, India: The Hindu. 26 December 2006. Archived from the original on 3 January 2007. Retrieved 13 February 2009.
  261. LTTE  : The Jihadi Connection. Jeremie Lanche. IPCS.
  262. Tamil Tiger Links with Islamist Terrorist Groups. Shanaka Jayasekara. 02/03/2008
  263. 1 2 Other people's wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada, p 46., John Thompson, The Mackenzie Institute.
  264. 1 2 "Human smuggling, most lucrative business for LTTE rump". Lanka Gazette. July 2011. Archived from the original on 28 March 2012. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  265. "Exposed: LTTE's Human Smuggling Ring". Sunday Leader. July 2011. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  266. Fong, Petti (August 2010). "3 months on the MV Sun Sea: Tamil migrants describe their journey". Toronto: The Star. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  267. "Failing the test: LTTE extortion continues unchecked". University Teachers for Human Rights. 30 April 2002. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  268. "LTTE extortion ring in Colombo bared". Asia Views. December 2010. Archived from the original on 29 September 2011. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  269. "How SL Tamil in Switzerland was coerced to finance the LTTE". Lanka Newspapers. January 2011. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  270. Money laundering and the financing of terrorism: 19th report of session 2008-09, Vol. 2: Evidence, retrieved on 18 January 2014.
  271. "Swiss authorities arrest LTTE members on money laundering". Switzerland: Anti Money Laundering Law. January 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
  272. ″LTTE in brief″, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development - Sri Lanka. p 7.
  273. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada,Sri Lanka: Alien Smuggling, 1 May 1996, accessed 2 February 2014.
  274. "Spanish-Thai forgery probe reveals new links to LTTE". Daily News and Analysis. December 2010. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  275. "Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism – a Dangerous Mix". United States Department of Justice. May 2003. Archived from the original on 29 November 2010. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  276. "LTTE fall will alter drug trade in India". Times of India. May 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  277. Fuard , Asif (30 March 2008). "Tiger paw in the credit card scam". The Sunday Times. Retrieved 9 July 2012.
  278. "SL High Commission bares LTTE links to clone credit card scam in UK". Ministry of Defense. April 2007. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  279. "Mastermind behind LTTE credit card fraud arrested". Ministry of Defense. June 2008. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  280. "LTTE credit card crooks sent to jail in Norway". Asian Tribune. April 2007. Retrieved 30 July 2011.
  281. 1 2 Banerjee, Indrajit (2007). The internet and governance in Asia : a critical reader. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre. pp. 183–184. OCLC 820772336.
  282. , Bernadette H Schell, Thomas J. Holt (2011). Corporate Hacking and Technology-Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications. Hershey, PA: Business Science Reference. p. 175. OCLC 682621348.
  283. 1 2 Himma, Kenneth Einar (2007). Internet security : hacking, counterhacking, and society. Sudbury, Mass: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. p. 129. OCLC 69013085.
  284. Britz, Marjie (2012). Computer forensics and cyber crime : an introduction. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall. p. 92.
  285. Brian D. Loader, , Douglas Thomas (2000). Cybercrime: Security and Surveillance in the Information Age. London: Routledge. p. 233.
  286. Yvonne Jewkes, Majid Yar (2010). Handbook of Internet crime. Cullompton: Willan. p. 206. OCLC 303098099.

Further reading

  • Balasingham, Adele (2003). The Will to Freedom – An Inside View of Tamil Resistance (2 ed.). Fairmax Publishing Ltd. ISBN 1-903679-03-6. 
  • Balasingham, Anton (2004). War and Peace – Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers (1 ed.). Fairmax Publishing Ltd. ISBN 1-903679-05-2. 
  • De Votta, Neil (2004). Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-4924-8. 
  • Gamage, Siri; Watson, I. B. (1999). Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka – 'Pearl of the East' or 'Island of Tears'?. SAGE Publications. ISBN 0-7619-9393-2. 
  • Gunaratna, Rohan (1998). Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security (1 ed.). South Asian Network on Conflict Research. ISBN 955-8093-00-9. 
  • Gunaratna, Rohan (1987). War and Peace in Sri Lanka: With a Post-Accord Report From Jaffna (1 ed.). Institute of Fundamental Studies. ISBN 978-955-26-0001-2. 
  • Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar (1994). The Tamil Tigers:armed struggle for identity. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-3-515-06530-6. 
  • La, J (September 2004). "Forced remittances in Canada's Tamil enclaves". Peace review 16:3: 379–385. ISBN 978-3-515-06530-6. 
  • Mehta, Raj (2010). Lost Victory: The Rise & Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran (1 ed.). Pentagon Press. ISBN 81-8274-443-1. 
  • Pratap, Anita (2001). Island of Blood: Frontline Reports From Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Other South Asian Flashpoints. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-302906-9. 
  • Swamy, M.R. Narayan (2003). Inside an Elusive Mind Prabhakaran: The First Profile of the Worlds Most Ruthless Guerrilla Leader (1 ed.). Literate World, Inc. ISBN 978-81-220-0657-5. 
  • Swamy, M. R. Narayan (2010). The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE's Story (1 ed.). Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. ISBN 978-81-321-0459-9. 
  • Swamy, M. R. Narayan (2002). Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas (2 ed.). Konark Publishers. ISBN 81-220-0631-0. 
  • Chellamuthu Kuppusamy (2009). Prabhakaran – The Story of his struggle for Eelam. New Horizon Media Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-81-8493-168-6. Archived from the original on 17 November 2012. 
  • Chellamuthu Kuppusamy (2008). பிரபாகரன்: ஒரு வாழ்க்கை. New Horizon Media Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-81-8493-039-9. Archived from the original on 26 December 2012. 

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
LTTE web sites
Sri Lanka Government
International organisations
International press
This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 12/4/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.